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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
“Why do they hate us?” President George W. Bush’s question in his address to the Congress 
on 20 September 2001 reflected the broad post-9/11 discourse of shock and incomprehension. 
Accompanied by a reinvigoration of public diplomacy to counter the hostility against the US, 
particularly in Arab and Muslim countries, the phrase has in international media become a 
symbol of American ignorance. Critical proclamations such as the ironic suggestion that “it’s 
not the policy that’s the problem, it’s just that we’re misunderstood” have branded public 
diplomacy as an arrogant strategy for manipulating foreign audiences. 
Out in the field and behind the desks of the US State Department (SD), public 
diplomats face a different reality. Throughout the world, and particularly in Muslim countries, 
the US’ image is deteriorating. The declining popularity of the US abroad, particularly 
following the war on terrorism, causes considerable concern about American soft power in 
general and security in particular. In public diplomacy circles, there is a belief that public 
diplomacy has the potential to help win the war on terrorism, by reaching out to people who 
potentially could be influenced by, and inclined to fund, terrorists. However, frustration is 
breeding among SD public diplomats who feel that their work is being counteracted by 
another enemy: The US Department of Defense. 
 Because the war on terrorism has caused a major concern about ‘hearts and minds’, 
the Department of Defense (DoD) has become increasingly involved in the issue. This has led 
to a bureaucratic struggle between the SD and the DoD, through which tasks have been 
shifted and practices have been changed. Public diplomacy has a long tradition from the Cold 
War, and practitioners have through various debates and practices developed strong norms 
and ideas about its purpose and target. I will in this thesis analyse how the entrance of the 
DoD as a perpetrator in this game has changed the public diplomacy discourse since 9/11, in a 
geopolitical perspective. 
The geographical dimensions of public diplomacy are a rather unexplored field in 
academia, although the practice is fundamentally geopolitical. It represents a tool for 
influencing strategic audiences in foreign audiences to counter a perceived geopolitical threat. 
In this thesis, I will analyse how the representation of the geopolitical threat direct different 
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approaches to public diplomacy, and how this practice has developed since the early days of 
the war on terrorism.  
1.1 Research Question 
The main research question of this thesis is “what is the geopolitical rationale of American 
public diplomacy in the war on terrorism era?” A ‘geopolitical rationale’ is a theoretical 
concept that refers to spatial-political networks of power embedded in reasoning and 
practices. Implicitly, this means that the thesis adopts a constructivist perspective, which sees 
the world as made up of socially constructed phenomena. The analytical strategy employed is 
a discourse analysis with emphasis on the impact of competing discourses on each other and 
their underlying geopolitical premises. 
To explain the geopolitical rationale of public diplomacy, I have differentiated the 
concept into three interconnected aspects. The first aspect concerns the display of geopolitical 
representations in public diplomacy activities. As a means of strategic communication, public 
diplomacy addresses potential threats to and opportunities for the US. Messages developed in 
this discourse, such as different representations of anti-Americanism, give insight in 
perceptions of geopolitical power structures embedded in the public diplomacy culture. The 
second aspect relates to how these representations are manifested in public diplomacy efforts. 
As the analysis will show, different approaches, often advocated by different institutions, are 
engaged in a discursive struggle about the rationale of public diplomacy. Much of the 
confusion and contradictory practices of public diplomacy can be attributed to the fact that 
diverging geopolitical representations guide the different approaches. This also relates to the 
third aspect, which is the output of the discursive struggle, or how these discourses affect each 
other and the development of public diplomacy in the war on terrorism era. Because the 
research questions are closely linked to the analytical approach and theoretical framework, 
they will be further explained and operationalised in chapter three and four.  
1.2 The structure of the thesis 
The next chapter outlines the context in which the notions, debates and practices discussed in 
this thesis have emerged. Some of the central concepts of the thesis are highly ambiguous, 
including core notions such as ‘public diplomacy’ and the ‘war on terrorism’. The notion of 
‘public diplomacy’ will be addressed through an outline of the variety of approaches to what 
public diplomacy is, how it relates to other kinds of strategic communication, and who the 
involved actors are. The ambiguities of the concept and practice of the ‘war on terrorism’ will 
also be dealt with here. Finally, the power structure in which public diplomacy is embedded in 
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the war on terrorism will be addressed, and what kind of power resource the practice 
constitutes. 
 Chapter three outlines the theoretical framework of this thesis, which comprises two 
compound sets of discourse theory and geopolitical theory. The discourse theory and the 
geopolitical framework respectively constitute two levels of the analytical strategy: the 
strategy employed to find meaning and the specific kind of meaning that will be analysed. In 
the end of the chapter, the research question is theoretically operationalised. 
Chapter four discusses the philosophical assumptions and analytical strategy of the 
thesis. A particular concern is how the choices of theories, analytical strategies, research 
questions and empirical data have affected the direction of the research process and hence the 
findings and conclusions. The chapter also deals with the motivation and analytical 
demarcation of the research question.  
Chapter five, six and seven constitute the analysis and answer to the research question. 
In Chapter five, the debates and practices through which public diplomacy has developed in 
the war on terrorism era are analysed. The chapter starts with how different approaches to 
public diplomacy construe the geopolitical threat anti-Americanism, and discusses how this 
premise forms the guidelines for different institutions to engage in public diplomacy. These 
guidelines, or “rules”, concern what methods and messages are considered appropriate for 
countering the geopolitical threat. The chapter further analyses the impact the diverging 
discourses have on each other and on the general practice and development of public 
diplomacy. 
Chapter six analyses a case, the public diplomacy advertising campaign Shared Values 
Initiative (SVI) from 2002. The campaign was an initiative of the State Department to engage 
in dialogue with audiences in Muslim countries as an attempt to counter the idea that the war 
on terrorism is a war on Muslims. Central to the analysis here is how the campaign 
communicates geopolitical visions, particularly in how it represents the relationship between 
Americans and Muslims, and the campaign’s standing among public diplomats.  
Chapter seven concludes the analytical findings of the thesis. Finally, three appendices 
are attached: a list of informants, the project proposal sent to the interviewees, and a 
transcription of the SVI campaign. 
 10 
2  CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The term ‘public diplomacy’ was first used in 1965 with the establishment of the Edward R. 
Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy. Until then, the concept was known as ‘propaganda’1, 
for which the term public diplomacy originated as a euphemism. However, this definition is 
somewhat dated, as the current trend of public diplomacy involves much more and sensitive 
practitioners reject the use of propaganda in favour of cross-cultural learning and dialogue.  
Since the beginning of the Cold War, public diplomacy has been a central tool for promoting 
the US and American interests abroad. Following the terrorist attacks on World Trade Center 
and Pentagon on 11 September 2001 (9/11), public diplomacy has been reinvigorated as an 
integrated strategy of the war on terrorism. 
 In this chapter, I will discuss the context in which the notions, debates and practices 
discussed in this thesis have emerged. A central notion is ‘public diplomacy’, whose very 
definition is a matter of substantial debate. I will discuss the variety of approaches to what 
public diplomacy is, how it relates to other kinds of strategic communication, and who the 
involved actors are. Another central notion is the ‘war on terrorism’, which involves 
ambiguities both as a concept and in practice. Finally, I will discuss what kind of power 
resource public diplomacy constitutes, and the power structure in which it is embedded in the 
war on terrorism.  
2.1 What Is Public Diplomacy? 
Many efforts have been made to define public diplomacy, often with different ideological 
implications and strong preferences involved. Because public diplomacy is a field of 
controversy, questions about the concept’s definition, ethics and effectiveness have been 
substantially debated. Different public diplomats advocate a variety of approaches as the real 
public diplomacy, distinguished from bad or quasi-public diplomacy. Because the notion 
tends to be used changeably, I will define public diplomacy broadly in this thesis, and discuss 
the variety of approaches to what public diplomacy is and what it is not.   
 While traditional diplomacy is communicated between national governments, public 
diplomacy is directed towards foreign publics. A common definition singles out the national 
                                                
1 http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm 
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government as the perpetrator, such as that of the Dictionary of International Relations Terms: 
“Public diplomacy refers to government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence 
public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, 
cultural exchanges, radio and television” (U.S. Department of State, 1987, 85). According to 
this definition, ‘public diplomacy’ labels government-sponsored activities with a certain 
intention. Other activities that can be included in this kind of definition are educational 
exchanges like the Fulbright programme; embassy press briefings; official websites in local 
languages; sports diplomacy, and to some extent international aid programmes like US 
Agency for International Development (USAID); Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), 
and National Endowment for Democracy (NED). However, many of these efforts have 
multifaceted intentions and are not specifically designed as public diplomacy.  
 According to some definitions, the role of the government is downplayed to highlight 
the increasing involvement of informal actors in activities with the same intentions and 
instruments. US Information Agency (USIA), the main coordinator of public diplomacy 
programs until it was abolished in 1999, used the following definition:  
 
Public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest and the national security of the 
United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign publics and 
broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts 
abroad.2 
 
This definition does not suggest any specific agent, but it is similar to the former in the sense 
that it places the emphasis on the intention.  
 It is frequently argued that the ultimate objective of public diplomacy is to improve 
the public opinion, or “move the needle” (Djerejian 2003). According to this approach, public 
diplomacy is not simply about delivering a message; it is about getting a result (Leonard 
2002). Rather than focusing on its intention, this approach emphasises the function of public 
diplomacy as a strategic and tactical tool. When focusing on its ability to improve a public 
opinion, what becomes apparent is that public diplomacy has reactive, tactical and strategic 
dimensions with different time frames and different impact.  
 Foreign policy actions and formulations have according to this approach a short-term 
impact, because it gives an immediate response. Government sponsored communications 
(such as radio, television, websites and publications) have a cumulative medium-term impact 
of creating understanding, appreciation or acceptance of American culture and foreign policy. 
                                                
2 http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm 
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Long-term investments such as educational and cultural exchanges can have an impact over 
time: the people involved can become local “ambassadors” for the US in their respective 
countries. A prime target for Fulbright exchanges, for example, is elite students, or “future 
state leaders”, which prospectively can have an impact on their respective countries’ foreign 
policies.  
 What the influence entails, however, is not always clear, and is utterly hard to 
measure. A historical parallel is Cold War public diplomacy, which demonstrates the 
historical success of the concept. Throughout the Cold War, institutions such as USIA and 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were central in executing what in the CIA was known as 
the “Marshall plan for the mind” (Saunders 2001). The success of the concept in Europe 
during the Cold War is indisputable: Public diplomacy was central for building an image of 
the US as a leader despite its (in Western Europe) disrespected “cowboy” reputation; creating 
the mythology of America, capitalism and consumerism; establishing emotional ties and 
loyalty to the US and American companies; and normalising American perspectives, 
archetypes and communication norms (Saunders 2001). Among public diplomacy people, 
there is a broad agreement that public diplomacy helped win the Cold War, both by serving as 
a Trojan horse in Communist societies and by attracting allies in Western Europe. The 
attraction relates to a core notion in the vocabulary of public diplomacy, ‘hearts and minds’. 
This notion describes well what the influence of public diplomacy entails: it relates not only 
to people’s opinions, but also to their sentiment through which opinions often are formed. In 
other words, the influence of public diplomacy is complex, often indirect and sometimes 
imperceptible. 
 Finally, public diplomacy is sometimes also defined through its effect, which to a less 
extent takes the perpetrator, means or strategic intention into account. A State Department 
official argued that, “Everything we do has a public diplomacy component; everything we do 
has a weight in the public arena” (Fernandez, interview 28.2.2007). The most effective 
examples of public diplomacy lately, he argued, have been the prison camps Abu Ghraib and 
Guantanamo, because they contribute to consolidating a strong image of the US abroad, albeit 
unintended and negative. When public diplomacy is defined outside of its formal or 
intentional bounds, it also becomes apparent that other transnational communication can have 
the desired public diplomacy effect: “With YouTube etc., public diplomacy has expanded 
beyond states, and is increasingly something going on from publics to publics, building 
relationships between people” (Snow, interview 8.3.2007).  
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 The new information environment is currently a central concern for public diplomats. 
It has become increasingly difficult to control and influence media and compete for attention. 
In this context, when regarded independently of its previous successes, public diplomacy can 
appear somewhat desperate in the war on terrorism.  However, public diplomacy has received 
increased attention in the previous years, and an increasing number of countries have started 
to engage in equivalent activities.   
 Public diplomacy is a floating term used differently by each speaker and often variably 
throughout a conversation. The different approaches to and definitions of public diplomacy 
range from focusing on its intention, through its function to the effect. These are not mutually 
excluding, but have a differing focus. Elements that are incorporated in the diverging 
approaches can be sorted accordingly: 
 
 
 
    Figure 2.1: Public diplomacy: The range of definitions 
 
As the figure shows, the elements are often overlapping, though they have a different 
implication for each approach. Where the intention-approach defines public diplomacy 
through its perpetrator or its means for accomplishing its purpose, the function-approach 
emphasizes the link between the intention and strategic impact. The effect-approach is less 
typical and includes unintended expressions in its definition of public diplomacy. In this 
thesis, I will define the concept broadly, but in accordance with the research question; I will 
focus only on the rationale of formal, governmental public diplomacy, and not on its effect.  
2.1.1 Public Diplomacy as Strategic Communication   
Public diplomacy is often distinguished from or compared to strategic communication, public 
affairs, propaganda, psychological operations (psy-ops) and spin. These concepts can be 
structured in the following analytical subcategories, which by no means are exhaustive:  
Strategic communication 
Public affairs Public diplomacy Information Operations 
Spin 
 Propaganda Psy-ops 
 White, Grey, Black   
 Advertising, Public relations  
   Figure 2.2: Subcategories of strategic communication 
Perpetrator, Instruments, Strategic impact, Hearts and minds, Reputation, Cultural ties 
          
Intention   Function     Effect 
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Strategic communication originated as the military counterpart to public diplomacy, but has in 
the recent years become the coordinating principle of public diplomacy, public affairs and 
information operations.3 It emerged as a major focus for transformation of the Department of 
Defense (DoD) as a result of a 2004 Defense Science Board study. According to the study, 
strategic communication refers to 
 
“a variety of instruments used by governments for generations to understand global 
attitudes and cultures, engage in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions, 
advise policymakers, diplomats, and military leaders on the public opinion 
implications of policy choices, and influence attitudes and behavior through 
communications strategies” (Defense Science Board 2004, 11; emphasis in original).  
 
The purpose of strategic communication, according to the study, is to “help to shape context 
and build relationships that enhance the achievement of political, economic, and military 
objectives” (Ibid).  
 The US State Department formally distinguishes between public diplomacy and public 
affairs due to the US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (Public Law 402), 
popularly referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act. Public affairs refer to “the provision of 
information to the public, press and other institutions concerning the goals, policies and 
activities of the US government” (Jansen 2005, 52). The target audience can thus be domestic, 
while that of public diplomacy is foreign. Moreover, the Act also prohibits domestic 
distribution of information intended for foreign audiences. The intention of the formal 
division between public affairs and public diplomacy was to produce barriers against 
information control of national narratives, or in a more common formulation: to prohibit the 
government from propagandizing the American public. 
 Information operation (IO) is a term used by the DoD to include Psy-ops, Computer 
Network Operations, Electronic Warfare, Operational Security and Military Deception. Psy-
ops sometimes resemble public diplomacy: it refers to “military activities that use selected 
information and indicators to influence the attitudes and behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals in support of military and national security objectives” 
(Defense Science Board 13, 2004). A difference between psy-ops and public diplomacy is the 
formers uninhibited use of deception. 
 Spin is sometimes used in all kinds of strategic communication, and is a “coordinated 
strategy to minimize negative information and present in a favourable light a story that is 
                                                
3 The notion of strategic communication originated as a military term, but since it diffused into the corporate 
world relating to communication with a clear purpose, it has often been chiefly associated with the private sector. 
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damaging” (Jowett & O’Donnell 1999, 3). Different rules apply to the use of spin in public 
diplomacy and psy-ops, because public diplomacy usually operates within a longer time frame 
and hence needs to build credibility. The same rules apply to the respective strategies’ use of 
propaganda.  
 Governmental propaganda is a delicate issue in many countries, including the US. 
Propaganda can be defined as “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, 
manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve response that furthers the desired intent 
of the propagandist” (Jowett & O’Donnell 1999, 6). The leading propaganda scholars Jowett 
and O’Donnell further divide the concept in the subcategories white, black, and grey 
propaganda. White propaganda usually communicates accurate information, and the source is 
defined correctly. It attempts to “build credibility with the audience, for this could have 
usefulness at some point in the future” (Ibid, 12). Black propaganda spreads lies, fabrications 
and deceptions, and is credited to a false source. Grey propaganda is somewhere between 
white and black propaganda: “The source may or may not be correctly identified, and the 
accuracy of the information is uncertain” (Ibid, 15). It is sometimes argued that public 
diplomacy can be white or grey propaganda, but never black (Romarheim 2005). However, as 
the initial discussion indicates: this depends on the definition of public diplomacy and its 
purpose. Black propaganda is known to be undermining in the long term, but propaganda-
sensitive societies sometimes react negatively on white and grey propaganda as well. The 
association with propaganda is regarded as a problem for public diplomacy in general, 
because of its connotation to mind-control, deception and cultural imperialism. 
  Strategic communication, public affairs, information operations, psy-ops, spin and 
propaganda constitute the exterior against which public diplomacy often is defined. A final set 
of notions rarely associated with this conceptual package is two genres of public diplomacy: 
advertising and public relations. Although these can be seen as kinds of propaganda, they are 
often not perceived as such and hence their placement in the figure is somewhat problematic. 
The differences between advertising and public relations relate respectively to whether it is 
paid or free publicity, whether the source is known as an advertiser or goes through a third-
party source, whether it goes through the closed advertising sphere or the news media, and 
whether the message is framed for the target audience or the media. In some cases, public 
relations campaigns open for two-ways communications, contrary to advertising, and are 
perceived as more credible, even though the use of third party (‘deflective’) sources can be 
understood as grey propaganda. These two approaches have through their different advocators 
marked a shift in the public diplomacy discourse in the war on terrorism era.  
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2.1.2 Perpetrators of US Public Diplomacy  
Who the agents of public diplomacy are, is also a matter of how the concept is defined. In the 
broadest sense, anyone that, in one way or another, shapes the foreign public opinion about 
the US can be a public diplomat: American firms and tourists abroad, internationally 
broadcasted television shows, etc. When such unintended public diplomacy is defined out, a 
number of institutions remain. The private sector performs a large amount of activities that 
resemble public diplomacy, although the primary purpose usually is to strengthen the 
reputation of the firm rather than that of the US. Likewise, a number of governmental 
institutions such as Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, Department of Justice, 
etc. are a large source of information abroad. However, some institutions are designated to 
perform public diplomacy tasks with the specific purpose of improving the public opinion 
about the US abroad.  
 Until 1999, the main coordinating institution of public diplomacy was the US 
Information Agency (USIA). For the purpose of administrative streamlining and bringing 
public diplomacy closer to policy formulation, USIA was disbanded and its tasks split 
between the State Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). While BBG 
became independently responsible for all governmental and government sponsored, non-
military international broadcasting, exchange- and information programs were transferred to 
the SD. BBG is responsible for two of the most “attention-grabbing” efforts in the war on 
terrorism era, Radio Sawa (Together) from March 2002, and the satellite TV channel Al-
Hurra (The Free One) from early 2004. These still broadcast in the Middle East. 
 In the SD, public diplomacy is headed by the Under Secretary of State for Public 
Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and the tasks split between the Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs and the Bureau of International Information Programs. A third bureau, the 
Bureau of Public Affairs, coordinates strategic communication with bureaus throughout the 
SD, the White House, and other agencies dealing with foreign affairs, such as the Department 
of Defense (DoD). So far in the war on terrorism era, the position as Under Secretary has been 
occupied by three different persons, as visualised on the figure:  
 
 Charlotte Beers         Margaret D. Tutwiler   Karen Hughes 
 
2 October 2001– 28 March 2003,  16 December 2003–30 June 2004,  9 September 2005–31 October 2007 
Figure 2.3: Timeline of Public Diplomacy Chiefs at the SD 
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The first, Charlotte Beers, was sworn in on 2 October 2001, nine months after the 
inauguration of President George W. Bush. Foreign public opinion and public diplomacy 
were not high on the Bush administration’s agenda until the terrorist attacks on World Trade 
Center and Pentagon on 11 September 2001 (9/11), but the terror attacks made the US’ 
declining popularity abroad an emergency issue.  
 Beers is a former advertising executive and had worked with then Secretary of State 
Colin Powell on an earlier occasion. Although Beers’ methods were varied and incorporated 
elements from traditional public diplomacy, she became rather infamous for introducing 
advertising as a public diplomacy strategy. Her main project was the controversial Shared 
Value Initiative in 2002, which is undoubtedly the most debated public diplomacy effort in 
the war on terrorism era. Already in March 2003, she resigned and the position remained 
vacant until former ambassador to Morocco Margaret Tutwiler was sworn in on 16 December 
2003. Tutwiler only lasted in the position for six months and did not seem to bring about 
much change in the State Department. After she resigned in June 2004, the position was again 
left vacant for more than a year until President Bush’s former communication advisor Karen 
Hughes was appointed as the new Under Secretary in September 2005. Hughes is a public 
relations expert, and throughout her period until she resigned in October 2007, she focused on 
process issues in the public diplomacy structure and less controversial efforts. I will analyse 
the approaches of the respective Under Secretaries Charlotte Beers and Karen Hughes in 
chapter 5.  
 Public diplomacy has developed as a concept through decades, and produced a 
discourse shaped by traditions, norms and debates. Because some of the current public 
diplomats are new in the game and operate outside the traditional public diplomacy sphere, 
these are less affected by this discourse. Those who partake in the discourse, are practitioners 
in the field and in the SD, critics, bloggers, members of the USIA Alumni Association, etc., 
and in this thesis, they will be referred to as the ‘public diplomacy culture’.    
 In the recent years, the DoD has emerged as a public diplomacy perpetrator, 
particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, DoD established the Iraqi Media Network, which 
comprises Al Iraqiya television network, the Al Sabah newspaper, and a radio network. As 
previously mentioned, the Defense Science Board study of 2004 emphasised the importance 
of coordinating public diplomacy, public affairs and open international military information. 
This study has contributed to an increased involvement of the DoD in strategic 
communication.  
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 The DoD has also outsourced a number of public diplomacy- and other information 
activities to private communications agencies, such as the Rendon Group and the Lincoln 
Group. Rendon Group is a secretive public relations firm that has assisted a number of DoD 
and CIA operations. Its activities include organizing the Iraqi National Congress, a PR front 
group designed to encourage the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and it was central in the 
famous toppling of the Hussein statue on 9 April 2003.4 The Lincoln group, formerly known 
as Iraqex, was formed to pursue private sector opportunities in Iraq. According to their 
website, the Lincoln Group “brings a unique combination of expertise in collecting and 
exploiting information; structuring transactions; and mitigating risks through due diligence 
and legal strategies”.5 It is hired by the DoD to perform public relations, and has become 
known particularly for its practice of paying local journalists and editors for media coverage. 
 Finally, a number of public diplomacy perpetrators exist in the private sector, although 
companies usually focus mainly on their own competitiveness and only secondarily on that of 
the US. An exception is Business for Diplomatic Action, a non-profit task force that guides 
multinational companies on communication and perception issues. Their mission is to “enlist 
the U.S. business community in actions to improve the standing of America in the world with 
the goal of once again, seeing America admired as a global leader and respected as a courier 
of progress and prosperity for all people”.6   
 The variety of perpetrators of public diplomacy that have emerged in the war on 
terrorism era indicates a broad acknowledgement that foreign public opinion about the US has 
consequences for American economy and security. This increased focus also indicates that 
public diplomacy is perceived as a relevant tool in the war on terrorism, which is another 
central notion of this thesis. 
2.2 The ‘War on Terror(ism)’ 
On September 20th, 2001, President George W. Bush formally declared war on terror during 
an address to a joint session of congress and the American people by saying, “Our war on 
terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group 
of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (Bush, 20 September 2001). Since 
then, the notions ‘war on terror’ and ‘war on terrorism’ have been simultaneously widely 
established and criticized. The very notions are inherently problematic. I will here briefly 
discuss some problems with the notions and how the Bush administration has related to them.  
                                                
4 http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Rendon_Group#Afghanistan 
5 http://www.lincolngroup.com 
6 http://www.businessfordiplomaticaction.org/who/index.html 
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The ‘war on terrorism’ is frequently used as an umbrella term for actions taken as a 
reaction to 9/11, which the US was a major force but far from sole perpetrator of. It can also 
be regarded as a doctrine enabling various measures for a common objective, to contain a 
certain terrorist threat. The terms ‘war on terrorism’ and ‘war on terror’ have been used 
interchangeably by the Bush administration and others. The difference between the two terms 
seems in this context to be larger in theory than in practice. Terrorism, according to Louise 
Richardson, means “deliberately and violently targeting civilians for political purposes” 
(Richardson 2006, 20). Terror, on the other hand, is a broader term, referring variably to the 
feeling of intense fear and the person or situation causing it. But ‘terror’ is also British and 
American slang for terrorism. In practice, the Bush administration does not seem to make an 
actual difference between the two. The actions taken under the labels ‘war on terror(ism)’ 
relate to a specific kind of terrorism of global reach rather than terror or even terrorism in 
general, which means that both terms are too broad to accurately describe the designated 
doctrine and actions. A conceptual problem with the term ‘war on terror(ism)’ is its 
oxymoronic character, a source of much ridicule throughout the world. Terrorism is not a 
group, not an ideology, but a tactic. A war on a tactic, without a defined enemy, signifies no 
ending, and an endless undefined war is regarded by many as a state of terror.  
Many of the US’ actions against the terrorist threat have clear associations to war. The 
operations ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan and ‘Iraqi Freedom’ in Iraq fought under the 
label ‘war on terrorism’ have indeed been war operations. However, the American war on 
terrorism involves more than a war. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism from 
February 2003 states that, 
 
 “The struggle against international terrorism is different from any other war in our 
history. We will not triumph solely or even primarily through military might. We must 
fight terrorist networks, and all those who support their efforts to spread fear around 
the world, using every instrument of national power – diplomatic, economic, law 
enforcement, financial, information, intelligence, and military” (Bush 2003, 1). 
 
To succeed, according to the National Strategy (Bush 2003, 29), all the elements of national 
power must be utilised to confront four fronts. The overall strategy is to 
1. Defeat terrorists and their organizations of global reach through relentless 
action.  
2. Deny terrorists the sponsorship, support and sanctuary they need to survive.  
3. Win the war of ideas and diminish the underlying conditions that promote the 
despair and the destructive visions of political change that lead people to 
embrace, rather than shun, terrorism.  
4. Defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad.  
 20 
In other words, the war on terrorism involves much more than a war and cannot be understood 
only in the terms of a war. The third point is subject for this thesis.  
Since President George W. Bush started using the term ‘war on terror’ shortly after 
9/11, it has been target of much criticism. After Karen Hughes came into office in 2005, the 
Bush administration tried to change the slogan (Schmitt & Schanker 2005). Then Defence 
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld referred in his later speeches to ‘global struggle against violent 
extremism’ rather than ‘war on terror’ (Ibid). Since 2006, the slogan of choice in the Bush 
administration has been ‘the long war’. President George W. Bush himself first used the new 
name in his 2006 State of the Union speech: “Our own generation is in a long war against a 
determined enemy” (Bush, 31 January 2006). None of these phrases have established in the 
war on terrorism discourse. Despite of these efforts, the term ‘war on terror’ is still in 
widespread use. While the State Department uses the term ‘counterterrorism’ on its webpage, 
the Department of Defense is still using ‘war on terror’.   
 In this thesis, I will continue to use the term ‘war on terrorism’ despite of its 
inaccuracy, for two reasons. Firstly, the “war on terrorism” is the most established of the 
terms. Secondly, notions like the ‘long war’ refer to the military actions and hence are not 
wide enough a term for my purpose. It would make little sense to talk about the role of public 
diplomacy in ‘the long war’. The ‘war on terrorism’ is used as an umbrella term and refers to 
political and legal as well as military actions. It grasps the purpose of the struggle, to contain 
terrorism, which is the logical link between the other actions and public diplomacy. Before I 
turn to what kind of weapon public diplomacy constitutes in the war on terrorism, I will 
discuss the role of this practice in a broader power structure.   
2.3 The Power Structure of the War on Terrorism  
In the war on terrorism, public diplomacy is a part of a broader network of power. Joseph S. 
Nye Jr. (2004) describes the space for agency in international issues with the metaphor ‘three-
dimensional chess game of world politics’. In this game, one can win “only by playing 
vertically as well as horizontally” (Nye 2004, 4). The top of the board represents classic 
interstate military issues, where the United States is the only superpower with global military 
reach. At this level, the distribution of power can be understood in traditional terms of 
unipolarity or hegemony. The middle board represents interstate economic issues; and at this 
level, the distribution of power is multipolar and requires cooperation between different actors 
for desired outcomes to be obtained. The bottom board represents transnational issues like 
terrorism, international crime, climate change, and the spread of infectious diseases. At this 
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level, Nye argues, “power is widely distributed and chaotically organized among state and 
nonstate actors” (Nye 2004, 4). The new challenge of international terrorism affects the space 
for American power at each of the three levels. 
 Nye argues that the distribution of power resources in the information age varies 
greatly on different issues. Influence can be achieved in different ways: coercion with threats; 
payments; or attraction and co-optation of people’s preferences. The last means is what Nye 
calls soft power, a term he first coined in 1990 in the book Bound to Lead, when he disputed 
the idea that the American hegemony was in decline. Soft power is “the ability to get what 
you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye 2004, x). Attraction is a 
substantial power resource because it shapes the preferences of others. However, the effect of 
soft power is far less tangible than hard power, creating general influence rather than 
producing an easily observable specific action. The soft power of a country rests primarily on 
three resources that produce such attraction: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to 
others), its political values (when it lives up to it at home and abroad), and its foreign policies 
(when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye 2004, 11). Public 
diplomacy can be both a soft power resource and a tool for communicating attractive power. 
  The term ‘soft power’ does not relate consistently to the metaphorical chessboard. 
Nye categorizes power in three dimensions as ‘military, economic and soft’, but also stresses 
the ‘soft’ dimensions of military and economic issues. Hard and soft powers can sometimes 
reinforce each other, and sometimes interfere (Nye 2004, 25). Especially post-industrial 
democracies demand legitimacy of warfare, which affects the role of military power, and war 
affects the trust necessary for the flows of capital in a globalised economy. Likewise, issues 
like terrorism have economic and military aspects, but the success of these resources, for both 
terrorists and counterterrorist practices, depends on soft power.  
2.3.1 The Soft Power of Terrorism  
In the three-dimensional game, Nye argues, “you will lose if you focus only on one board and 
fail to notice the other boards and the vertical connections among them” (Nye 2004, 137). He 
exemplifies this with the military actions in the war on terrorism on the top board of the 
chessboard, which simultaneously on the bottom board increased the ability of the Al Qaeda 
network to recruit more members. The bottom board requires a different set of resources 
where military and economic resources are insufficient. This relates to Telhami’s (2002) 
distinction between the supply- and the demand sides of terrorism. Telhami argues that the US 
has pursued a ‘supply side-only’ approach by “regarding terrorism as the product of 
 22 
organized groups that could be confronted and destroyed, without regard to their aims or 
to the reasons that they succeed in recruiting many willing members” (Telhami 2002, 13). 
Targeting the demand side is equally important for the terrorism phenomenon to be contained, 
because suppliers will continue to arise to exploit the persistent demand.  
 The war on terrorism is not conducted against terrorists in general, but against a 
specific kind of terrorism with a global reach rooted in a radical Islamist movement. Muslims, 
however, have historically not been a group associated with terrorism. Due to their reputation 
of accepting problems as “God’s will”, Muslims have been regarded as a rather predictable 
and favourable business partner (Telhami 2002). Likewise, the United States was not 
very high on jihadis’ lists of targets throughout the Cold War and until mid-1990s. American 
foreign policy and political Islam rather aligned in a marriage of convenience to prevent the 
further expansion of Communism and radical secularism (Gerges 2005). Since 9/11, Gerges 
argues, relations between the United States and Islamists have been portrayed as having 
always been on a collision course and fated to a military clash (Ibid, 70). Because this idea 
has become established, it has guided several geopolitical practices under the label ‘war on 
terrorism’. Gerges argues that the Bush administration through rhetoric and actions has played 
into Al Qaeda’s hands by lashing out militarily against the ummah (the Muslim community 
worldwide).  
 The three-dimensional chess game is an appropriate metaphor also for Al Qaeda’s 
power resources: it depends on soft power for financial support and recruitment of warriors. 
Al Qaeda only represents a tiny minority among jihadis, jihadis only a tiny minority among 
Islamists, and because it is widely rejected by the ummah, the mobilizing potential is meagre. 
In order to mobilise support, Al Qaeda employed a strategy of winning the ‘hearts and minds’ 
of the ummah by portraying them in an alliance against a common enemy. They adopted the 
slogan of “liberating the ummah of its foreign enemies” and portrayed it “as a battle between 
Islam and kufr [impiety] and kufar [infidels]” (Gerges 2005, 26, brackets in original). The 
9/11 attacks were according to Fawaz Gerges an act of desperation that aimed to save the 
crippling jihadist movement by precipitating a ‘clash of civilizations’ with the West that 
would bring the ummah into the battle on the jihadist side. When measured by this standard, 
the 9/11 attacks were an utter failure: Islamic opinion after the 9/11 attacks was almost 
universally critical of Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Nevertheless, the ‘clash’-discourse has 
been mirrored by the West, and is a source of the discursive struggle about public diplomacy 
in the war on terrorism. As I will discuss in part 2 of this thesis, there is a concern that the 
representations of natural enemies and clash of civilizations have both increased the terror 
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threat and contributed to the general decline of American soft power. An aspiration of 
American public diplomacy efforts has been to deconstruct the representation of enemies and 
reconstruct new alliances. This aspiration has culminated in a variety of expressions.  
2.3.2 Public Diplomacy against Terrorism   
A source of much ridicule in international press since 9/11 is the idea that public diplomacy is 
supposed to “fix it all”, often expressed as “to know us is to love us”, or that simple 
persuasive efforts are supposed to turn terrorists into friends. However, there does not seem to 
be a customary belief in public diplomacy circles that the threat of terrorism can solely be 
countered with public diplomacy. It is rather regarded as a tool for (re-)framing the image of 
the US’ culture and policy that together with other actions can turn the unfavourable public 
opinion. Much frustration in public diplomacy circles is vented towards military and political 
actions in the war on terrorism that are perceived to interfere with rather than reinforce 
American soft power. 
 The target audience of public diplomacy in the war on terrorism is not the terrorists, 
but the people they might influence. In order to succeed, terrorist organisations need to 
recruit willing members, raise funds, and appeal to public opinion in pursuit of their political 
objectives. Public diplomacy efforts are designed to reach the same public opinion ahead of a 
potential radicalisation, and create an understanding or acceptance for the American point of 
view. But even though 9/11 was the catalyst that brought public diplomacy back on the 
agenda, only a small amount of public diplomacy efforts in the war on terrorism era have been 
specifically designated to counter terrorism, and those who are, usually have a broader 
purpose.   
 A rare example of a public diplomacy effort directly targeted to counter terrorism is 
Charlotte Beers’ 2001 revival of the SD communication program Rewards for Justice, which 
started running already in 1984. The program includes a website (www.rewardsforjustice.net), 
posters and leaflets. Prior to Beers’ involvement, Rewards for Justice looked like Wanted-
posters, featuring mug shots of terrorists with biographical data and information about how to 
call in tips and collect awards. Beers recommended that the campaign should be directed 
towards those who are most likely to have information about terrorists and turn them in, 
which according to her panel of counter-terrorist experts were women. Based on that 
recommendation, the posters were replaced with subtle ads that should appeal to the desire for 
safety, such as one ad featuring the headline “Can a woman stop terrorism?” (Fullerton and 
 24 
Kendrick 2006, 82). This campaign is an overt attempt to make an alliance with Muslim 
women against terrorists. 
 Most public diplomacy efforts, however, are more indirectly targeted to countering 
terrorism. The Shared Values Initiative (SVI), which will be analysed in chapter 6, is an 
example of such. It aims to reach out to the critical middle by claiming that Muslims and 
Americans live in peaceful coexistence, but does not explicitly state that it is an effort against 
terrorism.  
2.4 Summary 
This thesis rests upon several ambiguous concepts, including core notions such as ‘public 
diplomacy’ and the ‘war on terrorism’. Public diplomacy has many competing definitions, 
which I have sorted on a continuum from its intention, through its function to its effect. The 
concept is often defined in relation or negation to traditional diplomacy on the one hand, and 
strategic communication, public affairs, psy-ops, propaganda and spin on the other. Various 
agents perform public diplomacy tasks, of which a few are specially designated to improve 
the public opinion of strategic audiences in the war on terrorism: The SD, BBG and DoD. In 
addition, the DoD has outsourced some public diplomacy tasks to private communications 
agencies, and businesses are becoming increasingly involved in similar activities. Public 
diplomacy has become reinvigorated as a coordinated strategy in the war on terrorism. Its role 
in this strategy is to enhance the soft power of the US and win the hearts and minds of the 
critical middle that potentially could be persuaded by terrorist motives. Most public 
diplomacy efforts, however, are designed with compound intentions and do not explicate their 
role in the war on terrorism. 
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3  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
The analytical purpose of this thesis is to find out how geopolitical reasoning direct public 
diplomacy practices and messages in the war on terrorism era. Such an analysis is about how 
meaning is produced, reproduced and changed, and not to assess the legitimacy or truthfulness 
of any claims of reality. Discourse analysis is suited for this purpose because it seeks to find 
the systems through which the world appears as meaningful to subjects. This thesis draws 
from the terms and concepts from different discourse theories. A moot point among discourse 
theorists relates to whether different approaches with diverging methodological foundations 
can be mixed. I follow Jørgensen and Phillips’ (1999) stance on this issue: different 
approaches can profitably be combined according to the subject matter, because it enables the 
analysis to grasp different aspects of a discourse.  
As the aim is to find a specific kind of meaning, a geopolitical rationale, the discourse 
analysis is supplied with Security analysis and geopolitical theory. The discourse theory and 
the geopolitical framework constitute the two levels of the analytical strategy: respectively the 
strategy employed to find meaning and the specific kind of meaning that will be analysed. 
Although the Security analysis is something between these categories, it will be incorporated 
in the discourse theory due to its function in the theoretical framework.  
 The structure of this chapter is as follows: First, I will present the discourse theory, 
then the geopolitical framework, and finally, I will theoretically operationalise the research 
question based on the discussed theory.   
3.1 Discourse Theoretical Framework 
In the first part of the theory chapter, I will outline a framework for explaining how meaning 
is produced and changed through exchanges of different discourses. The theoretical 
framework draws from as different scholars as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985; 
2001), Norman Fairclough (2003), Katherine R. Young (1987), Mikhail Bakhtin [1963] and 
the Copenhagen School of Security analysis (Buzan et al, 1998). The theoretical aspiration is 
to compose a framework that can explain different levels of discourses, from implicit 
representations to hierarchies between discourses. I will discuss how production of meaning 
occurs; how different discourses influence each other; how discourses are limited and 
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changed; and finally, how the rules of the discourse depend on how political issues are 
framed. In order to outline a coherent theoretical framework, I will theoretically “translate” 
some concepts.  
3.1.1 The Social Production of Meaning  
Laclau and Mouffes’ discourse theory builds on an understanding of language that derives 
from structuralism, post-structuralism and structural Marxism. The theory comprises 
epistemological and ontological reflections as well as a toolbox of notions that can be used for 
discourse analysis. To begin at an abstract level, the theory explains how the social production 
of meaning occurs.  
Laclau and Mouffe combine the Gramscian theory of hegemony with semiotic terms 
to explain how discourses arise. In abstract terms, the discourse is established when meaning 
crystallises around certain nodal points (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, xi). Nodal points are 
floating signifiers, which means they have different meanings in other discourses. These 
signifiers have no predetermined meaning: they attain their meaning in co-articulation with 
other signs. Depending on the discourse, an articulation constructs the relation between signs, 
which are categorised with the semiotic terms moments and elements. A moment is a sign (a 
word, phrase, practice, etc.) with a fixed meaning in the discourse, while an element has an 
undetermined meaning. At some level, every articulation in a discourse tries to turn elements 
into moments, or in other words, to define something: to distinguish what it is from what it is 
not (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). Because all articulations continuously challenge or reproduce 
discourses, discourses are constantly changing. The understanding of meaning to the 
Structuralist tradition can be explained with an allegory of a fishnet (Jørgensen and Philips 
1999). In the fishnet all the signs can be understood as nodes, which attain meaning by being 
different from each other and localised on specific places of the net. Laclau and Mouffe 
follow Jacques Derrida’s critique of this allegory. Derrida, followed by the Post-Structuralist 
tradition, acknowledged that the signs attain meaning through their reciprocal difference, but 
in a different sense than to the Structuralist tradition. In practice, signs are placed in varying 
relations to each other (‘differential positions’), and thereby, attain different connotations. In 
Laclau and Mouffes’ discourse theory, the social production of meaning is about fixing the 
floating signifiers, as if there was an objective fishnet structure (Jørgensen and Philips 1999, 
35).  
All other possible meanings that the discourse excludes constitute what Laclau and 
Mouffe call the field of discursivity. Because a sign attains meaning from other signs, it 
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excludes other meanings. In cases where it does not attain meaning from its difference from 
other signs, but stands unchallenged as the only signifier, Laclau and Mouffe call it a 
hegemonic discourse. A hegemonic discourse consists of elements that are made into 
moments by a discursive closure. In practice, this means that a discourse is perceived to be 
objective. But in the terms of the discourse theory, hegemony is impossible in the end, 
because all determinacy of meaning is contingent: possible, but not necessary (Jørgensen and 
Philips 1999, 61). The overall aim of Laclau and Mouffes discourse analysis is to map 
discursive struggle: the processes in which the fixation of meaning is negotiated, and where 
meaning becomes so conventionalised that we perceive it as natural (Laclau and Mouffe 
2001). An articulation actively formed to intervene in the discursive struggle against a 
perceived hegemonic or dominating discourse will in this thesis be called a counter discourse. 
 Because the discourse theory explains only what is given meaning and distinguishes 
sharply between discourse and the field of discursivity, it offers no notions about how 
discourses are influenced by excluded discourses. Sentiment or attitudes towards a discourse 
cannot be explained by the discourse analysis unless they are expressed in another discourse. 
To explain the relation between discourses, I will supply the theoretical framework with 
perspectives from Bakhtin and Young. 
3.1.2 Relational Discourses 
Discourses can be analysed on many levels. Polyphony is Greek for “many voices” and in 
Bakhtin’s concept it refers to the existence of many discourses in one and the same. What is 
characteristic for polyphonic articulations is their double focus: they focus at the same time on 
its own content as some other discursive context. Bakhtin distinguishes between three kinds 
of polyphonic articulations. The first kind is about imitation: articulations that imitate or copy 
the style of previous articulations. For the second kind, parody is typical. In parody, two 
intentions collide and the new voice forces the first to serve other purposes than intended. 
Common for these two polyphonic articulations is the passive role of the other voice: it is 
defenceless in somebody else’s discourse. In the third kind, there is an active connection 
between the discourses. It comprises all kinds of articulations that are affected by the 
awareness of other’s discourse. The other’s discourse is not reproduced, but it affects the 
discourse of the speaker while it stays outside its boundaries (Børtnes 1999)7. Bakhtin’s 
notion of polyphony gives a more substantial insight in parallel discourses than Laclau and 
Mouffes’ notion of the field of discursivity does, because it takes into account that a discourse 
                                                
7 http://www.hum.au.dk/romansk/polyfoni/Tribune9/borstnestrib.htm 
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can be included and excluded at the same time. Polyphony admits to the influence of excluded 
discourses, even when they only exist in the awareness of the speaker without being 
articulated.   
 Young (1987) draws from a phenomenological perspective and writes about told 
stories, or more specific, about the Brits’ telling of good stories, but some of her notions are 
useful also for analysing the relationship between discourses and meta- or counter discourses. 
She draws a boundary between the Storyrealm and the Taleworld to emphasize the impact of 
context for every story. This boundary locates the literal or physical border between 
discourses. In the Taleworld, the tale that is told, persons and events follow their own 
ontological conventions. The Storyrealm is where the tale is told and framed.  
 
Storyrealm Taleworld 
The storyteller and the audience The tale  
 Figure 3.1: The Boundary Between Discourses 
 
Two points should here be made. Firstly, similarity or contiguity between realms allows 
meaning to leak from one context to another. For instance, Young writes, the “meaning” of a 
dream can be interpreted by a linguistic integration into the order of everyday. The dream 
now becomes meaningful in terms of everyday life rather than of its own terms (Young 1987, 
11). This point can be made about any tale: it’s meaning is understood in terms of the 
Storyrealm wherein it is articulated. Secondly, the way the tale is framed in the Storyrealm 
affects the status of or attitude toward either the Taleworld or the Storyrealm. The status of 
one, Young argues, “bears on but does not fix the status of the other” (Ibid, 22). When a 
storyteller frames the conceptual limits between realms, the meaning as well as the framed 
status transferred from one realm to another needs inter-realm resonance. Or simpler put, in 
the context of this thesis: In order for a tale to be credible, it must be framed in accordance 
with perceptions that already exist in the Storyrealm. 
 
Storyrealm Taleworld 
Affects the meaning of and attitudes towards 
the tale  
Affects the attitudes towards the storyteller 
and her framing of the tale 
   Figure 3.2: How Meaning and Attitudes Leak between Realms 
 
A methodological problem with the notions of Taleworld and Storyrealm is that these realms 
are relationally dependent yet not mutually excluding. It is useful to see these realms 
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metaphorically as Matrjosjka-puppets: One and the same story can be the mother of one tale 
and the child of another. However, the level upon which the notions are used should be clear 
from the context. 
 In the forthcoming analysis, I will incorporate Bakhtin, Young, and Laclau and 
Mouffes’ theories into a coherent framework to find relations and boundaries between 
discourses through polyphony and negation. This analytical strategy will reveal how certain 
tales guide the Storyrealm of various discourses that are involved in a discursive struggle. 
How the discursive struggle unfolds will be explained by Fairclough’s concept of ‘order of 
discourse’.  
3.1.3 The Struggle for Discursive Hegemony 
The ‘order of discourse’ is a “particular combination or configuration of genres, discourses 
and styles, which constitutes the discoursal aspect of a network of social practices”8 
(Fairclough 2003, 220). It can be described as a social field of discursive conflict, and can on 
a certain level explain how discursive struggle and hegemony occur: all genres and discourses 
of a communicative action compete for authority on a subject matter (Jørgensen and Philips 
1999). Fairclough describes the relationship between a communicative action and the order of 
discourse, as dialectic (Ibid, 83). The discourses and genres of an order of discourse constitute 
the resources available within that order of discourse, which limits the premises of the 
discourse. Simultaneously, the speaker can change the order of discourse by drawing on 
discourses or genres from other orders of discourse. Articulation of different discourses within 
and across different orders of discourse witnesses what Fairclough calls interdiscursivity, 
which moves the borders within and between orders of discourse. Interdiscursivity is a form 
of intertextuality, which refers to the influence of history on a text and the influence of a text 
on the history: every text draws from previous texts and contributes to the historical 
development of texts. Intertextuality has in principle the same function as Laclau and 
Mouffes’ notion articulation, in the sense that it draws on existing patterns to form new ones 
(Jørgensen and Philips 1999, 145).    
 Different discourses draw on the intertextual history of the discourse and communicate 
through different genres. “The genres associated with a particular network of social practices 
constitute a potential which is variably drawn upon in actual texts and interactions” 
(Fairclough 2003, 69; emphasis in original). Fairclough distinguishes between three different 
                                                
8 Fairclough separates between discourses and social practices in a different way than I will in this thesis, which 
I will come back to in chapter 4.  
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subcategories of genres, ‘pre-genre’, ‘disembedded genre’ and ‘situated genre’. He uses ‘pre-
genre’ for “the most abstract categories like Narrative, ‘disembedded genre’ for somewhat 
less abstract categories like Interview, ‘situated genre’ for genres which are specific to 
particular networks of practices such as ‘ethnographic interview’” (Ibid). This differentiation 
is useful also for my purpose, but because this thesis is about other kinds of genres, I will use 
these terms differently. Linked to the geopolitical framework that will be discussed shortly; 
popular, formal and practical geopolitics can be regarded as pre-genres with dissimilar 
potentials. In this context, public diplomacy can belong to a disembedded genre and public 
relations, advertising and propaganda to a situated genre.  
 
Subcategories Concept 
Pre-genre Popular, formal and practical geopolitics 
Disembedded genre Public diplomacy 
Situated genre Propaganda, public relations, advertising, etc. 
      Figure 3.3: Subcategories of Genres 
 
Which genre a discourse is identified with, greatly affects the rules and conception of the 
discourse. In an order of discourse, different discourses have diverging opportunities to use 
the same genres. For instance, it is far more controversial for a government to employ the 
propaganda genre than any actor in the private sector, because their activities are situated in 
different games of power. What is considered as controversial or conventional in the 
discourse is produced by the genre and the intertextual history of the discourse, and for the 
same reason; this is subject to change.  
 A main aspiration of Fairclough’s theory is to map societal change, of which 
discursive change is an expression. Fairclough sees the main tendency in the neo-liberal 
‘marketization-discourse’ that has diffused into most aspects of daily life, particularly where 
the welfare-discourse previously dominated (Fairclough 1992; 1998). Several examples of 
contemporary societal organisation and reorganisation can demonstrate Fairclough’s point. 
However, in some social areas neo-liberalism seems to be in retreat. According to Anderson 
(2004), neo-liberalism has since 9/11 been giving way to neo-conservativism, with increased 
focus on the state, state borders, security and military power. The discussion about public 
diplomacy in the war on terrorism era in part 2 will exemplify how the marketization 
discourse in some ways has weakened its position and given way to a security imperative. 
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 The theoretical concept of ‘order of discourse’ will be a structuring foundation of the 
forthcoming analysis, combined in a particular way with the Security analysis of the 
Copenhagen school of security studies.  
3.1.4 Framework for a Differentiated Security-‘Order of Discourse’-Analysis  
The Copenhagen School is a school of thought with origins in international relations that 
places particular emphasis upon the social aspects of security. The concept of securitization is 
central: It is argued that ‘security’ is a speech act with distinct consequences in international 
politics. By “talking” security an actor tries to move a topic away from politics and into an 
area of security in order to justify extraordinary means. The speech act “security” is a matter 
of framing a political issue as a matter of security, rather than speaking the word. 
Securitization is studied by its effect: an issue is securitized when the audience tolerates 
violations of rules that otherwise would have to be obeyed. Presenting something as a security 
threat is a securitizing move, but an issue is successfully securitized only when the audience 
accepts it as such. 
 According to the theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from 
nonpoliticized through politicized to securitized. An issue is nonpoliticized when it is not 
dealt with by the state or made an issue of public debate; politicized when it is part of public 
policy and requires government decision and resource allocations, and securitized when it is 
presented as an existential threat that requires emergency measures. Securitization is a more 
extreme version of politicization because it “takes politics beyond the established rules of the 
game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al 
1998, 23).    
 Although securitization is an intensification of politicization in the sense that it 
strengthens the role of the state, the implications can be the exact opposite. The substantial 
difference between politicization and securitization is how an issue is regarded: “Politicization 
means to make an issue appear to be open, a matter of choice, something that is decided upon 
and that therefore entails responsibility” (Ibid, 29). Securitization means to present an issue 
as urgent and existential, important enough to legitimize secrecy and disregard for democratic 
rules. In national politics, existential threats are traditionally defined in terms of the 
constituting principle of sovereignty or against the ideology of the state (Ibid). International 
regimes can be existentially threatened by situations that undermine their constituting rules, 
norms, and institutions. I will come back to the social construction of threats later in this 
chapter. 
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 The Security analysis specifically describes the self-legitimising function of security, 
although other kinds of framing also have the effect of moving the responsibility for and 
control over an issue away from politics into spheres where democratic rules do not apply. 
Such frames, which in accordance with the theory can be labelled ‘non-politicized’, justify the 
shift of control over an issue to experts, religious leaders, jurists, the family, the private 
sector, etc. A problem with locating ‘non-politicized’ issues on the opposite side of the 
spectrum to security is that they appear as less relevant or less powerful. A set of frames with 
this function that is relevant for analysing public diplomacy is marketization, which follows 
an economic imperative rather than a political and hence to a less extent abides by democratic 
rules. 
 There can be several ambiguities in a process of securitization that the security 
analysis does not register, because it regards the process as one movement. One and the same 
issue can be a matter of politicization and securitization in different discourses, such as anti-
Americanism, which I will analyse in part 2 of this thesis. Moreover: the security analysis 
distinguishes between a securitizing move and a securitized issue according to whether it is 
accepted as such by the audience. A more differentiating theoretical framework could have 
shown that, who the audience is and what the accept entails, varies with the discourse. An 
incorporation of Fairclough’s concept of order of discourse in the security analysis can elevate 
the discursive struggle behind the securitization process to highlight a variation of movements 
with different functions. In this particular combination of theories, securitization is regarded 
as one distinct discourse in an order of discourse with parallel discourses. 
 I will later analyse a distinct order of discourse that I have called ‘public diplomacy in 
the war on terrorism era’ (PDWTE). In the PDWTE order of discourse, various discourses are 
in different ways involved in a discursive struggle about anti-Americanism and public 
diplomacy. Following the Copenhagen-school, I will crudely divide the discourses into three 
categories, but instead of the category of ‘non-politicized’ discourse, I will use Fairclough’s 
concept of marketization. The three discourses I will discuss are thus marketized, politicized- 
and securitized discourses. Each discourse is based on a set of tales about the threat and its 
consequences, and each has its own set of discursive resources (intertextual history and 
genres) and relative power to meet the threats. To find patterns of meaning in these 
discourses, I will use Laclau and Mouffes’ discourse theory, and to find polyphonic 
exchanges between the discourses I will use Bakhtin and Youngs’ notions. I will now turn to 
the geopolitical meaning I will search for in the discourse analysis. 
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3.2 Geopolitical Approach 
Critical geopolitics, which is the geopolitical approach of this thesis, is a constructivist, post-
Marxist approach to the geographical reasoning of all kinds of politics. The label ‘critical 
geopolitics’ refers to a school of thought as well as distinct theories associated with this 
theoretical enterprise. I will in the following discuss a theoretical framework that explains the 
geopolitical function of discourses. On a macro level, the geopolitical function of discourses 
is to direct geopolitical practices and hence contribute to reproducing the geopolitical order, 
and on a micro level it is to designate agents and threats through the establishment of 
geopolitical identities. But first, I will briefly discuss the origin and development of the 
concept of geopolitics and the critical and geographical aspects of critical geopolitics as a 
school of thought.  
3.2.1 The Origin and the Critical Turn   
The term ‘geopolitics’ was coined by Rudolf Kjellèn in 1899, and firstly became associated 
with the model of geographical influences on global conflict proposed by the British 
geographer Halford Mackinder in the early twentieth century, as an aid to the practice of 
British statecraft. After German geographers in the 1920s and 1930s adopted Mackinder’s 
model of a Eurasian ‘heartland’ and used it to justify Nazi expansionism on Eastern Europe, 
the term ‘geopolitics’ suffered from guilt by association, and fell into disuse (Agnew & 
Corbridge 1995, 1). In the mid-80s and following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, a loose 
group of political geographers and international relations scholars articulated a post-Marxist 
reformulation of geopolitics. They propose a constructivist approach to geopolitics that 
deconstructs the ideological presuppositions of geographical knowledge and practices. 
Geography is seen as a social discourse that has been construed and constructed by ideology 
and politics, and diffused into all aspects of social life. A central notion is ‘hegemony’, which 
is derived from the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and developed into a geopolitical 
perspective. The critical aspect of this approach is thus a combination of Marxist and post-
modern perspectives on power.  
 The approach is also essentially geographical, in its analysis of how places form the 
premises for the reductive geopolitical reasoning of intellectuals of statecraft. This practice, 
Agnew and Ó Tuathail argue, ‘spatializes’ international politics “in such a way as to represent 
it as a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas” (Agnew  & Ó 
Tuathail 1992, 80). These representations of space, in turn, are the guidelines for further 
geopolitical practice. In other words, this approach to geopolitics suggests there is a 
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dialectical relationship between representations of space and spatial practices. This is what 
Agnew and Corbridge (1995) call geopolitical order and –discourse: respectively the 
organization of spatial practices and the discursive consent-production and reproduction of the 
geopolitical order9. I will in the following discuss the dialectics between geopolitical practices 
and genres and representations. 
3.2.2 Pre-genres and Representations Guide Spatial Practices 
The geopolitical aspect of discourse involves how representations of space guide actions 
towards a geographical area or a people. Agnew and Corbridge refer to the term ‘geopolitical 
discourse’ as “how the geography of the international political economy has been ‘written and 
read’ in the practices of foreign economic policies during the different periods of geopolitical 
order” (Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 46). By ‘written’ they refer to “the way geographical 
representations are incorporated into the practices of the political elites”, and by ‘read’: “the 
ways in which these representations are communicated” (Ibid, 46-47). How the geography is 
written and read depends on two discursive aspects: pre-genres and representations. 
3.2.2.1 Geopolitical Pre-genres  
Simon Dalby and Gearóid Ó Tuathail (1998) add an extra dimension to Agnew and 
Corbridges’ theory by emphasising the broad social and cultural extent of geopolitics. Their 
approach to critical geopolitics is to regard geopolitics as a set of representational practices, 
which I will merge with the previously discussed notion of ‘pre-genre’.  
 The broadness of geopolitics is demonstrated with a three-fold typology that 
distinguishes the practical geopolitics of state leaders and foreign policy bureaucracy from 
the formal geopolitics of the strategic community nationally and internationally and the 
popular geopolitics of trans-national popular culture. Linked together, as shown in figure 4.4, 
they “comprise the geopolitical culture of a particular region, state or inter-state alliance” (Ó 
Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
9 The notion ‘geopolitical order’ should not be confused with the notion ‘order of discourse’ discussed 
previously. 
 35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Geopolitical 
Map over the 
World 
 
 
Geopolitical 
Imagination 
Figure 3.4: The Geopolitical Culture (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998) 
 
The figure opens an understanding of three issues. Firstly, based on Agnew and Corbridges’ 
theory, the figure emphasises the dialectics of geopolitical practices and representations. 
Secondly, the figure points at the relationship between the geopolitical imagination and the 
geopolitical map over the world, as I will come back to. Thirdly, it takes into account a 
variety of agents producing geopolitical discourse who operate according to different logics. 
Investigating geopolitics at only one of the three suggested levels, or either of them 
separately, misses out on an important dimension of geopolitics. The diffusion of norms and 
ideas creates a ‘smooth space’ of rule, “constitutive of the very power that enables the US and 
its allied governments and organizations to act” (Allen 2003, 105). The formal geopolitical 
reasoning of the strategic community, Simon Dalby argues, has the ability to mystify politics 
through specialized discourses. They “act to reduce the role of political discussion by 
recasting the political issues in terms of technical problems to which they can, by using their 
specialized procedures, find ‘correct’ or ‘optimal’ answers” (Dalby 1990, 11). Popular 
geopolitics is important due to its wide reach, both in number of addressees and the ability to 
permeate people’s everyday lives with imperceptible geopolitical reasoning. The space for 
practical geopolitics is seen as ‘smoother’ if it shares the depoliticized reasoning of formal 
and popular geopolitics; and practical geopolitics nurtures the narration of popular and formal 
geopolitics.  
GEOPOLITICAL REPRESENTATIONS  
OF SELF AND OTHER 
SPATIALIZING OF 
BOUNDARIES 
AND DANGERS 
POPULAR 
GEOPOLITICS 
Mass Media 
Cinema 
Novels 
Cartoons 
PRACTICAL 
GEOPOLITICS FORMAL 
GEOPOLITICS 
Foreign Policy 
Bureaucracy 
Political Institutions 
Strategic Institutes 
Think tanks 
Academia 
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The model can be described as a deductive approach to finding specific types of 
geopolitics in traditions, tendencies, practices and debates. For a more inductive research 
approach, I see more utility in understanding popular, formal and practical geopolitics as 
genres, or more specifically, pre-genres, in a liberal interpretation of Fairclough’s notion. A 
pre-genre is in this context a constituting part of a geopolitical practice that determines the 
ways in which geopolitical discourses are, or can be, produced and consumed. The reasoning 
around issues common for the respective categories of geopolitics can be the same, yet 
communicated and understood in completely different terms.  
A conceptual problem is also circumvented when the categories ‘popular’, ‘formal’ 
and ‘practical’ geopolitics are regarded as pre-genres rather than reasoning: otherwise, the 
model would artificially separate between overlapping forms of reasoning. For example, the 
mass media does not only facilitate popular geopolitics, but also the mediation of formal and 
practical geopolitical reasoning, albeit usually in a hybrid form. Academic discourses are 
more likely to be accepted by mass media when it mixes academic- with popular discourses, 
and exclusively popular discourses have less credence in mass media than popular-
political/academic discourses. When regarding popular geopolitics as a pre-genre, what is 
discovered is that mass media, for instance, is merely a generative facilitator for reasoning, 
which simultaneously affects how the message is produced and consumed. 
3.2.2.2 Geopolitical Representations  
The second aspect of geopolitical dialectics is how geopolitical representations direct 
geopolitical practices. This discursive process is what John Allen (2003, 102) calls the politics 
of geo-graphing space, that is, “writing or representing it in ways that justify a particular 
group’s authority over a subject population.” In this sense, hegemonic ideas embedded in 
geopolitical discourses reify themselves in foreign policy making. This is the dialectic aspect 
of the relationship between the geopolitical imagination and the geopolitical map of the 
world, as visualised on figure 4.4. By rendering certain geographical 
understandings ‘obvious’, intellectuals, institutions and practising statespersons justify the 
right of a political entity to exercise power, based upon geopolitical visions. “In writing such 
scenarios,” Allen argues, “geographical metaphors and tropes come into play, such as 
the identification of ‘rogue states’ recently deployed by the US and its allies in their ‘war’ 
against ‘terrorism’, as well as rhetorical proclamations such as the ‘clash of civilizations’ and 
the ‘end of history’” (Allen 2003, 102). Gertjan Dijkink defines geopolitical imaginations or 
visions as “any idea concerning the relation between one’s own and other places, involving 
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feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a collective mission or 
foreign policy strategy” (Dijkink 1996, 11). His specific approach to geopolitics is the power 
to define danger, and hence to prescribe the remedy to provide security. A crucial discursive 
task of geopolitics, then, is to construct the popular understanding of order and threat. Linked 
together with figure 4.4, the understanding of order and threat has the ability to diffuse 
between geopolitical agents through the various genres of geopolitics and together create a 
‘smooth space of rule’. 
A geopolitical vision is often organised around a distinct geopolitical subject, which in 
geopolitical theory is understood as the basic agent shaping global political and 
economic relations (Kearns 2003, 174). I will base the understanding of a geopolitical subject 
upon the perspective of geopolitical representations and Laclau and Mouffes’ discourse 
theory. This approach to geopolitical subjects elevates the status of the represented ‘Other’ to 
a geopolitical subject. 
 Subjects are in Laclau & Mouffes discourse theory understood to be determined by the 
discourse. The discourse theory derives its understanding of the subject from the French 
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and, via Michel Foucault, the French structural-Marxist Louis 
Althusser. To Lacan, the subject knows herself by identifying with something external and 
therefore constantly tries to “find herself” in the discourses (Jørgensen and Philips 1999, 55). 
The nodal points of identity, or master signifiers, in Lacanian terminology, are in different 
discourses given meaning in different ways. The master signifier is a sign with the ability to 
construct a node of definite meanings, such as man, woman, American, Muslim or any other 
kind of identity category. The way the subject is given meaning, is how different signifiers are 
connected in chains of equivalence or difference, which establish the identity relationally to 
what it is and what it is not. At once the subject’s identity has been identified; discourses then 
give guidelines for the subject. By identifying with a master signifier, the subject also 
identifies with and tries to live up to what this master signifier positively connotes within the 
given discourse. Likewise, the negative/opposition to this chain of equivalent meanings 
constitutes the Other, because the subject attains meaning through being different from 
something else (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). Not only the Other is understood in terms of the 
Self, but the Self is also understood in terms of the constructed Other. In this sense, identity is 
completely a social construction (Jørgensen and Philips 1999, 55).  
Groups, such as ‘Americans’ or ‘Muslims’, are according to Laclau constructed in the 
same way as the subject. When a group is represented, an image of the rest of the society 
follows accordingly, because the group is constituted in negation to other groups. An identity 
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can thus not be separated from its context, because the context is constituted on the 
differentiation of the group (Laclau 1996). The construction of states follows the same logic: 
the history of statehood is about drawing borders to distinguish a state from what it is not. 
Moreover, the construction of the state has founded the state as a national community and 
defined the people at the inside as different from those at the outside. The geopolitical identity 
of a state or other geographic entity is applied to the members of the states. A geopolitical 
subject is thus any discursively represented identity and the geopolitical representation it is 
associated with. How a geopolitical subject is represented, affects how it should be acted 
towards in any given situation.  
Although identities are mutually excluding according to the logic of Laclau and 
Mouffes’ theory, geopolitical subjects can form alliances for common (symmetric or 
asymmetric) benefit. In the book The Origin of Alliances, Stephen M. Walt (1987) explores 
the alliance formation of states and argues that they either balance or bandwagon when 
confronted by an external threat. Balancing means allying with others against the prevailing 
threat and bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger (Walt 1987, 17). 
Ideological solidarity is another explanation of alliance formation: the more similar states are, 
the more likely they are to ally (Walt 1987, 33). I will not focus on states in this thesis, but 
rather how discourses construct alliances between geopolitical subjects that give guidelines 
for the involved subjects. As I will analyse in part 2 of this thesis, the micro level of the 
geopolitical rationale of public diplomacy is how identities are established in discourses. The 
logic of the geopolitical dialectics emphasizes how the subjects’ position and discursive 
guidelines direct what they can do and say within the geopolitical order.  
The notion of soft power discussed in chapter 2 highlights the agency aspect of the 
geopolitical dialectics. Agents with soft power have the ability to persuade others of the 
appropriateness of their own geopolitical visions, or the definition of the involved subjects 
and threats. Soft power gives a geopolitical vision the ability to diffuse through the 
geopolitical culture and be expressed through genres and discourses with different range. 
3.2.3 Spatial Practices Reproduce the Geopolitical Order 
The significance of geopolitical discourses is how they guide spatial practices that in turn 
constitute the geopolitical order. Since the school of critical geopolitics started its theoretical 
enterprise in the mid-nineties the notion of ‘geopolitical order’ has been contested and 
developed in different directions. In the book Mastering Space from 1995, Agnew and 
Corbridge defined ‘geopolitical order’ as the organisation of spatial practices; “the routinized 
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rules, institutions, activities and strategies through which the international political economy 
operates in different historical periods” (1995, 15). An important development of the concept 
is who or what is perceived as the hegemon of the geopolitical order.10 In 1995, Agnew and 
Corbridge defined the geopolitical order as a state of hegemony, without a hegemonic state. 
At the time, this was a radical statement, because there was broad agreement that Pax 
Americana constituted the geopolitical order. In Agnew’s later book Hegemony: the New 
Shape of Global Power from 2005, he returns to the claim that the current geopolitical order is 
created by the US. Agnew argues that the contemporary world economy is a historical product 
of US design and ideology, which gained its position through the geographic expansion of 
economic practices. The marketplace society, mass consumer culture and the American way 
of conducting business have become a global condition: the right, acceptable and desirable 
form of human life. It developed in the nineteenth century in a rather national context but later 
materialized globally as the US model of conducting business expanded under the auspices of 
the US governments in the twentieth century.  
An important criticism of Agnew’s book is the ambiguity of the role and meaning of 
agency in the historical development of the American hegemony. Agnew does not suggest 
that the creation of American hegemony has been a ‘project’ with a master plan, but rather 
shows how political-economic events have followed each other. I will not suggest that the 
American hegemony is a manufactured product, but the practice of public diplomacy is only 
one example of how the US government as well as several distinct agents and discourses have 
been important navigators in its making. Powerful networks such as Pax Americana during 
the Cold War and the neoconservative Project for a New American Century (PNAC) 
respectively had and have clear geopolitical aspirations: The former promoted a new age of 
enlightenment, called The American Century, the latter aggressively upholds the idea of the 
American leadership of the world. Together with the proactive US government, CIA, USIA 
and other institutions, these networks have contributed to creating and nurturing the American 
hegemony. The case of governmental public diplomacy demonstrates how geopolitical 
discourses are used strategically to reproduce the geopolitical order.  
 
                                                
10 The notion of hegemony in this context must not be confused with Laclau and Mouffes’ notion of hegemonic 
discourses discussed previously, which refers to something that has been deemed objective. 
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3.3 Summary and Operationalisation of the Research Question  
I have in chapter 3 outlined a coherent theoretical framework that integrates discourse theory 
and the geopolitical approach. The discourse theory and the geopolitical framework constitute 
respectively the strategy employed to find meaning and the specific kind of meaning that will 
be analysed.   
  The outlined discourse theory incorporates notions from Bakhtin, Young, Fairclough 
and Laclau and Mouffe in a framework that can explain different aspects of discourses, 
ranging from how implicit representations direct discourses to how different discourses 
struggle for the valid practice or description of an issue. The struggle also involves how the 
discourse frames issues and uses genres, which affect the rules that apply to the discourse, and 
how it is consumed and produced. How the discursive struggle unfolds relates to Fairclough’s 
concept of ‘order of discourse’, which combined with the security analysis of the Copenhagen 
school will be a structuring foundation of the forthcoming analysis. 
 The geopolitical framework comprises more than can be associated with the school of 
critical geopolitics. Foundational for the framework is the dialectical relationship between the 
geopolitical order and –discourse, which emphasizes the role of representational practices 
(‘pre-genres’) and geopolitical representations (visions and subjects) in reproducing and 
changing the geopolitical order. Connected to Nye’s three-dimensional chessboard of world 
politics, the geopolitical framework can explain how representations of the world influence 
geopolitical practices, and how the output interconnects with larger power structures. 
 I will in the following chapters analyse a specific order of discourse in which various 
discourses in different ways are involved in a discursive struggle about anti-Americanism and 
public diplomacy, called “public diplomacy in the war on terrorism era” (PDWTE). These 
‘discourses’ comprise networks of practices, utterances and opinions. Each discourse is based 
on a set of tales about the geopolitical threat and its consequences, and each has its own set of 
discursive resources (intertextual history and genres) and relative power to meet the threats. 
Together, these discourses shape the development of public diplomacy in the war on terrorism 
era. I will now turn to how the research question can be operationalised for the analysis.  
 The main research question of this thesis is, as discussed in the introductory chapter, 
“What is the geopolitical rationale of American public diplomacy in the war on terrorism 
era?” This rationale will be explained through three interlinked aspects: “what geopolitical 
representations dominate this public diplomacy order of discourse,” “how do these 
representations manifest in public diplomacy efforts”, and “how does the discursive struggle 
affect the output of American public diplomacy in the war on terrorism era”? I will answer 
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these questions through an analysis of the discursive struggle and a case. In chapter 5, I will 
categorise the discourses that dominate the PDWTE order of discourse, and analyse them 
according to each aspect. The first aspect will be explained through an analysis of the 
discourses’ underlying geopolitical representations, or definition of the situation, designation 
of relevant subjects and assessment of the threat. The second aspect will be explained through 
an analysis of the means and messages the diverging discourses use, and consider appropriate, 
to counter the geopolitical threat. To explain the third aspect, I will analyse how the different 
strategies struggling on the same arena affect the order of discourse, by assessing their relative 
power to define public diplomacy according to their representation of the geopolitical 
situation.  
 In chapter 6, I will analyse the public diplomacy campaign Shared Values Initiative 
(SVI) from 2002. First, I will analyse the campaign as a geopolitical discourse through how it 
communicates geopolitical representations and its role in a broader network of power. 
Thereafter, I will discuss the debate that followed it in media, academia and public diplomacy 
circles, to analyse how the campaign represents the PDWTE order of discourse through what 
kinds of messages and methods are considered controversial or conventional. 
 But first, I will discuss the epistemological approach and analytical strategy of the 
thesis. 
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4  ANALYTICAL APPROACH  
 
A typical identity marker that distinguishes the discourse analysis from other analytical 
strategies in the social sciences is its approach to ontology and epistemology. Ontology is the 
study of the existence and seeks to describe the basic categories of being, and epistemology is 
the study of the nature and scope of knowledge. Contrary to other social scientists that mainly 
focus on ontology, a discourse analyst is less interested in the being than the becoming – how 
and why objects have come to appear the way they do (Neumann 2001). The object of 
analysis in this thesis has been defined through a series of demarcations and a theoretical 
framework comprising Critical geopolitics, Security analysis and various branches of 
discourse theory. The discourse theory and the geopolitical framework constitute the two 
levels of the analytical strategy: respectively the strategy employed to find meaning and the 
specific kind of meaning that will be analysed. However, there has never been a clear 
distinction between the theoretical framework and analytical object. In this chapter, I will 
discuss how the philosophy of science, methodological approach and analytical strategy have 
contributed to shaping the analytical object and conclusions of this thesis, and evaluate the 
research. 
4.1 Philosophy of Science 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is based on a compound interpretation of post-
Marxist epistemology, which combines post-modern and Marxist approaches to power, 
knowledge and geography. 
 Postmodern post-Marxism (hereafter called post-Marxism11) is a theoretical 
amalgamation of two, in many ways, opposite epistemologies. Postmodernism refers in this 
context to the philosophy of science characterised by its fundamental critique of knowledge. 
While Marxism is a so-called ‘metanarrative’ that seeks to find the objective structures behind 
human interaction, postmodernism rejects the very notion of objectivity and claims that all 
knowledge is historically and culturally contingent. What postmodernism and Marxism have 
in common, however, is the deconstructive approach to knowledge and power. Although 
Marxism believes in objective structures, it indeed has a deconstructing tradition with notions 
                                                
11 Several branches of Marxism can be labelled post-Marxist, such as Structural Marxism, neo-Marxism, the 
Frankfurt school and analytical Marxism, but in this text, the emphasis is on postmodern post-Marxism. 
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such as ideology, false consciousness and hegemony, which emphasise the power and 
situatedness of knowledge. A fundamental difference between the Marxist deconstructive 
epistemology and the post-modern is that Marxism inserts an alternative Truth where the post-
modern discourses mainly comment how the Truth is constructed. In post-Marxism, the 
rejection of the metanarrative is a matter of degree, from Laclau and Mouffes’ anti-essentialist 
approach to Fairclough’s emphasis on revealing discursive expressions of “real” economic 
power relations (Jørgensen and Philips 1999).  
 The epistemological value of geography can be incorporated into the post-Marxist 
framework. According to Henri Lefebvre (1991), the configuration of space is often taken to 
be objective, although spatial metaphors constitute a powerful form of reasoning in sciences 
and daily practices. In that sense, geography has a “naturalised” epistemology, embedded in 
our forms of reasoning. Before, during and after any spatial practice there is a discursive 
struggle about the configuration of space (Neumann 2001, 43). The post-Marxist aspect of 
this approach is the emphasis on deconstructing the power and modes of domination 
embedded in geographic practices, and is central in the critical understanding of geopolitics. 
Post-Marxist constructivism is also reflected in my methodological approach.   
4.2 Methodological Approach 
Political geography can be called a geo-sociological approach, which situates individuals and 
explains processes in social-geographical contexts (Agnew 1996). Unlike the disciplines of 
political science, sociology and economics, political geography demands a consideration of 
the spatial context in which a political process takes place, but at the same time, offers no 
specific methodology to measure spatial effects (O’Loughlin 2003, 35). There are advantages 
and disadvantages to employing approaches with little developed methodological framework. 
One advantage is that the approach allows for an exploring research strategy with space for 
creativity and for using interdisciplinary perspectives. A disadvantage, however, is that the 
use of approaches from other disciplines may seem less convincing when they are taken out of 
their original contexts. The intention of the theoretical approach of this thesis is to adapt such 
theories to a geo-sociological perspective rather than follow an already endorsed method. 
Although the creative benefits of the approach may compensate for the benefits of a strong 
methodological and theoretical tradition, a central challenge remains: to unite 
epistemologically diverging theories into a coherent framework. 
 In order to harmonise Critical geopolitics, Security analysis, Fairclough’s critical 
discourse analysis and Laclau and Mouffes’ discourse theory, some conceptual translation is 
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necessary. Although all of these theories can be described as social constructivist, their 
epistemological foundations diverge: Laclau and Mouffes’ approach can be categorised as 
‘idealist’ and the others ‘realist’. A principal difference between these approaches is that, 
where idealists merge epistemology with ontology, realists maintain this division. A problem 
with using the terms ‘idealists’ and ‘realists’ is the assumption that idealists reject the 
existence of a world external to thought: What they deny is rather that objects can constitute 
themselves as meaningful outside of a discursive context (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 108). An 
idealist would argue that, because our only access to the reality or materiality is through 
discourses, discourses construct the social world. A realist would argue that although aspects 
of the social world are socially constructed; once they are constructed they become objective 
realities that affect and limit the possibilities for discourse (Fairclough 2003, 8). In other 
words, realists distinguish between discursive and social practices where idealists suggest that 
discourses, practices and identities all can be understood in terms of the same, discursive, 
logic. This indicates a fundamental difference between the respective definitions of discourse: 
To idealists, discourse is a fixation of meaning in a broad sense, and to realists, it is a 
particular view on language, analysed in an abstract sense as “an element of social life”, or as 
particular discourses (Fairclough 2003, 5).  
 The methodical implications of these two approaches are significant: Whether the 
discourse is regarded as the lingual element of social life or as the structuring totality of the 
social, determines the boundaries of the analytical object as well as its societal function. In the 
analysis, I will combine the two approaches in a particular way. I will follow Laclau and 
Mouffes’ definition of discourse as a fixation of meaning in a broad sense, and hence 
understand also social practices and identities according to a discursive logic. When 
understood as such, what becomes noticeable is how institutional and methodical practices 
produce meaning, and how they struggle for establishment. However; a theory that 
understands structures, discourses and agents in the same terms, leaves no “natural” space for 
understanding hierarchies between discourses and speakers, although such hierarchies can be 
understood indirectly as discursively constituted and hegemonised entities. To clarify these 
levels, I will analytically separate between discourse and practice, but use the discourse theory 
also to explain ‘extra-discursive’ entities, such as subjects and social practices.  
 In discourse analysis, the difference between theory and method is seen as artificial. 
Although discourse analysis is often referred to as a method, the concept’s genealogical origin 
is rather anti-method, because ‘method’ is frequently understood as a means to represent 
something from an external viewpoint. Because no such external viewpoint exists according 
 45 
to discourse analysis, this approach to method is seen as unachievable and therefore 
inappropriate not only for discourse analysis, but for social sciences in general (Neumann 
2001, 15). Any theory has methodical implications, and any method rests on some kind of 
theory. Instead, the notion ‘analytical strategies’ is employed to break down the hierarchy 
between the notions. I will now turn to the analytical strategy employed in this thesis. 
4.3 Analytical Strategy and -Process  
In constructivist research, neutrality is neither a possibility nor an ideal. The choices of 
theories, analytical strategies, research questions and empirical data determine the direction of 
the research process and hence the findings and conclusions. Throughout the research process, 
several choices, detours and reversals have shaped this thesis. The strategy applied can be 
labelled abductive reasoning, because the theory and data have been used in a dialectical 
fashion. Abductive dialectics means that theory offers perspectives to guide the interpretation 
of data, and in the next turn, systematic empirical analyses contribute to the development of 
theory, etc. (Thagaard 2003, 174). I have interchangeably used theory to highlight aspects of 
the empirical material, and the empirical data to show weaknesses of the theory. 
 It is often argued that the method or analytical strategy should be chosen according to 
its suitability for explaining an empirical phenomenon. I have not followed this advice nor do 
I believe it is customary to do so. Researchers usually have a theoretical or methodological 
preference that guides their choice of research material and research question. In the case of 
this thesis, my starting point was purely theoretical and emerged from an interest in popular 
geopolitics and discourse theory. I picked the case of American public diplomacy because it 
was a good example of popular geopolitics and an interesting study material for discourse 
analysis. My initial knowledge about American public diplomacy came from media studies, 
from scholars with a primarily critical focus on public diplomacy (See, for instance, 
Kamalipour 2004; Miller 2006; Snow 2002; 2003; Thussu 2005). After extensive reading, I 
turned to the literature from the public diplomacy culture to balance the image. What I found 
out after comparing media analyses of public diplomacy with public diplomacy literature12 
was that a discourse analysis of any public diplomacy campaign would give a very simplified 
image of its rationale. The public diplomacy culture is a conflictual one, and characterised by 
many different approaches and intentions, which would not be captured by an analysis of one 
or some of its expressions. Indeed, a campaign can be an excellent study material for finding 
geopolitical representations, but the representations may not even be accepted within public 
                                                
12 The public diplomacy literature is extensive and includes weblogs, websites, reports, books and articles. 
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diplomacy circles. To find out whether the geopolitical representations of such campaigns 
reflect the rationale of the public diplomacy culture, I decided to supplement the discourse 
analysis of campaigns with interviews with public diplomacy perpetrators and critics. The 
combination of research strategies is often called triangulation.  
 Traditionally, the purpose of triangulation in qualitative research has been to increase 
the validity of the results. The premise of validity is, if not contradictory to the purpose of 
qualitative research, certainly problematic in the episteme of postmodernism. For the purpose 
of validating findings, triangulation of methods carry the assumption “that there is a ‘fixed 
point’ or an ‘object’ that can be triangulated” (Richardson & St. Pierre 2005, 963). A 
postmodernist deconstruction of triangulation would recognize that there are far more than 
“three sides” by which to approach the world. Richardson and St. Pierre suggest that replacing 
the notion triangulation with ‘crystallization’ deconstructs the idea of validity; “we feel how 
there is no single truth, and we see how texts validate themselves” (Ibid). Such an approach 
provides a deepened, complex, and thoroughly partial understanding of a topic, with space for 
doubt and for knowing that there is always more to know. I follow this critique of the notion 
of triangulation, but still find it a useful notion if its purpose can be redefined to finding new 
and more information on a topic. I have throughout the research process triangulated data, 
analytical strategies and theoretical approaches to produce a unique perspective.  
 There are advantages and disadvantages of studying a different culture. For an 
outsider, it can be easier to see congealed patterns and hegemonised ideas, but some nuances 
disappear in the process. In order to balance the cultural handicap as an outsider, I have made 
extensive efforts to understand as much as possible from the American public diplomacy 
culture. Before the field trip to the US is January 2007, I spent a whole semester studying 
secondary literature and find relevant interviewees. Because much of the literature about 
public diplomacy, anti-Americanism and the war on terrorism is brand new, I spent a week at 
the British Library in London for literature search. The preparation for the field trip included 
extensive reading of blogs, articles, reports, books and official websites, studying accessible 
public diplomacy efforts and interviewing public diplomats at the American Embassy in Oslo. 
This process gave me some indication of what this “public diplomacy culture” is about, and 
helped me to choose relevant interviewees and a central case.  
 The analytical strategies applied have allowed a systematisation of a large amount of 
data and perspectives to be incorporated into the analysis. The subject under discussion is a 
chaotic field, partly because it is under contemporary development, and partly because the 
interests behind and purpose of public diplomacy are inherently contradictory. I do not wish 
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to diminish the complexity of the analytical “object”. Rather, the main challenge of this thesis 
has been to choose analytical perspectives and construct categories that simultaneously 
capture the complexity and keep a clear and steady focus. I will now turn to how these 
choices and constructions have been done.   
4.3.1 Analytical Operationalisation 
The research question of this thesis has been theoretically operationalised in chapter 3, but 
operational questions also emerge regarding the analytical strategy: How can a geopolitical 
rationale be analysed? How do I choose relevant data? How do I construct relevant 
demarcations of theory and the analytical object, and of time and space?  
 The motivation and analytical demarcation of the research question is theoretical. A 
geopolitical rationale is a theoretical concept that must analytically construct its object of 
research to make sense. There is no such “thing” as a geopolitical rationale or essential 
structure that imposes actions or thoughts on subjects. Neither does it make sense to simply 
ask the agents what the geopolitical rationale is behind their actions. Discourse analysis is 
well suited for this task, because it is designed to search for meaning: how textual or other 
practices are constructed upon assumptions about the world.  
 Another demarcation of the analytical object is the time frame under discussion, the 
“war on terrorism era”. This “era” is an analytical construct, although its time frame is widely 
accepted as relevant: from the terror attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) till today.13 I have 
set this time frame because 9/11 constituted a catalyst of the current public diplomacy era. 
This is not to suggest that the current public diplomacy era exclusively relates to the memory 
of 9/11, but the incident certainly marked a change in the discourse. Setting a time frame 
always involves an analytical demarcation, because no history has a “beginning”. Memories 
of the past and past discourses always contribute to shaping a discourse (Neumann, 2001). 
Public diplomacy has a long tradition, and its rules, norms and conventions have developed 
through this process. The starting point of this time frame, however, is justifiable because it 
has initiated a cultural narration central to public diplomacy discourses. A greater challenge is 
the late ending point, because a number of public diplomacy practices have changed and new 
literature has emerged throughout my writing process. I have still chosen to follow this recent 
development because it gives a more comprehensive understanding of the direction public 
diplomacy has taken in this period.  
                                                
13 Although this ”era” is still evolving, I discontinued the research after Karen Hughes resigned from her post as 
Under Secretary for public diplomacy and public affairs on 31. October 2007. 
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 The analytical object also includes a set of spatial demarcations. I have mainly focused 
on American public diplomacy in Muslim countries, because these are closer linked to the war 
on terrorism than, say, efforts towards the Norwegian audience. ‘Muslim countries’ does in 
this context not refer to places as such, but rather the construation of Muslim countries in the 
public diplomacy discourse. Because I wanted to study the rationale of public diplomacy 
rather than its effect, it was natural to choose the perpetrators rather than recipients as 
research object. However, many public diplomats mainly work “in the field”, at embassies, 
TV-networks, radio stations, publishing houses, etc., and do a smaller share of their work in 
the US. I still found that the State Department and other institutions in Washington DC were 
more appropriate as study object, because these are central in the development of the strategic 
direction of public diplomacy. For that reason, I chose the US as destination for my field trip.  
 A final demarcation concerns how I have chosen the analytical object. Two 
approaches have been employed to answer the research question: a study of a discursive 
struggle and a case study. These approaches require fundamentally different sets of 
demarcations: while the discursive struggle is analytically constructed, the case sets its own 
boundaries. 
 The American public diplomacy culture consists of a variety of conflict lines. If one 
were to ask different representatives for the public diplomacy culture what the main conflict 
lines were, different answers would emerge. However, an obvious pattern appeared from the 
interview material, which I have further construed with Security Analysis and discourse 
theory as guidelines. A combination of theory and an empirical observation has thus 
contributed to the demarcation of the analytical object. This demarcation has also formed the 
categorisation of discourses and agents in the analysis of the discursive struggle.  
 A case study is a research strategy that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life 
context (Yin 2002). The empirical boundaries of the phenomenon determine the boundaries of 
the case. My approach to the case can be labelled instrumental. An instrumental case is one 
that is selected for its ability to demonstrate the phenomenon of interest, such as an 
understanding of an issue or refinement of theory. Although the case is studied in detail, it 
serves as a vehicle for the subject of interest (Stake 1995). I have chosen the controversial 
public diplomacy campaign Shared Values Initiative from 2002, which I have studied partly 
as a case and partly as a part of the discursive struggle. As a case, the campaign is interesting 
study material as a display of geopolitical visions. As a part of the discursive struggle, it is 
interesting because it has been so much debated that a substantial amount of information 
about its purpose and response is available. I have analysed the campaign as well as the 
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interview data as discursive practices because they, when regarded as such, give insight in the 
rationale of the public diplomacy culture.  
 I will now turn to how the sample of informants was selected, how the interviews were 
done and ethical issues concerning the interviews.  
4.3.2 Interviews  
In total sixteen people were interviewed for this thesis. Fourteen of them are listed in the 
appendix, and the remaining two were not relevant enough to count as data material. It was 
fairly easy to find suitable informants, and only a few of my interview requests were rejected. 
Because public diplomacy people work with information, they often participate in public 
debate in press and websites and are readily accessible through email. The basis upon which 
the informants were chosen varied: most of them were chosen due to the perspective of their 
writings in articles, books or reports; some were chosen with help from the State Department 
Press Office, and yet others were recommended by other interviewees. The sample of 
informants was chosen on the basis of already constructed categories, so-called quota 
sampling (Thagaard 2003, 55). These categories were ‘perpetrators’, ‘sideline critics,’ and 
‘principal critics’, based on my impression of public diplomacy discourses from the consulted 
literature. The categories of critics can also be called ‘constructive’ and ‘deconstructive 
critics’, according to the nature of the critique. An early discovery in the interview process, 
however, was that each and every one of the interviewees was critical, even the perpetrators, 
in both a constructive and deconstructive sense.  
 During the interviews, I also found that my initial knowledge about the public 
diplomacy culture was insufficient on some areas. I had decided to focus only on State 
Department (SD) public diplomacy because it appeared from the literature as the most central 
agent. What I found was that the public diplomacy culture is profoundly fragmented. I was 
aware of that a variety of schools and approaches exists among traditional public diplomats, 
but a more significant division was much less noticed in the literature: a new agent had 
emerged as a public diplomacy perpetrator, the Department of Defense (DoD). After the field 
trip, more documents have been declassified and made publicly available about the 
involvement of the DoD in public diplomacy, but at the time, this information seemed to be 
less known and little debated in the literature. This new knowledge caused me to categorize 
the information differently and focus on other conflict lines than the initial intention, which 
made the categories through which I had chosen interviewees in some ways obsolete. For that 
reason, I added more interviewees to the sample and slightly changed the focus of the 
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interviews. Despite the rearrangement of categories; the broadness of the sample has been a 
great advantage due to the varied understanding of public diplomacy it has provided. 
 A weakness of my data material is that the discursive struggle between SD and DoD is 
asymmetrically represented with a bias in favour of the SD. Nobody at the DoD was willing 
to be interviewed, only two of my interviewees had background from the DoD and only one 
of them was interested in defending that institution. This means that the discursive struggle is 
in the interviews represented partly from a SD point of view, partly from external viewpoints 
and only briefly from that of DoD. To balance the data bias, I have consulted DoD budgets, 
reports and articles that discuss the distribution of public diplomacy tasks between SD and 
DoD. The nature of information produced by interview data and reports, however, profoundly 
diverge, and hence the DoD appears more static and uniform. I have taken the consequence of 
the data bias by focusing in more depth on SD public diplomacy and how this camp relates to 
the DoD than the DoD practice per se.   
 The interviews produced almost twenty hours of taped material that was later 
transcribed. I never intended to strictly compare the interviews, so I used the opportunity to 
try a variety of interview techniques. These techniques can all be labelled semi structured: 
“neither an open conversation nor a highly structured questionnaire” (Kvale 1996, 27). In 
some interviews, I asked only a few, broad questions and tried to direct the conversation 
according to the relevance of the information that came up. In others I asked more specific 
questions, and in a few cases I provoked a debate. Two of the interviews were group 
interviews, with two informants in each. None of the techniques turned out more favourably 
than others, and the difference between the data material it produced followed the lines of 
perspectives rather than the interview technique. The subject under discussion, however, was 
defined differently by each interviewee: the definition of public diplomacy evoked resolute, 
yet diverging, opinions. Because the main topic was subject to negotiation, the interviews 
were hard to predict, regardless of preparation. This relates to Haraway’s (1991) notions about 
situated knowledges. Because the interviewer and the interviewee have different situated 
knowledges, they can never fully understand each other. I must admit that I have knowingly 
used this occasion to get access to both the interviewees and to information, which also poses 
an ethical question concerning the interview process. 
4.3.2.1 Ethical Issues 
The central purpose of critical sciences is to reveal power structures, and hence the 
consideration for ethical issues is regarded lighter when dealing with elites. Elites are usually 
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capable of defending themselves through their defining power and access to media etc. While 
some of my informants certainly can be regarded as members of an elite, all of them were 
educated and had some kind of professional background from the subject under discussion, 
and hence to some extent fall into the same category. The only use I have made of this 
reversed power structure is the amount of information I have shared about the project. 
Because some of the informants might become wary if they knew that the theoretical 
approach was critical geopolitics, the project proposal attached to each interview request 
scarcely focused on the critical aspect.14 However, with only one exception, it did not seem to 
interest the interviewees for what purpose the information would be used.  
 Another ethical consideration concerning the interviews is the principle of 
confidentiality (NESH 1993). I have chosen to keep my sources open since none of the 
interviewees expressed any wish to be treated anonymously. Because they were educated, 
accustomed to journalists and researchers, and no personal information was exchanged, I see 
no reason to believe that the lack of confidentiality could harm the informants. However, I 
have chosen to protect the sources in a few cases where the interview situation has been 
informal and allowed criticism that might look harsher in print. I will in the following section 
assess the research according to certain criteria, which includes the care for informants. 
4.4 Research Assessment  
Traditionally, social sciences have proposed standard criteria to determine the quality of a 
study. Reliability, validity and generalisation have been accepted as such criteria (Kvale 
1996). These notions have to some extent become rejected in social sciences, because they are 
formed on the premise from quantitative sciences that all knowledge is measurable. In a 
constructivist approach, these notions are also considered inappropriate because they reflect a 
philosophical presupposition that it is possible to achieve an objective or true knowledge 
about the world. Lincoln and Guba (1989) replace these notions with criteria that they argue 
better reflect the underlying assumptions involved in much qualitative research: credibility, 
confirmability and transferability.  
 One way of demonstrating the credibility of the research is to discuss the choices 
made throughout the research process, how the analytical object is constructed and analysed 
so that the reader can assess the choices made by the researcher (Dyrberg et.al. 2000). I have 
made extensive efforts to make the research transparent, by exposing the philosophical 
presuppositions, theories and analytical strategies applied. However, the credibility criterion 
                                                
14 The project proposal is listed in the appendix. 
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can also imply that the results of qualitative research are credible or believable from the 
perspective of the participant in the research.15 This can be described as an “empirical” 
approach to the criterion, because the participants do not necessarily recognise the theoretical 
notions applied and hence could feel alienated by the analysis. The interpretation of data also 
involves selection of data, which means that some participants would recognise more from the 
analysis than others. I have in the research focused on certain trends that have appeared as 
central from various sources, but if some of the participants would find these trends less 
relevant to how they perceive public diplomacy, it is understandable. This also relates to the 
criterion of confirmability, which refers to the extent to which the results could be confirmed 
or corroborated by others. All the aspects of public diplomacy I have focused on in this thesis 
are recognised by other literature. However, because the geopolitical perspective is a 
theoretical construct, it would only be corroborated by those who accept the premise of the 
theory. This also relates to the criterion of transferability, which refers to the degree to which 
the results of qualitative research can be generalized or transferred to other contexts or 
settings. An appropriate approach for this study is from grounded theory: Blumer’s notion of 
‘sensitizing concepts’. Sensitizing concepts can be understood as “background ideas that 
inform the overall research problem” (Charmaz 2003). The kind of transferability this 
approach advocates, is thus to regard the findings of one analysis as starting points for 
another. This thesis advocates a perspective that could be used in other studies to highlight the 
geopolitical assumptions that structure our everyday practices. In order for such a perspective 
to be established in the social sciences, it should be transferred to other analyses: it should be 
repeatedly tried, developed and debated. In the last resort, the credibility of a perspective rests 
on its recognition by the research community.  
 I will now turn to the actual analysis: What is the geopolitical rationale of public 
diplomacy in the war on terrorism era? 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/qualval.php 
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5   THE GEOPOLITICAL RATIONALE  
 
The concept of ‘geopolitical rationale’ of American public diplomacy requires differentiation; 
as a singular rationale representing the practice does not exist. It is rather subject to discursive 
struggle, advocated by different agents. In this chapter, the geopolitical rationale will be 
analysed through a classification of discourses that struggle for the definition of the 
geopolitical situation, so-called geopolitical discourses. These discourses constitute an order 
of discourse described as “public diplomacy in the war on terrorism era” (PDWTE). Although 
the current public diplomacy era involves more than can be related to the war on terrorism, 
this geopolitical situation has such a structuring impact on public diplomacy that it has 
produced a distinct order of discourse. The forthcoming analysis will be structured around the 
central public diplomacy discourses in this order of discourse, which I have classified as 
‘politicized’, ‘securitized’ and ‘marketized’. This specific categorisation pinpoints how the 
diverging interpretations of the geopolitical threat have contributed to fragmenting the 
development of public diplomacy in the war on terrorism era. I will use the categories to 
deconstruct this process by analysing how the geopolitical visions of the order of discourse 
designates responsible institutions and forms the methods and messages of public diplomacy; 
how the respective discourses have developed since 9/11, and how the inherent differences 
between, and power of, the discourses affect the output of American public diplomacy in this 
era.  
 The principal geopolitical threat structuring this order of discourse is anti-
Americanism. However, the threat of anti-Americanism has different implications in different 
discourses about public diplomacy. A discourse that understands anti-Americanism as a threat 
to US soft power can be characterised as politicized, because it situates the geopolitical threat 
in a political game of power. In such a discourse, public diplomacy is regarded as a tool to 
turn the worldwide negative attitudes towards the US that particularly mushroomed following 
the US-led war on terrorism and the Iraq war. Since the decline of soft power cannot be 
countered with unattractive means, this discourse often advocates enhancing and/or 
communicating the resources that makes the US attractive, such as democratic values like 
freedom of expression.  
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 Declining soft power can also constitute a security threat, because it makes the US 
more vulnerable to attacks and weakens its ability to build international alliances necessary 
for military actions. However, when anti-Americanism is regarded principally as a security 
threat, it produces a discourse characterized as securitized. Because security prevails over 
other interests in this discourse, the means to counter the threat are not obliged to consider the 
potential loss of soft power. Hence, the securitized discourse has the opportunity to employ 
more diverse means for public diplomacy and other information strategies. 
  Anti-Americanism is in some discourses principally regarded as an economic issue 
that affects the competitiveness of the US and American firms abroad. This approach can 
focus on threats to the trade security as well as marketing power, and the discourse it produces 
can be characterised as marketized. Examples of such threats are potential trade barriers, 
commodity boycotts, declining brand value, etc. Different processes can be described as 
marketization of public diplomacy. One such process involves that public diplomacy activities 
are being outsourced to private actors, on the initiative of governmental institutions or the 
private sector. Another involves that market logic, with discourses and genres associated with 
the private sector, are increasingly diffusing into the public diplomacy sphere. Both processes 
result in a change of the number and variety of agents and methods of public diplomacy.   
 A final set of discourses in the PDWTE order of discourse that is worth mentioning is 
critical discourses that approach the threat of anti-Americanism mainly by its cause, and argue 
that the cause is American foreign policy. These focus on the unethical aspects of public 
diplomacy, whether it relates to the use of propagandistic methods or cultural imperialism. 
Because these discourses usually stay outside boundaries of the practicing public diplomacy 
sphere, they have less influence on the development of the PDWTE order of discourse. 
Therefore, they will only briefly be discussed in this thesis. 
 Discourse analyses can be at risk of becoming vague and inefficient when they avoid 
grounding the discourses in institutions or other tangible spaces. Although the discourses 
under discussion often cross institutional boundaries, it is useful to identify their institutional 
foundations, because different institutions are designed to target different threats and hence 
interpret the situation according to their mandate. I will mainly focus on securitized and 
politicized public diplomacy discourses, but a secondary perspective is how the marketized 
discourses contribute to shaping the other discourses.  
 As discussed in chapter 2, there exist a variety of institutions that in one way of 
another are involved in public diplomacy activities. Central institutions are State Department 
(SD), Office of Global Communications and Broadcasting Board of Governors. Somewhat 
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less acknowledged until recently, is the involvement of the Department of Defense (DoD) in 
public diplomacy activities. Other institutions could be listed, but I will limit this analysis to 
SD and DoD. Which institution performs which tasks of public diplomacy is significant 
because the institutions largely base their practices on different discourses. Of course; because 
the categorisation is analytically essentialised, there will always be exceptions. The categories 
‘securitized’ and ‘politicized’ discourses to some extent correspond with the respective 
institutions’ approach to public diplomacy; DoD employing securitized discourses and SD 
politicized. As I will come back to, this pattern is partly shifting because the SD discourse is 
increasingly influenced by the securitized discourse of DoD and the Bush administration.  
 During the interviews with SD people, former diplomats and external critics, an initial 
impression was that they all were familiar with public diplomacy being a conflictual field, and 
a central struggle being between SD and DoD. A representative for the public diplomacy 
culture attributes the struggle to what he calls tribal cultures.  
 
 “Public diplomacy has tribal cultures. Diplomats are a tribal culture; the military can 
 be seen  as a tribal culture. […] The people who do democratisation are a tribal culture; 
 the people who do cultural exchange are a tribal culture. They don’t talk to each other! 
 They want to defend their budget, they want to, ‘the way I approach this is really the 
 answer and you military folks don’t know what you’re talking about’” (Gregory, 
 Interview 2.3.2007). 
 
This description is typical of the State Department public diplomacy discourse. On the one 
hand, public diplomats are almost invariably critical to DoD methods, but on the other, the 
polyphonic presence of the DoD public diplomacy discourse witnessed an exchange between 
the discourses. The notion of polyphony is useful here to point out the influence of the DoD 
on the SD discourse without being present.  
 Before I turn to how the politicized and securitized trends shape specific practices and 
discourses, I will analyse how the geopolitical representation of anti-Americanism direct the 
respective discourses. 
5.1 The Geopolitical Premise of Public Diplomacy Discourses  
The idea of anti-Americanism is essentially geopolitical because it represents a power 
structure by which the US in one way or another is threatened by the outside world. Polls 
about anti-Americanism are omnipresent in contemporary literature about public diplomacy, 
be it “insider” or critical literature (See, for instance, Rugh 2006; Lynch 2006;  Lord 2006; 
Stauber & Rampton 2006; Nye 2004; Telhami 2002; Satloff 2004; Djerejian 2003; Zogby 
2002, etc.), and the polls were frequently referred to by my interviewees. The idea that anti-
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Americanism both shapes the information climate and necessitates public diplomacy is 
hegemonic in the securitized, politicized and marketized discourses. Alternative ideas about 
anti-Americanism and public diplomacy are still available: for instance, it can be claimed that 
anti-Americanism can only be countered by policy change or that public diplomacy can only 
have an impact if the audience already sympathises with the message. These ideas exist in 
critical discourses, but seem to have little influence in the PDWTE order of discourse. An 
observation from my interviews with public diplomacy critics is that the argument that public 
diplomacy can not alter anti-Americanism is not consistently formulated. A typical example: 
 
 “The reason why there’s anti-Americanism in the world is because people don’t like 
 the product, it’s not because it’s not being sold well. That’s the basic flaw in the whole 
 public diplomacy industry. […] Having said that, of course, it’s possible and 
 important for the US to do a much better job at public diplomacy (Toensing, interview 
 26.2.2007).  
 
The articulation seems to be representative for critical discourses: The speakers argue that 
policy change is necessary to turn the unfavourable opinion, yet request typical public 
diplomacy elements in the process, such as language skills, dialogue and cultural sensitivity. 
Therefore, I partly include critical discourses when I argue that there is a broad agreement in 
the PDWTE order of discourse that the challenge of anti-Americanism is a responsibility of 
public diplomacy.  
 What the geopolitical threat of anti-Americanism means, on the other hand, is 
differently defined in the securitized, marketized and politicized discourses. I will briefly 
present some polls about global (especially Muslim) attitudes towards the US, before I discuss 
how the discourses in the PDWTE order of discourse relate to these statistics.  
 Since 9/11, tracking public opinion has become a widespread enterprise, and various 
institutions such as the Pew Global Attitudes Project and Zogby International are involved in 
surveys. The polls show a worldwide trend of plunging opinions towards the US (Kohut 
2007).16 The negative opinions are clearly strongest in Muslim countries, although there has 
been a slight improvement in some countries since the negative peak following the Iraq war. 
Moreover, with the Iraq war, anti-Americanism spread to Muslim countries where the U.S. 
had previously been relatively popular. Polls show that many in Muslim countries began to 
see the U.S. as a threat to Islam after the Iraq war. A 2005 Pew study found that in all five 
                                                
16 All the statistics in this section are from the same report (Kohut 2007), which can be retrieved at 
http://pewglobal.org/commentary/pdf/1019.pdf.  The reason for choosing this particular report is because it 
shows a longer time frame and includes newer figures than most similar reports, and it compares the public 
opinion in relatively many countries.  
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majority Muslim countries surveyed, solid majorities said they worried that the U.S. might 
become a military threat to their country. In 2006, a poll showed that majorities in Jordan, 
Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan believe the war has made the world a more dangerous 
place. The war on terrorism is also perceived quite negatively throughout much of the Muslim 
world, and the support for American anti-terrorism efforts are declining in many parts of the 
globe. An important reason appears to be that people distrust the US’ motives. In a 2004 Pew 
poll, majorities in seven of the nine countries surveyed said the war on terrorism was not 
really a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism. Suspected motives were “to control 
Mideast oil”, “to dominate the world”, “to target unfriendly Muslim governments” and “to 
protect Israel”. A more optimistic finding is that the polls show a significant improvement in 
Indonesian public attitude towards the US after the 2004 tsunami relief efforts. This example 
is also frequently used in public diplomacy literature as a proof that public diplomacy together 
with aid can turn unfavourable opinions.  
 The Pew opinion surveys include several more findings of reasons for the US’ 
declining popularity, and most of them relate to US foreign policy. Because there is an 
agreement that these polls are relevant for public diplomacy, they are interesting for this study 
as a tale the Storyrealm of public diplomacy discourses relate to: The geopolitical threat of 
anti-Americanism is the source of the reinvigoration of public diplomacy in the war on 
terrorism era.  
 Although the consequences of the US’ declining standing are construed differently in 
securitized, marketized and politicized discourses, the polls are uniformly interpreted with the 
notion ‘anti-Americanism’. The hegemony of this notion is interesting, not because it 
necessarily is an inappropriate term, but because it constitutes a central premise throughout 
the PDWTE order of discourse that none of the conflicting discourses seem to question. In 
contrast, there exists no such notion as ‘anti-Norwegianism’ despite of the incendiary 
bombing of the Norwegian embassy in Syria in 2006, or the foreign disapproval of Norway’s 
involvement in controversial industries such as whaling.  
 The hegemony of the notion of anti-Americanism is rather new in the public 
diplomacy discourse. During the Cold War, public diplomacy discourses usually presupposed 
that the audience sympathized with the US because the threat of the Soviet Union was taken 
to be the worse alternative. It was only after 9/11 the notion of anti-Americanism came to 
structure the public diplomacy discourse, although the US’ declining popularity already was a 
concern in the SD in early 2001 (Fullerton and Kendrick 2006). 
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 Before I turn to what premise anti-Americanism forms for the various discourses, a 
short reminder of Laclau and Mouffes’ discourse theory is in place. A discourse is established 
around certain nodal points, which constitute a structuring element that other signs are 
established in relation to. These other signs are categorised as elements and moments, the 
former referring to floating signifiers and the latter to signs with a fixed meaning in the 
discourse. In the PDWTE order of discourse, the signs ‘anti-Americanism’ and ‘security’ are 
central in all the discourses, but their meanings change according to the discourse.  
 In the marketized discourse, an economic rationale constitutes the nodal point. Anti-
Americanism can be seen as a moment because its meaning is fixed as an economic threat and 
hence constitutes the rationale for engaging in public diplomacy. Security can be seen as an 
element because the rather vague idea that anti-Americanism can affect the competitiveness 
and trade security of American firms has made private actors interested in public diplomacy. 
However, it merely constitutes one of various factors, and neither is it clear what security 
means for the specific actor nor is it necessarily the source of the interest. 
 In the securitized discourse, security constitutes the nodal point because all the 
elements and moments in the discourse are structured in relation to it. Anti-Americanism is a 
fixed moment in the discourse. It is uniformly perceived as a security threat, often as an 
existential threat against both the American people and territory through terrorism and against 
American ideology through radical Islamism. Although there are securitized elements to SD 
public diplomacy, a “purer” expression of securitized public diplomacy can be identified in 
the Department of Defense (DoD) approach. The DoD standing body for coordination of 
strategic communication (one of which public diplomacy), the Strategic Communication 
Integration Group (SCIG), has two priorities approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 
These are to “Educate coalition and domestic audiences on Iraq strategy”, and to “Counter al-
Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan” (Wells 2007, 4). In other words, the strategy is broader in 
the sense that it comprises foreign and domestic audiences, but the goal is narrowed down to 
the war on terrorism and the war on Iraq. Due to the narrow goal, the DoD has no other 
matters to balance, and hence, security has a structuring impact on all other interests.  
 In a politicized discourse, the notion of security is a moment because it has a specific 
meaning yet balances the threat with other factors at risk. The SD Director for Public 
Diplomacy for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Alberto Fernandez, attributed this to a 
broader definition of what is at stake in the war on terrorism. 
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  “Everything we do has a cost beyond the cost of the thing itself. […] Guantanamo has 
 other costs to it. It has a social cost, a political cost, a moral cost, it costs you in that 
 critical mass of  goodwill, of a good view of the US that people have, they may be real 
 or not”  (Fernandez, interview 28.2.2007).  
 
This critical mass of goodwill, which can be described with Nye’s notion of ‘soft power’, 
relates to any issue where influence requires other or more assets than military or economic 
power. Such spheres of influence range from trade to diplomacy and popular culture. The 
nodal point in the politicized discourse is thus soft power, and its role for countering terrorism 
exemplifies where this discourse diverges form the securitized. Typical of the politicized 
discourse is the argument that the US in the war on terrorism has relied too much on the 
wrong assets.   
 
 “The problem is that Islamist motivated extremism that is manifested in terrorism, is 
 not overwhelmingly military or security or intelligence related. It’s an intellectual 
 issue, an ideological issue. It built up over time by certain trends of jihadi Islam 
 being perverted or channelled to violent extremes. It is something that is manifested 
 by terrorism, but it did not become that over time by violence. It became what it 
 became over time in schools, in  universities, in the media, on the Internet, in 
 publications, and we [the US] have hardly addressed that side of the problem” 
 (Fernandez, SD, interview 28.2.2007).  
 
The claim that the disregard for root causes in the war on terrorism may have increased the 
terror threat is typical of a politicized approach. Security and terrorism are thus central 
moments, but because these are structured around the nodal point ‘soft power’, security 
attains a different meaning. The notion of anti-Americanism constitutes an element in the 
discourse, however central, because it has a floating meaning: it variably refers to the terror 
threat and the general loss of soft power, particularly following the war on terrorism. This 
dilemma resembles Nye’s theory of world politics as a “three-dimensional chess game”: the 
war on terrorism works in interplay with other games of power. In this three-dimensional 
game, military, economic and transnational issues must be coordinated, and different power 
resources must be judged according to their contexts. In order to succeed in the three-
dimensional game, perceptions must be taken into account and the possible cost of soft power 
must be balanced against other actions. 
 A foundational split in the PDWTE order of discourse is which geopolitical vision 
anti-Americanism is associated with. The premise that anti-Americanism constitutes a 
security threat exists in each discourse, but it does not necessarily securitize the discourse. 
The sign ‘security’ constitutes a nodal point in the securitized discourse, a moment in the 
politicized discourse and an element in the marketized discourse. In practice, this means that 
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‘security’ is imperative to the securitized discourse, has a specific meaning to the politicized 
and exists as a notion to the marketized discourse. The structure of the discourses can be 
summarised as follows: 
 Securitized Politicized Marketized 
Nodal point Security threat Soft power threat Economic threat 
Moment Anti-Americanism Security threat Anti-Americanism 
Element - Anti-Americanism Security threat 
Figure 5.1: The geopolitical premise of the different discourses 
 
The implication of these differences relate to how the security threat is defined, how the 
solution is prescribed and whether this solution prevails or is balanced against other costs. It is 
thus the respective nodal points of the discourses that determine what kind of geopolitical 
threat anti-Americanism constitutes and what considerations that should be taken into account 
for countering it. In a securitized discourse, anti-Americanism represents a security threat that 
must be countered; in a politicized it represents a decline of soft power that must be won 
back. These considerations, in turn, shape the discourses’ guidelines, or “rules”, for public 
diplomacy.  
5.2 The Rules of Public Diplomacy in the Various Discourses 
An initial impression during the interview process was that there exists a discursive struggle 
about the practice of public diplomacy in the PDWTE order of discourse. This discursive 
struggle is about the rules of the game: which methods of public diplomacy and strategic 
communication are appropriate, strategically clever or even legal. These “rules” of public 
diplomacy can be called features of the geopolitical order, because they refer to 
institutionalised patterns that enable geopolitical discourses.  
 The rules of the discourses are not only based on the understanding of anti-
Americanism, they have been produced through the different intertextual histories of the 
discourses. Because the marketized and securitized discourses are “new” challengers to the 
more traditional politicized discourse, they have diverging functions in the PDWTE order of 
discourse. In the recent years, public diplomacy has been heavily debated in news media; 
blogs, articles and books, and some 30 reports have been produced to advise the US 
government about the strategic direction of public diplomacy. This debate is interesting 
because it reveals how different rules apply to public diplomacy according to which 
geopolitical threat it is designated to target: whether the threat of anti-Americanism is based 
on the rationale of security, economics or soft power. I will discuss how the respective 
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discourses have affected the rules of public diplomacy in separate paragraphs: the marketized 
and the politicized discourses in the SD, and the securitized in SD and DoD.  
5.2.1 Marketized Public Diplomacy  
Marketization of public diplomacy in the SD has manifested in different expressions. Two 
distinct periods have characterised the SD discourse since 9/11: Charlotte Beers’ era from 
October 2001 to March 2003 and Karen Hughes’ era from July 2005 to October 2007.17 A 
comparison of Beers’ and Hughes’ practices of is interesting because their respective 
approaches have left such different footprints on the public diplomacy discourse. The 
different receptions of Beers’ and Hughes’ approaches in public diplomacy circles give 
insight in broader tendencies in the discourse.  
The appointment of the former advertising executive Charlotte Beers as Under 
Secretary for public diplomacy and public affairs in 2001 illustrated the influence of the 
marketized discourse, but it also marked its limitations. 
 Months before Beers was sworn in, then Secretary of State Colin Powell told a House 
Budget Committee that the SD would bring “people into the public diplomacy function who 
are going to change from just selling us in the old USIA way to really branding foreign 
policy, branding the department, […] marketing American values to the world” (Fullerton and 
Kendrick 2006, 20). The marketing-discourse was drawn directly from Beers, who later 
introduced the situated genre of advertising in public diplomacy. The introduction of the 
advertising genre in the SD public diplomacy discourse is well described by Fairclough’s 
notion of marketization, referring to market logic diffusing into areas where other discourses 
previously have dominated. Fairclough uses this notion to describe societal change. In this 
case, the marketization process did not produce a permanent change. It rather caused a major 
debate from its introduction, and the method of advertising was accused of being unethical on 
the one hand and counterproductive on the other. The advertising strategy has been advocated 
by some, like the prominent Djerejian report (2003), but the discourse has not taken hold in 
the SD. State Department officials have rather distinguished themselves from Charlotte Beers 
and the advertising strategy. The reluctance to accept the marketized discourse in the SD is 
also an example of the context-dependency of Fairclough’s notion, which often appears as if it 
describes a process without an exit.  
                                                
17 Between March 2003 and July 2005, the position as Under Secretary was occupied for only six months 
between December 2003 and June 2004 by Margaret Tutwiler, former ambassador to Morocco, and for the rest 
remained vacant.  
 62 
 After Beers’ resignation, the SD internally chose to push back on the marketized 
discourse. Still, it is involved in a different marketization process by encouraging businesses 
to engage in public diplomacy.18 Karen Hughes underlined the role of the private sector in her 
first testimony as Under Secretary before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2005. 
Under the heading “the Mission of Public Diplomacy”, she claimed that, “We […] must 
develop effective ways to marshal the great creativity of our private sector […] because I 
believe this engagement is critical to our success” (Hughes 2005). Sheldon Rampton at the 
Center for Media and Democracy explained this tendency with the businesses’ more 
differentiated means for public diplomacy: Businesses can reach into foreign cultures in ways 
the government does not, like consumption, and have fewer legal restraints. The businesses’ 
motivation for engaging in public diplomacy activities, Rampton argued, is that they are 
concerned that the declining American reputation abroad affects their ability to do business, 
and they believe that they can do a better job than the government (Rampton, interview 
12.2.2007). 
 The marketization process of the SD discourse in Karen Hughes’ era was substantially 
different than that of Charlotte Beers. On the one hand, the increase of agents performing 
public diplomacy efforts without leaving government fingerprints makes more differentiated 
efforts possible. On the other hand, because other agents take on some of this work, the SD 
public diplomacy discourse can sway away from the marketized discourse and focus on 
democratic ideals, which are seen as less controversial as governmental public diplomacy 
activities. This subtle marketizing process thus simultaneously leads to a politicization of SD 
public diplomacy.  
5.2.2 Politicized Public Diplomacy  
Since Karen Hughes entered office, process issues have been reversed and transformed in the 
State Department. During her first testimony, “the Mission of Public Diplomacy” 
(22.06.2005), Hughes described her approach to public diplomacy in the war on terrorism, 
which was clearly influenced by the premise of soft power:  
 
 “In the long run, the way to prevail in this battle [of ideas] is through the power of our 
 ideals; for they speak to all of us, every people in every land on every continent. 
 Given a fair hearing, I am sure they will prevail. […] Our adversaries resort to 
 propaganda, myths, intimidation and control because they don’t want people to 
 decide for themselves. In contrast, we want to create the connections and conditions 
                                                
18 The involvement of the private sector is not new in public diplomacy, but the past years it has become a 
central issue in public diplomacy discourses.  
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 that allow people to make up their own minds, because we are confident that given a 
 fair hearing and a free choice, people will choose freedom over tyranny and tolerance 
 over extremism every time.” 
 
The emphasis on attractive power situates the articulation in a politicized discourse, which in 
the next turn affects the strategic direction and selection of methods to target the geopolitical 
threat. To accomplish the mission of public diplomacy, Karen Hughes outlined four strategic 
pillars for public diplomacy in the war on terrorism, “the four E’s”: engagement, exchanges, 
education and empowerment. ‘Engagement’ refers to the advocacy of American ideas and 
rapid response to “confront hateful propaganda, dispel dangerous myths, and get out the truth” 
(Hughes 22.06.2005). ‘Exchanges’ means giving more people the opportunity to live, work 
and study in the US, so that they “can learn for themselves that Americans are generous, hard-
working people who value faith and family” (Ibid). ‘Education’ refers both to enhancing 
Americans’ knowledge about the world and offering English language training programs in 
foreign countries. ‘Empowerment’ involves advocating participation for women, and helping 
those who share American values. Another notion that public diplomacy people associate with 
Karen Hughes is ‘dialogue’. The strategic pillars and the dialogic ideal appear to be widely 
embraced by public diplomats. What Hughes has often been criticized for is that she does not 
always herself follow her ideals: she is rather infamous for talking more than she listens, and 
for not being sensitive to cultural differences when she is advocating ‘universal ideals’.  
 Hughes’ selection of methods reflects the politicized discourse: they are balanced 
against other potential costs. Since 9/11 and following the war on terrorism, it has been 
reported that American public diplomacy efforts have been received as propaganda and 
attempts to control foreign public opinion. Examples of controversial efforts are the 
advertising campaign Shared Value Initiative, Hi Magazine and the television channel Al 
Hurra. It seems that the image as a propagandist that followed these efforts has been taken 
seriously, because Karen Hughes and the SD have either abandoned or started to relate 
differently to the controversial public diplomacy efforts. Only a few months after Hughes 
entered office, Hi Magazine was suspended. The SD started more or less to distance itself 
from Al Hurra, which is a product of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Instead of talking 
on Al Hurra, Hughes and public diplomats chose to show up on Arabic media like Al Jazeera 
and Al Arabiya, which have larger audiences and higher credibility among Muslims.  
 Not only has Karen Hughes reversed unpopular public diplomacy efforts, new 
methods have been introduced. A priority under the strategic pillar ‘engagement’ is the Rapid 
Response Unit, which provides extensive monitoring of foreign media. The purpose is to keep 
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track of misinformation and criticism of American policies and actions, and provide 
guidelines for synchronic response to public diplomats in the field. The Rapid Response Unit 
aims to restore the US’ credibility, which is seen to have been undermined by the 
contradictory messages in the war on terrorism and the war on Iraq. Process efforts have also 
been set in place to weaken the negative image of the SD as an information-controlling 
institution, like giving ambassadors freer reins to give speeches without having to clear them 
with the SD first. 
 The strategic pillars ‘empowerment’ and ‘education’ underline the focus on root 
causes of anti-Americanism and terrorism, which is also a typical feature of the politicized 
discourse. A central project of the SD is the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), which 
was launched by President George W. Bush in 2002. Through more than 350 programs, MEPI 
supports indigenous organizations in the Middle East that are working to bring about 
structural and institutional reform in their own countries. The project addresses the following 
“obstacles” to development: political governance and participation, economic liberalization 
and opportunity, educational quality and access, and the empowerment of women. Karen 
Hughes has spent much effort on outreach tours to inform Middle Eastern audiences about 
MEPI and US aid. 
 Another aspect that situates the SD public diplomacy in a politicized discourse is the 
designation of the target audience. The target audience is people throughout the whole world 
(except in the US), not merely people in strategically important areas such as the Middle East. 
As illustrated by Nye’s metaphorical three-dimensional chessboard of world politics, each 
game of power must be played simultaneously to succeed in military, economic or 
transnational issues. Not only Middle Eastern audiences, but also others like the European, 
have strong opinions about American actions in the war on terrorism, including information 
programs. A reason for marking a distance from propagandistic methods is the negative 
impact it has had on the public opinion throughout the world, including Europe. The use of 
propaganda in the war on terrorism has signalled that the US is abandoning its own ideals 
about freedom of expression and democracy, which renders the US less attractive to cooperate 
with for Europeans. Although several public diplomacy programs designated for Europeans 
exist, I have limited the analysis to efforts specifically directed to Muslim audiences. 
 A superficial comparison of the public diplomacy approaches of Charlotte Beers and 
Karen Hughes gives impression that the change is radical. Indeed, the change of approach is 
substantial, but it is important to note that the politicized part of Hughes’ approach resembles 
much traditional public diplomacy, which was performed during Beers’ era as well. 
 65 
Exchanges and outreach tours, for instance, have been central strategies all along; the 
difference is the degree of priority. Neither were any of the Under Secretaries dictators of the 
public diplomats in the SD or in the field: experienced employees have ensured a continuance 
of traditional practices.  
 The significance of comparing the two eras is that the impact of the respective 
approaches to public diplomacy reveals how the geopolitical situation is defined and solution 
prescribed in the State Department. Whether a method is embraced or rejected depends on 
how the discourse defines its purpose. In public diplomacy circles, Karen Hughes’ ideals and 
methods seem to have been embraced and those introduced by Charlotte Beers largely 
rejected.19 However, Karen Hughes’ purpose of public diplomacy appears to have been 
contradictory: it appears to have juggled soft power with a narrower, securitized approach. 
5.2.3 Securitized public diplomacy     
The SD and the DoD have different roles in securitizing public diplomacy. In the SD, Karen 
Hughes started to regard public diplomacy as a security priority and hence strengthened its 
position. Simultaneously, tasks have been shifted from the SD to the DoD where other 
traditions and rules shape the discourse. It appears that Karen Hughes has had a firm hand in 
shifting the responsibility of public diplomacy. 
 In her departure press conference on 31.October 2007, Karen Hughes stated the link 
between public diplomacy and security. “I feel that I have done what Secretary Rice and 
President Bush asked me to do by transforming public diplomacy and making it a national 
security priority central to everything we do in government.” According to public diplomats, 
the coordination process must have started after Donald Rumsfeld was replaced by Robert 
Gates as Secretary of Defense in December 2006, because Rumsfeld was not concerned with 
the “hearts and minds-issues” (Rugh, interview 26.2.2007).  
 In the past years, a number of articles in the US press have reported that political and 
military leaders are frustrated because the government does not have an integrated process for 
strategic communication in the war on terrorism. According to Brigadier General Eder in the 
U.S. Army, this frustration has been vented toward the DoD and the military services (Eder 
2007). To counter the problem of unsynchronised information, Karen Hughes started a 
process for closer coordination and integration among various government agencies dealing 
                                                
19 The rejection of Charlotte Beers’ methods is somewhat overstated, but the nuances of this argument will be 
analysed in chapter 6. 
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with public information. The process of associating public diplomacy more with strategic 
communication, Eder argues, is transforming the way SD works (Eder 2007).  
 There are clear and distinct rules for governmental public diplomacy in the US. Since 
the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 banned the government from propagandizing domestic 
audience, there has been a practice of distinguishing formally between public diplomacy and 
public affairs. What distinguishes strategic communication from “the old stovepiped way 
of doing business”, according to Eder, is “formal cooperation among communicators” (Eder 
63, 2007). In order to avoid mixed messages in the war on terrorism, a process of coordination 
between strategic actors has been initiated, which blurs the distinction between public 
diplomacy, public affairs and other strategic communication. This transformation is caused by 
the entrance of a securitized discourse in the SD: the purpose has been narrowed down to 
target the security threat of anti-Americanism. The exchange between the discourses can be 
explained with the notion interdiscursivity, which describes how borders between discourses 
move when fixed moments from one discourse enters another. In the politicized discourse, 
attempts to fix the meaning of ‘security’ in a narrow sense are gradually challenging the 
discourse. However, the controversy of the coordinating process indicates that the rule has yet 
to become conventional in the discourse.  
 A reason for the controversy among SD public diplomats to cooperate with the DoD 
on public diplomacy is that the respective institutions have different motives and methods. In 
the DoD discourse, the main challenges public diplomacy is designated to solve, is the 
information problem in the war on terrorism, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. The special 
nature of security enables discourses relying on its premise to justify extraordinary means to 
counter the threat. As the DoD motivation for engaging in public diplomacy is exclusively 
defined in terms of security, more diverse methods are considered legitimate. The overarching 
principle to deal with the problem is strategic communication, which aims to achieve specific 
goals with fewer restraints on the means. A public diplomacy officer who recently served in 
Iraq, Richard Schmierer, explained the military information effort as a more differentiated 
approach. People at the SD, he argued, have certain guidelines appropriate for their purpose. 
Because the SD does not per se fight wars, the information activities have to be completely 
transparent, credible and truthful. The same guidelines apply to DoD regular public affairs 
operations, but not necessarily to information operations for tactical purposes, and tactical 
warfare. Such information operations include paying local newspapers for publishing 
information without revealing the source. This information, Schmierer argued, must be 
truthful, but paint a helpful picture, like when a new school has been opened, the road has 
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been paved, or a clinic has been built. Tactical warfare can include untrue information, such 
as planting the word on the street that the US military has planted a spy in an enemy 
organisation to distract the enemy (Schmierer, interview 2.3.2007).  
 The fact that the DoD and the military’s methods have not been saved from 
controversy clarifies some of their public diplomacy regulations. When DoD practice of 
buying media space for favourable information through Lincoln Group was revealed by LA 
Times in November 2005, it caused a heated debate in American and European press. 
According to a public diplomat to the Middle East, the DoD and White House also reacted 
negatively on the practice, but the practice of using Lincoln Group was never changed (Rugh, 
interview 26.2.2007). After an internal investigation, the DoD concluded officially that the 
practice was within their mandate (NTB 20.10. 2006). In comparison, the SD employed a 
similar technique with the mentioned campaign Shared Values Initiative in 2002, which I will 
analyse in chapter 6. Similar to the Lincoln Group practice, a root criticism of the campaign 
was that the SD covered the source. However, the SD did not conclude  that the practice was 
within their mandate, but rather marked a distance from it. This comparison exemplifies how 
different rules apply to the SD and DoD public diplomacy discourses. 
5.2.4 The Difficult Coordination Process 
There is broad agreement in the PDWTE order of discourse that the contradictory messages in 
the war on terrorism have been a problem. Although efforts are made to streamline SD and 
DoD public diplomacy processes, a frequent complaint is that these agents are playing on too 
diverse strings. 
 
 There are so many cooks involved, so many agencies involved in framing an 
 American message, and they can’t agree on a message, because the bureaucracy has 
 become so huge. Trying to get the State Department, the Pentagon, the National 
 Security Council, various other interest groups to agree on a message, […] they 
 wouldn’t know what to do (Brown, interview 23.2.2007). 
 
The size of the bureaucracy is not the only issue at stake here. As already mentioned, some 
SD-affiliated public diplomats are unhappy with the DoD and the military’s involvement in 
public diplomacy. The DoD has been called an “elephant in the room”, “a bull in a china 
store”, and its involvement in public diplomacy has been described as “It’s like giving a 
loaded gun to a child!” Of course, this negative sentiment can be attributed to the defence of 
tribal cultures, but it should not be surprising that coordination of public diplomacy messages 
can be difficult when the purpose and the means profoundly diverge.  
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 Some SD-affiliated public diplomats are upset with the DoD methods and literally feel 
that their own work is being undermined. One example is the practice of paying for media 
coverage: 
 “I was there, in Afghanistan, when journalists asked me, ‘Mr. Fernandez, when do we 
 get our  money?’ They were bribing journalists! We could never do something like 
 that. For one thing, we don’t have that kind of money. For the other, it would have 
 been a very bad idea” (Fernandez, interview 28.2.2007).  
 
Although public diplomats experience difficulties with getting media coverage, they engage 
in a long-term relationship with journalists and editors and hence depend on credibility. For 
that reason, SD public diplomats are concerned that DoD practice is undermining the normal, 
“non-bribing way” (Schmierer, interview 2.3.2007). The concerns are that anything they get 
in the newspaper can be suspected for being there only because money changed hands, or that 
such practices contribute to the image of the US as a self-declared authority controlling 
information towards other countries. The DoD acceptance of such practices witnesses the 
differences in time frame as well as purpose of the respective institutions’ approaches. 
 The discourses share the premise that anti-Americanism constitutes a security threat, 
but diverge on which game of power the threat is situated in and hence what practices are 
strategically appropriate. Moreover, the rules of the discourses have been produced through 
different intertextual histories. The politicized discourse resembles what is called “traditional 
public diplomacy”, which has a long history of debating the appropriateness of different 
methods. Securitized and marketized discourses, however, have little intertextual history, and 
hence, their rules are only known by the reaction following their deviance. It should not be 
surprising if the coordination process of SD and DoD public diplomacy and strategic 
communication practices turn out to be difficult. The respective institutions are designated to 
target different challenges that require different considerations, and for the same reason, they 
have different messages to communicate. 
5.3 Diverging Discourses – Clashing Messages  
How the geopolitical threat of anti-Americanism is defined in a public diplomacy discourse 
affects which messages that will arise to explain and encounter it. The respective nodal points 
‘security’ and ‘soft power’ in securitizing and politicizing discourses connote fundamentally 
different representations of the geopolitical ‘Other’, the anti-American. Exchanges of these 
representations inevitably clash: the geopolitical representation of a security threat requires a 
corresponding representation of an enemy, while the soft power approach aims to build 
bridges. 
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 A central task of public diplomacy in the war on terrorism, in Charlotte Beers’ as well 
as Karen Hughes’ era, has been to challenge the tale of clash of civilisations. The ‘clash of 
civilisations’ theory was introduced by Samuel Huntington in Foreign Affairs in 199320 and 
has been established in different ways throughout the geopolitical culture. The ‘clash-thesis’ 
was developed within the pre-genre of formal geopolitics, and proposed that cultural and 
religious identities would be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world. A 
‘civilization’ in this context refers to the highest rank of cultural identities. Huntington 
identified eight such civilizations in the world, mainly following religious lines: The African, 
Hindu, Western, Islamic, Sinic, Orthodox, Japanese and Latin American. 
 Huntington’s thesis is heavily debated in academia, but has been exported as mainly 
an image to practical and popular geopolitics. On the journey from formal to practical 
geopolitics in the war on terrorism, the clash-thesis has changed connotations and refers to a 
clash between the civilization and the non-civilization. This representation has lingered with 
time: The first National Strategy for Combating Terrorism from February 2003 stated that, 
“The war against terrorism […] is not some sort of ‘clash of civilizations’; instead, it is a 
clash between civilisation and those who would destroy it” (Bush 2003, 29) On the 
President’s Address to the Nation on the fifth anniversary of 9/11, the image was repeated: 
“This struggle has been called a clash of civilizations. In truth, it is a struggle for civilization. 
[…] We are now in the early hours of this struggle between tyranny and freedom” (Bush, 
9.11.2006). The clash-thesis has also taken some hold in popular culture, but as popular 
geopolitics it has mainly been reduced to a metaphor, usually referring to a clash of binary 
civilizations. This is the clash-discourse that public diplomacy aims to challenge.  
 The clash-thesis constitutes fundamentally different tales in the politicizing and the 
securitizing discourses. According to the politicizing discourse, the diffusion of the tale itself 
constitutes a geopolitical threat, because it contributes to the idea that Muslim anti-
Americanism is natural. When an idea is perceived as natural, it is severely difficult to 
counter. A State Department official argued that because Al Qaeda feeds off the concept of 
polarisation, a major public diplomacy task is to break that image. The problem is that people 
in the US and the West sometimes mirror the polarised discourse, he argued:  
 
 “This feeds into their idea of the conflict, this clash of civilization. That is why I 
 always say on Arab media that ‘I am against Huntington. I reject that idea. I don’t 
                                                
20 The notion was first used by Bernard Lewis in 1990, but has since the formulation of the theory in 1993 been 
attributed to Huntington.  
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 believe in a clash of civilizations. Because we’re all part of the same civilization. The 
 West is the child of the same civilization as Islam’” (Fernandez, interview 28.2.2007). 
 
In other words: while the politicized discourse uses public diplomacy to build alliances, the 
Bush administration’s definition of the war on terrorism as a clash between civilization and 
non-civilization counteracts the discourse. 
 In the politicized discourse, it is frequently argued that the very notion ‘war on 
terrorism’ is a public diplomacy challenge. One of the reasons is that the war on terrorism 
almost exclusively targets a certain kind of terrorism: Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. The 
problem is, according to a public diplomat who recently served in Iraq,  
 
 “when you mobilise your efforts worldwide against that threat, you’re mobilising 
 them against an Arab/Muslim threat. So you’ve got that natural conflict where you’re 
 doing what is appropriate security wise, but perception wise, it convinces some people 
 in the Arab and Muslim world that it’s actually not against terrorism but against Arabs 
 and Muslims” (Schmierer, interview 2.3.2007). 
 
The representation of the war on terrorism as a war on Muslims is according to SD public 
diplomats also mirrored by the DoD and military’s practices. A SD public diplomat gave this 
example: “In Guantanamo two Saudi prisoners committed suicide. Then, this US military 
official called it a terrorist act, that they had killed themselves. Can you imagine? We had to 
clean up that mess!” (Fernandez, interview 28.2.2007).  
 The reason for the warnings from the politicized discourse against the equation of 
terrorists and Muslims is that it enlarges the group that potentially could identify themselves 
as terrorists. Public diplomacy is designated to target the demand-side of terrorism, which is 
ordinary people’s inclination to sympathize with terrorist groups because they perceive the 
US as a worse alternative.  
 A basic problem is that a message that makes sense in one discourse has different 
implications in another. Securitized public diplomacy is founded on the idea that the US is 
threatened, and this idea necessitates a representation of a conflict and an enemy. In politics 
and military discourses in the war on terrorism it makes sense to talk about ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
and to present certain groups as enemies, because it stimulates domestic support. The 
geopolitical representation of the Muslim as the anti-American, however, simultaneously 
represents the American as anti-Muslim. 
 In chapter 6, I will analyse an example of a SD public diplomacy campaign that aims 
to deconstruct the image of a natural conflict between Americans and Muslims. But first, I 
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will analyse the politicized and securitized discourses’ relative establishment in the ‘public 
diplomacy in the war on terrorism era’ (PDWTE) order of discourse. 
5.4 The Relative Power of the Diverging Discourses  
There is a broad agreement in the US government that anti-Americanism should be countered 
with coordinated strategic communication. According to public diplomats, there has been an 
increased focus on perception since the earlier stages of the Iraq war, when the primary focus 
was on the military side. However, the increased attention on perceptions and strategic 
communication has also changed the focus on public diplomacy. Two contradictory, yet 
concomitant, processes seem to be occurring simultaneously: an overall securitization of 
public diplomacy and a purification of the politicized discourse. 
 DoD involvement in public diplomacy has until recent years officially been limited. In 
2001, the distribution of responsibility for public diplomacy between SD and DoD was in a 
report by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination 
(DoD 2001), described as follows:  
 
 “DoD public diplomacy is comprised of strategic actions such as deployment of 
 troops and ships for combined training or demonstration of resolve, official visits, and 
 defense and military contacts with foreign officials. However, there is no one within 
 DoD specifically tasked to plan or conduct PD activities even though 
 DoD possesses enormous potential to influence foreign audiences through an 
 organized and coordinated PD program. […] The State Department is the primary 
 Government agency responsible for the conduct of PD.”  
 
What should be noted from this October 2001 report is that the DoD performed public 
diplomacy without any coordinating unit, and that SD was acknowledged as the primary 
agency responsible for public diplomacy. In 2006, DoD declassified a new strategic direction, 
approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 2003. This direction, proposed in the QDR 
Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap, seeks to achieve three overarching objectives: 
(1) “Define roles and develop strategic communication doctrine for the primary 
communication-supporting capabilities: public affairs, information operations, military 
diplomacy, and defense support to public diplomacy.” (2) “Resource, organize, train, and 
equip DoD primary communication support capabilities.” (3) “Institutionalize a DoD process 
in which strategic communication is incorporated in the development of strategic policy, 
planning, and execution” (Eder 2007). Following this roadmap, the DoD established a 
Strategic Communication Integration Group (SCIG). This shift of ambitions for DoD public 
diplomacy indicates that the DoD position as a public diplomacy perpetrator has been 
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significantly strengthened between 2001 and 2006 and increases its relevance in the PDWTE 
order of discourse.  
 Although there is a broad agreement that public diplomacy is important in the war on 
terrorism and DoD resources for this task have been strengthened, the SD public diplomacy 
discourse is still struggling for recognition. When Karen Hughes entered the SD, it was 
expected that the status of public diplomacy would improve because the Under Secretary was 
close to the president. Still, according to the Director for Public Diplomacy for the Bureau of 
Near Eastern Affairs in the State Department, Alberto Fernandez; the State Department finds 
that the Congress has a hard time understanding what public diplomacy is. “It’s easier for 
parliaments to approve money for national defence than, people understand that, ‘defend the 
motherland’, than to do ‘What, with foreigners? What are you doing with them? You’re 
giving them money to do what?’” (Fernandez, interview 28.2.2007). The result is, Fernandez 
argued, that the SD is not getting enough tools to do public diplomacy: “I just took a budget 
cut for our embassies that are doing this work of half a million dollars, so instead of having 
more money, […] they have less money to do this. Even though this problem is bigger in that 
region than it was before.” Fernandez estimated that the total SD spending on public 
diplomacy is about 800 million dollars. “That’s 800 million dollars,” he said, “but it’s nothing 
compared to how much money the Pentagon spends. The Pentagon has billions and billions of 
dollars” (Fernandez, Interview 28.2.2007). Another sign that SD public diplomacy does not 
correspond with the Congress’ stated aims for the war on terrorism is that the Middle East 
according to Fernandez is “not favoured over other parts of the world” when it comes to 
funding, although the problem of anti-Americanism is worse in that region (Fernandez, 
interview 28.2.2007). 
 Fernandez is not the only SD-affiliated person who is concerned with how funding for 
public diplomacy has shifted from SD to DoD. A former Foreign Service Officer to Muslim 
countries argued that the DoD is using the war in Iraq as an “open wedge” to expand into 
public diplomacy operations (Rugh, interview 26.2.2007). However, he argued, the purpose of 
this expansion is unclear. Another former Foreign Service Officer found that most people 
working for the DoD were not really interested in public diplomacy, but “because of the 
pressure about the minds and hearts, from Congress and other American spheres of influence 
that the Pentagon felt that it had to get into the hearts and minds game war” (Brown, interview 
23.2.2007). Brown argued that SD public diplomacy people have been warned that the money 
for public diplomacy activities in the future will go to DoD. This duality is interesting: on the 
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one hand, there has been an increased focus on ‘hearts and minds’, but the institution 
traditionally designated for the task is increasingly excluded in favour of another. 
 According to John Stauber, the director of the Madison-based Center for Media and 
Democracy (CMD), which publishes critical literature on public diplomacy, the DoD employs 
arguments that resonate better with the Bush administration. Stauber has observed a split 
between public diplomacy people in the SD and the “war on Iraq-people” in the lead up to the 
Iraq war and up to today. Before the military intervention in Iraq, Stauber argued, Rumsfeld 
and Cheney “were on war” with Colin Powell and the public diplomacy types, and the latter 
lost that round (Stauber, interview 12.2.2007). Sheldon Rampton from the same institution 
(CMD) characterised these two viewpoints on American foreign policy as follows:  
 
 “the public diplomacy people in the SD come from a philosophy, which focuses on the 
 need to  be diplomatic and try to cultivate friends. The Bush administration, on the 
 other hand, fundamentally believes that hard power is the only real power, and that if 
 you press your adversaries, their hearts and minds will fall” (Rampton, interview 
 12.2.2007).  
  
Although this polarisation is intentionally overstated, it gives an impression of the discursive 
struggle. The relevance of the split is that the SD depends on the Bush administration and 
Congress for allocation of resources for public diplomacy. In order to get sufficient funding, 
the public diplomacy discourse needs to correspond with the Congress’ perception of its 
purpose and utility. Towards the Congress, the securitized discourse is relatively stronger. 
However, the audience supporting the securitization of the discourse is not only the Congress, 
but also the agents involved. The practices of intentionally shifting tasks from the SD to the 
DoD and coordinating tasks to increasingly resemble DoD methods witness a securitizing 
effect on Karen Hughes’ approach to public diplomacy.  
 The securitization process of the PDWTE order of discourse is occurring on two 
levels: firstly, tasks are shifted from SD to DoD, and secondly, the rules of public diplomacy 
change due to the redefinition of its purpose.  
 That being said, claiming that public diplomacy in the war on terrorism era has 
become uniformly securitized, would be an overstatement. The incorporation of the notion of 
‘order of discourse’ in the security analysis opens the categories to explain the disintegrated 
succession of the securitization process. Simultaneously with the securitization of public 
diplomacy, the politicized discourse has within its own boundaries increasingly legitimised its 
position. Karen Hughes has at the same time purified the politicized discourse and validated 
different spaces for marketized and securitized public diplomacy. This purification may 
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enhance the SD credibility without precluding the variety of methods for performing public 
diplomacy. However, when the methods applied and the messages to communicate diverge 
profoundly, the question is whether these can be compliant or the securitized discourse will 
undermine the politicized in the end. The effect of the coordination may very well be a 
successful sensitisation of the DoD information practices, but it is unlikely that the DoD 
changes the premise of its public diplomacy discourse, since it is firmly rooted in the mandate 
of the institution.  
5.5 The Geopolitical Rationale of Public Diplomacy in the PDWTE  
Three aspects explain the geopolitical rationale of public diplomacy in the war on terrorism 
era (PDWTE). The first aspect concerns what geopolitical representations that form the 
premises of this order of discourse, which I have argued is anti-Americanism and the 
geopolitical vision it is associated with. Various discourses struggle for the definition of the 
geopolitical situation, labelled politicized, securitized and marketized discourses according to 
how they construe the representation of anti-Americanism. The discourses share the premise 
that anti-Americanism constitutes a security threat, but diverge on which game of power the 
threat is situated in and hence what considerations should be incorporated in the strategy to 
counter it. In the politicized discourse, anti-Americanism is regarded as a threat to American 
soft power, which can only be won back with attractive means. In the securitized discourse, 
the threat is considered potentially existential against American territory and people as well as 
ideology, and should be countered with emergency measures. In the marketized discourse, 
anti-Americanism is situated in an economic game of power and constitutes a rather vague 
threat to American competitiveness and trade security. The game of power where the 
discourses are situated shapes the guidelines, or “rules”, for public diplomacy. This is the 
second aspect of the geopolitical rationale: how the geopolitical representations manifest in 
public diplomacy efforts, through the designation of appropriate institutions, means and 
messages.  
 The most central institutions involved in public diplomacy activities in the war on 
terrorism era are the State Department (SD) and the Department of Defense (DoD). Since 
9/11, which was the catalyst of public diplomacy in the war on terrorism era, the politicized, 
securitized and marketized discourses have had different functions in each institution. The 
discursive struggle about the geopolitical situation has manifested in a shift of resource 
allocations and tasks for public diplomacy from the SD to the DoD. In that sense, DoD, which 
largely produces a securitized discourse, has gradually strengthened its position as a public 
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diplomacy perpetrator. The SD discourse has since 9/11 been characterised by two shifts 
represented by the different Under Secretaries of State for public diplomacy and public 
affairs, Charlotte Beers and Karen Hughes. In Beers’ era, a somewhat contradictory 
marketized and politicized discourse was produced within the SD. Hughes cultivated space 
for all three discourses by outsourcing tasks to the DoD and encouraging the private sector to 
involve in public diplomacy activities.   
  Because the respective institutions are designated to target different geopolitical 
threats that require diverging considerations, they consider the appropriateness of methods 
and messages differently. Concerning the methods for public diplomacy, there is a conflict 
between the politicized discourse, which requires the use of attractive means, and the other 
discourses, which have fewer restrictions. The geopolitical representation each discourse is 
founded on sometimes also produces contradictory messages. While securitized public 
diplomacy is founded on a representation of a conflict and an enemy, politicized public 
diplomacy aims to attract allies. This natural conflict relates to the third aspect of the 
geopolitical rationale of this public diplomacy era, the output of the discursive struggle.  
 The result of the marketized and securitized discourses’ influence on public diplomacy 
involves that tasks have been shifted between agents and the rules of public diplomacy have 
changed due to the redefinition of their purpose. Simultaneously, the SD discourse has 
through the shifting of tasks defined its approach in negation to the securitized and marketized 
discourses and cultivated a soft power approach to public diplomacy. This double-edged 
process leaves a challenge for the future of American public diplomacy: to synchronise two 
strategies with profoundly divergent purpose, methods and messages.  
 In the following chapter, I will use the same questions to analyse a case, the public 
diplomacy campaign Shared Values Initiative from 2002. This campaign has been so much 
debated that it gives a unique insight in which methods and messages are considered 
controversial or acceptable.  
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6   SHARED VALUES INITIATIVE:         
  CONTROVERSY AND GEOPOLITICAL VISIONS  
 
The advertising campaign Shared Values Initiative from 2002 is without doubt the most 
debated public diplomacy effort in the war on terrorism era. Although the campaign is an 
early representative of this era, its continuing controversy reveals the rules and boundaries for 
the State Department public diplomacy discourse and makes it particularly interesting as a 
case. It has both politicizing and marketizing elements, and evolves in interplay with 
securitizing discourses. As an advertising campaign, the strategic nature of the message also 
highlights the geopolitics of the discourse. 
 The campaign was the brainchild of then Under Secretary for public diplomacy and 
public affairs Charlotte Beers, who resigned her post following the controversy. It combined 
traditional public diplomacy methods with advertising, a new genre in public diplomacy. The 
campaign included speeches by American Muslims and diplomats to international audiences, 
town hall events in several countries, Internet sites and chat rooms, the 60-page colour 
magazine Muslim Life in America, a series of newspaper and radio ads and five television 
commercials. Because the other elements have received far less attention, I will only focus on 
the television ad campaign, from hereon called the SVI21.  
 In this chapter, two aspects of the campaign will be discussed. Firstly, I will conduct a 
geopolitical discourse analysis of the film spots, to search for geopolitical representations 
embedded in their discourse, and how they manifest themselves. More specifically, these 
representations relate to the portrayal of central geopolitical subjects: Muslims and 
Americans. Secondly, I will discuss the controversy of the campaign, and analyse its role in 
the development of the order of discourse called ‘public diplomacy in the war on terrorism 
era’ (PDWTE): What does the debate about the campaign tell us about this order of discourse 
– what kinds of messages and methods are controversial and conventional? And what kind of 
power does the campaign execute? But first, I will briefly present the campaign and the 
                                                
21 The SVI will interchangeably be called SVI and ‘the campaign’ when referring to the product and the 
infrastructure of its making, and ‘the ads’ and ‘the spots’ when referring to the discursive content. 
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analytical strategy employed. It can be useful to watch the spots or read the transcription of 
the Shared Values television commercials in the appendix before proceeding.22 
6.1 SVI as a Geopolitical Counter Discourse 
The intention of the SVI campaign, according to internal State Department reports, was “to 
foster free, candid and respectful engagement and exchange between Americans and people 
from the Muslim world” (Fullerton and Kendrick 2006, 26). According to Under Secretary 
Charlotte Beers, Fullerton and Kendrick write, “the ultimate goal for the campaign would 
be ‘discussion and debate’, as opposed to changing minds about US foreign policy” (Ibid, 27). 
The target audience was “the people”, especially mothers and teachers in the target countries. 
In order to understand the target audience, Beers consulted a research tool called 
ValueScopeTM, which employs consumer research based on personal values. This research 
identifies 57 values that respondents are asked to rank in the order of personal importance. 
The 2002 ValueScopeTM research revealed several differences between the US and Muslim 
countries, but also significant agreement on values such as faith, family and learning. Based 
on these findings, Beers designed a campaign to focus on the shared values of Americans and 
Muslims. The work with the campaign started shortly after Beers was sworn in as Under 
Secretary in October 2001. Throughout Ramadan in 2002, the campaign was aired on state-
run media systems in Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Kuwait. It was also available to 
viewers in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Lebanon and the United Arab 
Emirates via pan-Arab satellite and in Kenya and Tanzania through embassy placement. 
 The campaign consists of five short ads, depicting American Muslims in their daily 
lives in the US. Their respective titles reflect the profession of the main characters: Baker, 
Doctor, Teacher, Journalist and Fire fighter. Each spot lasts for about two minutes, except 
the spot Fire fighter, which lasts for one minute. Visually, the spots are simple and look 
home-made. The stories are narrated mainly through the voice of one or two main characters, 
supported by images and music. Because the characters appear so determined about the 
subject under discussion, it seems like they either “answer” questions that they perceive the 
target audience to have, or even deliberately try to challenge a discourse they perceive as 
dominating.23  
                                                
22 The film spots can be downloaded from http://www.osu-tulsa.okstate.edu/sharedvalues/commercials.aspx 
23 Whether the questions actually stem from the characters or the producer is unclear. Although characters’ 
articulations appear to be personal, they may have been carefully directed, but neither do I find any indications 
of this nor is it important for the analysis.   
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 I will employ an analytical strategy that I have developed with notions from Bakhtin, 
Young and Laclau and Mouffe, with emphasis on finding relations and boundaries between 
discourses through polyphony and negation. The operational research question is why are the 
characters saying what they are saying? A premise for this analytical strategy is that the ads 
do not operate in accordance with their own discursive conventions: they are a contribution to 
an already established discursive struggle. I understand the spots as a counter discourse to a 
perceived dominating discourse about the US in Muslim countries. When understood as such, 
the spots give access to two geopolitical discourses simultaneously: the Storyrealm, or the 
discourse of the film spots, and the imagined intertextual history that the characters “talk 
back” to, the Taleworld. The characters’ contribution is thus to a discursive struggle to 
prevent the thought adversary discourse’s hegemony. This makes their discourse polyphonic 
of the third kind: the characters draw their understanding from a discourse that is nowhere 
mentioned. Although the intentions of the campaign are beyond the scope of this analysis, it is 
hard to imagine that the campaign had been produced if no discourse had existed claiming 
that Muslims were badly treated in the US. Still, it should be noted that the findings of the 
forthcoming analysis are based on the analytical strategy rather than the intention of the 
filmmaker or articulator. I will not discuss the quality of the campaign, but rather look for the 
geopolitical representations the film spots reveal in their implicit representation of the others’ 
discourse. 
6.2 The Geopolitical Tales of the SVI Spots 
The significance of identifying the geopolitical representations of a public diplomacy 
campaign is not only of intrinsic value. Because geopolitical discourses give insight into how 
geopolitical subjects are understood in a geopolitical culture, it gives certain indications of 
how they are acted towards in the geopolitical order. This insight reveals the power structure 
between geopolitical subjects as well as the perceived geopolitical purpose of their relation. 
 I will now analyse each film spot in turn. The presented order is coincidental; they 
were aired independently and separately. I will focus on the main aspects of each spot in this 
paragraph and analyse the SVI ads as a whole in the next.  
6.2.1 Baker: Relational Identities Based on Religion and Nationality 
The first spot is about the Libyan Abdul Hammuda, who presents himself as “the owner of 
Tiger Lebanese bakery located here in Toledo, Ohio, the United States of America”.  
 The film spot starts with a happy Muslim family in a living room, singing and playing 
drums. Hammuda’s voice breaks in: “I believe American people in general respect the Islamic 
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faith. Muslims can practice their faith in totality here”. When applying the analytical strategy 
discussed above, regarding the articulations as an “answer” to an unmentioned discourse, 
what we understand from this is that he believes that the spectator might think the opposite: 
that Americans do not respect Islamic faith, and that Muslims can not practice their faith in 
the US. The articulation also reveals a construction of identity in relational terms: Muslims 
are a distinct group and different to American people. The implicitness of this representation 
indicates that it is discursively hegemonised from the Taleworld he draws his perspective 
from. Throughout the film spot, Hammuda continues to establish his own identity in 
negation to an American identity. Not only is he the owner of a bakery in the US, but a 
Lebanese bakery that also serves dishes from Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Instead of, say, 
presenting his bakery as one of many different bakeries in town, Hammuda emphasises the 
foreign nature of his bakery. Hammuda’s family is also presented in the film spot. Together 
with Hammuda and his wife, their son and daughter work in the bakery. Not only the foreign 
identity is emphasized, but also the religious. A visual signifier of this is the hijabs on the 
women’s heads. Hammuda was also one of the co-founders of the Toledo Islamic Academy, 
“from pre-k to high school”. Hammuda: “Religious freedom here is something very 
important, and we see it practiced and no one ever bothered us.” With this articulation, 
Hammuda implies that the spectator would believe that Muslims are bothered for their 
religious practice. It is uncertain what Hammuda means by “we see it practiced”, whether he 
is referring to Muslims or other religious groups. But no other references to other religious 
groups are made. There are, however, references to other groups: customers and clients, from 
whom “we” (the Hammudas, I suppose) have enjoyed “an overwhelming sense of support” 
since 9/11. In other words, not only Hammuda self, but also the customers and clients 
associate the Hammudas with Islam (or other groups connected with the terrorist attack, but 
Islam is probably the closest call). Hammuda concludes the spot with: “America is a land of 
opportunity, of equality. We are happy to live here as Muslims and preserve our faith”. Again, 
he implies that a discourse exists that claims the opposite, and in addition to rejecting this 
view, he implies that this cultural “generosity” is not to take for granted. The Muslims, in this 
Storyrealm, are a distinct autonomous and tolerated group that, even when they live in 
America, is not American. Why Hammuda maintains this division can seem cryptic because 
he otherwise seems so well integrated in the American society. The ubiquitous visual and 
uttered representations of national and religious identity seem important for the ad’s message, 
and can indicate a polyphonic answer to a discourse accusing Muslim Americans of being 
assimilated and abandoning their native identity. Some of the other spots indicate the same. 
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6.2.2 Doctor: Assimilation and Universal Egalitarianism   
The next spot is about the Algerian-born Dr. Zerhouni, the director of the National Institute of 
Health in America, a position to which he has been nominated by President George W. Bush. 
Zerhouni talks about what he calls a “profound connection” between medicine and Islam: 
“The notion that science can improve health has been borne out in Islam for many centuries. 
Some of the best doctors in the history of the world have been Muslim doctors.” The 
motivation behind these articulations can seem cryptic. Would a Muslim, the target audience, 
consider the relationship between Islam and medicine a contradiction? That is unlikely. “The 
mission of the National Institute of Health is to advance knowledge about the medical care 
and diseases that affect mankind,” Zerhouni proceeds. Because the intrinsic value of medical 
knowledge in Islam is already stated, this articulation connects Islam with the American 
institute, and the institution is already presented as deeply anchored in American politics. But 
is this a response to an idea that Muslim and American culture diverge on these issues? Not 
likely. It could be a reminder that the US and Islam have some shared values at all. But 
fetching farther in the logic of negation can also reveal a discourse of assimilation in 
Zerhouni’s Taleworld: that the discourse he is talking back to, assumes that Muslims in the 
US are Americanised, a discourse Zerhouni’s position as a successful doctor could be seen as 
confirming. There are further indications of such a polyphonic discourse in Zerhouni’s 
articulation: “When we develop a new treatment, it is available worldwide, so it impacts on 
the health of everyone on Earth.” The polyphonic “question” this could be an answer to, is 
whether the US employs foreigners only to serve Americans, or, whether the doctor’s 
motivation for working in the US are because he elevates the importance of the Americans’ 
health above that of others. Zerhouni continues to emphasize that his choice of becoming a 
doctor is not due to him being assimilated into American values: “I became very interested in 
medicine because I had an uncle who was actually a radiologist.” Following the logic of 
negation, Zerhouni’s articulations can be understood as (1) he wants to state the shared 
American-Muslim values of medical knowledge, and (2) to avoid being seen as another 
assimilated American, he emphasizes that these values originate in Islam and for himself, in 
his native country.  
 Zerhouni also talks about the universal egalitarianism of the American culture, and his 
experience with coming to the US in 1975: “I was totally embraced by people here, my 
professors. You know, everybody told me we are all immigrants here, we are all from 
different places, and we all melt together and I love that, I really do.” This articulation can be 
seen as a rejection of an idea that Muslims in America are socially excluded. But with this 
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articulation, he also partly breaks down the discourse of intrinsic difference that the other 
spots maintain. However, in his next articulation he maintains a division between Muslims 
and the American society when he highlights the particularity of this cultural integration: 
“What I can tell Muslims around the world is the tolerance and support I’ve received myself 
is remarkable. I don’t think that there is any other country in the world, where I think different 
people from different countries are accepted and welcomed as members of the society, as 
good citizens.” The hegemonic representation here is thus the relevance of the immanent 
difference between “different people from different countries”: it is reproduced as a natural 
division of the American society.  
6.2.3 Teacher: Equivalence and Difference  
The next spot is about Rawia Ismail, a female public schoolteacher from Beirut, Lebanon who 
has lived in the US since 1984.  
 Ismail talks about how it is like to wear a hijab in the classroom: “I’ve never met a 
child who thought it was weird or anything like that, and they like the fact, both them and 
their parents, that they are introduced to a different culture.” Implicitly, what we can read 
from this is the existence of a discourse that assumes the opposite, that Muslim symbols are 
met with incomprehension in the US and that people do not like differences. She also implies, 
like Hammuda does, that the local (American24) culture is a distinct culture different to 
Muslim culture. Ismail also teaches her children in Saturday school, Islamic school. This is 
not a sign of difference between Ismail and the non-Muslims, but rather one of equivalence: 
“In my neighbourhood all the non-Muslims, I see that they care a lot about their children’s 
education, just as much as I do and about family values.” What she implicitly rejects with this 
articulation is an idea that Americans do not care about family values and children’s 
education. Her final remark in the spot is: “I had to work hard at getting the kids to understand 
that […] we should work on our similarities rather than our differences”. This articulation can 
be an indication of the existence of two separate discourses she is talking back to: (1) the 
assimilation-discourse discussed above and (2) the inevitability of culture clashes between 
Americans and Muslims. First: the fact that she had to “work hard” at convincing the kids, 
and that she admits clear differences between the groups, could be a negation of a discourse 
claiming that Muslim children in America are assimilated and Americanised. Second, the use 
of past tense in the word had, reveals that the mission is accomplished and “working on our 
                                                
24 Ismail never mentions Americans as a group, only the United States, the non-Muslims and her neighbours, to 
all of which she contrasts herself and her religion. Because it is not always clear which group she is talking 
about, I will refer to it as “American” and hereby caution against the lack of specificity.    
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similarities” is thus not impossible. Drawn even further, this could be an answer to and 
negation of the previously discussed “clash of civilisations” discourse, but of course, the data 
does not support a conclusion of such specificity.     
6.2.4 Journalist: Shared, Rather Than Imposed, Values  
The next spot is about Devianti Faridz, an Indonesian Master’s student of broadcast 
journalism at the University of Missouri. She is concerned with shared educational values and 
religious tolerance.   
 
“To become a journalist, of course, you have to uphold truth. You have to be honest; 
you have to be objective, and all those values I’ve already learned. […] The values of 
Islam that I have been taught ever since I was a child are values that I have been 
exposed to here at school – honesty, truth, knowledge.”  
 
The relevance of these articulations in an ad campaign for the US can seem unclear because 
they do not directly address the US or American values. Faridz does not talk about the 
similarities between Americans or the US and Islam, but the journalist school/profession and 
Islam. However, she has come to the US to study journalism and finds these values important 
there. What Faridz rejects in this articulation, are that the US has changed (Americanised) her, 
and given her new values: she implies that honesty, truth and knowledge are values shared 
between the respective cultures. And she proceeds: “I hope to be able to go back to Indonesia 
and become an objective journalist who can contribute to the betterment of society,” Faridz 
says, indicating that her stay in the US can help her cultivate these values.  
 The value of religious tolerance is also stated in the spot. Faridz looks like a typical 
integrated American in her casual Western style. Then suddenly, she is in the mosque praying, 
wearing religious clothing. “So far,” she says, “the American students I have met have 
respected my beliefs”. Again, this indicates the existence of a discourse claiming the opposite. 
However, the use of the words “so far” also indicates that Faridz does not take this respect for 
granted. Rather, there is a latent scepticism to the current situation in her assessment of how 
people should perceive difference: “We should embrace diversity and differences, and not be 
afraid of them.” Faridz concludes with an optimistic remark: “It is nice to know that 
Americans are willing to understand more about Islam, and there is an opportunity for 
understanding.” This articulation is ambiguous, and can be seen as a double-rejection of (1) 
an idea that Americans are unwilling to understand or (2) ignorance of the opposite fact. 
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6.2.5 Fire fighter: Associated Religion and Collective Guilt  
The final spot is shorter than the others and has two main characters: Farooq Muhammad, a 
paramedic for a fire department in New York, and Abdul Malik, a volunteer chaplain with the 
MT Police department. Muhammad talks about how it is like having co-workers with 
different faiths, like Jewish, Christian, and Hindu: 
 
  “We get along fine. You know, we treat each other with respect. They have all been 
 supportive of me since the 9/11 attack and I have been very grateful for that. I have 
 never gotten disrespected because I am a Muslim. […] We are all brothers and sisters 
 and here I am as a human being taking care of another.” 
 
These articulations indicate, like the similar analyses from above, the existence of a discourse 
about religious (Muslim) intolerance in the US. Although Muhammad dismisses this 
discourse, he upholds with his gratefulness that tolerance is not to be taken for granted. This 
ambiguity maintains a separation between groups and may indicate a sense of Muslim 
collective guilt against the rest caused by 9/11 and a latent cultural conflict. It is interesting 
that Mohammad as well as Hammuda and Ismail25 define themselves in positive relation to 
9/11 just because the terrorists were Muslim coreligionists. The fact that they as Muslims 
have internalised a representation of the “Muslim” with “terrorist” as a moment in the chain 
of equivalence reveals a strong bond of religious identity and sense of collective guilt. 
 Malik talks about working for “those who are putting their lives on the line each and 
every day to protect the citizens of this nation”, and emphasises the religious nature of his 
work: 
  “It is my responsibility to do whatever I can, whether that is offering counselling or 
 spiritual guidance or words of acknowledgement of the hard work they are doing. 
 […]  I think Muslims in America have more freedom to work for Islam, perhaps more 
 than any country that I have visited.”  
 
The negation of these articulations could be a discourse about the US being a godless 
community with little opportunity for religious establishment. Malik implies that US not only 
is an ideal place for Muslims, because the society facilitates Islamic practices, but that it even 
tops the “list” of countries worthy of deserving Muslim sympathy.  
 
                                                
25 Ismail also talks about the lack of prejudice after 9/11, but I have not addressed it in the text. 
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6.2.6 Summary 
I have in the analysis of the spots focused on the following aspects: the relationship between 
Americans and Muslims, similarities and differences between their respective identities, the 
shared values of family, education, knowledge, honesty and truth, the universal egalitarianism 
and the opportunity of religious establishment in the American society, and religious tolerance 
in the US. Some of these elements are challenged, others carried on.  
 The analytical findings are summarised in the model below: how the Storyrealm 
represents the Taleworld’s and its own understanding of Americans, Muslims in America and 
the relationship between these. Numbers in brackets indicate the spots in which the 
representations are present. 
 
Relationship Americans and 
Muslims in America 
Muslims in America Americans 
Storyrealm Taleworld Storyrealm Taleworld Storyrealm Taleworld 
 
Distinct, different 
groups (1-5) 
 
Peaceful co-
existence (1-5) 
 
Allies (1-5) 
 
 
Shared values: 
Knowledge 
(2,3,4), education 
(3,4), truth (4), 
family (3), 
community (3,5) 
 
Distinct,  
different groups (1-5) 
 
Inherent culture clash 
(1-5) 
 
Muslims either 
excluded or 
Americanised (1-5) 
 
… 
 
 
Maintain religious 
faith, 
practices and 
symbols (1-5) 
 
 
Associated with 
9/11 (1,3,5) 
 
Integrated/ 
foreign (1-5) 
 
  
 
Abandon 
religious faith, 
practices and 
symbols (1-5) 
 
 
Associated with 
9/11 (1,3,5) 
 
Either 
assimilated/ 
Americanised  
or excluded (1-
5) 
 
 
Religious 
tolerance (1-5) 
 
Willing to learn 
(3,4) 
 
Universal 
egalitarianism 
(2) 
 
Family- and 
community 
oriented (3) 
 
Religious 
discrimination (1-
5) 
 
Incomprehension 
(3,4) 
 
Americans above 
the rest 
(2) 
 
Individualistic (3) 
Figure 6.1: The Re-mapping of Geopolitical Identities in the SVI 
 
The representation of the American in a logic of difference to the Muslim is established in the 
ads’ Taleworld and carried on and hegemonised by the Storyrealm. However, some moments 
are challenged: the idea that an inherent culture clash exists between Americans and Muslims, 
and that Muslims are either excluded from the society or assimilated. Rather, the spots 
reinstate that the two groups live in peaceful co-existence, and that there is an active relation 
between them. The shared values introduced in the Storyrealm do not seem to “talk back” to 
the Taleworld, and are thus represented as new elements.  
 In the next paragraph, I will analyse the geopolitical rationale of the campaign’s 
portrayal of the relation between Muslims and Americans.  
 85 
6.3  Geopolitical Alliances in the SVI Spots  
What do we understand from the SVI’s representation of Americans and Muslims? We can 
conclude from the analysis that the relationship between Americans and Muslims is 
represented as mutually exclusive and peacefully co-existent, but does it also indicate a power 
structure of responsibilities and privileges? I will in the following analyse the ads’ 
construction of the geopolitical relations. 
 Three geopolitical subjects are represented in the ads. These are (1) the not-
assimilated, American well-integrated Muslims, represented by the characters (2) the 
imagined Muslim spectator and/or supposed originator of the Taleworld discourse, and (3) the 
Americans, who exist only in the ads’ Taleworld. Between these three geopolitical subjects, 
two consolidations of groups take place: the characters with the Muslim audience they are 
reaching out to, and this united Muslim identity with the Americans. The natures of the 
respective groups differ profoundly: What consolidates the Muslims as a group is a matter of 
equivalence, while what consolidates the Muslims and the Americans is a matter of alliance.  
 The Muslims are united in a logic of equivalence to essential Muslim identity markers 
discussed above and to the 9/11 attack, and the unity of the group is further consolidated in a 
logic of difference to Americans. Although the characters are American Muslims, the identity 
of the Muslim is constructed in distinction to that of the American: they remain distinct, 
different groups and are decidedly not assimilated. This logic of difference is interesting 
because the two groups are not mutually exclusive: they do not represent two different 
nationalities or religions, but one religion and one nationality. No references to other religions 
are made. The spots do not juxtapose the American with, say, the Christian, but rather 
represent it as a place and a people. Still, this place/people (USA/Americans) is understood in 
the negative terms of the religion/religious group (Islam/Muslims).   
 Despite the insistence on maintaining the division between Americans and Muslims: 
the fact that Muslims are chosen to tell “America’s story” and their emphasis on shared values 
and peaceful co-existence construes the relationship between the groups as mutually 
beneficial. Because the distinction between the groups remains, the depicted Muslims are not 
understood as Americans, but rather as allies of America. These findings raise interesting 
questions. What can we understand from this discursive remapping of geopolitical subjects? 
What is the rationale behind fixating such an alliance in the first place?  
 What the fixation of geopolitical allies entails is also a question about what alliances 
are. Alliance building can have multiple associations, like relations between states or 
companies, even marriages between people and families. Typical representations of interstate 
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alliances, as discussed in the theory chapter, are that they are formed when confronted by an 
external threat, which they encounter by bandwagoning or balancing the threat. Any alliance, 
like the Muslim-American in the SVI, implies an allegiance against something external, and 
because the US represents itself as a source of peace rather than danger, the nature of this 
alliance seems to be to balance the external threat rather than bandwagon. Interestingly, the 
construed alliance is not between Americans and Muslims against terrorists: The 
representation of the 9/11 terrorist attack remains unchallenged as a moment on the Muslim 
chain of equivalence. The Muslims are not asked to cut off their bonds with their terrorist co-
religionists: they are asked to feel collective guilt, and the extension of this collective guilt is 
to give the US moral superiority. The external threat is thus not terrorism, but rather not being 
an ally with the US.  
 Another theory of alliance formation is ideological solidarity: the more similar states 
are, the more likely they are to ally. The emphasis on shared values in public diplomacy can 
be understood as an attempt to build alliances on an ideological foundation. This is interesting 
because an acknowledged source of the resentment towards the US in the Arab and Muslim 
world is the US’ inclination to ally with repressive regimes. The US even united with jihadis 
in opposition to the Soviet regime during the Cold War. The focus on shared values in SVI 
campaign can be understood as an attempt to re-articulate the legitimacy of alliance building 
or to nuance the perspective on the US’ intentions, which are frequently criticised for being 
calculating and selfish. But what does a legitimate alliance with the US involve? One 
indication lies in the campaign itself and how it makes use of the allegiance with the Muslim 
characters. The way it uses Muslims to speak on the US’ behalf witnesses a demand for 
discursive loyalty: the allies are utilised as a buffer against hostile discourses. Such a 
discursive buffer can contribute to American security because the war on terrorism 
necessitates a discursive struggle: Al Qaeda largely depends on the dissemination of hostile 
discourses to gain public (and financial) support. The legitimacy of the alliance with the 
Muslim characters in the SVI originates from the mutually beneficial nature of their relation, 
represented by the characters’ gratitude for being accepted as citizens. In the next turn, the 
legitimacy of the alliance depoliticises the relation and naturalises the fact that Muslims are 
utilised to disseminate American norms and perspectives rather than their own. 
 An acknowledged technique of the campaign was the use of Muslim opinion leaders in 
the US to reach out to opinion leaders in Muslim countries. The characters chosen to represent 
Muslims in America are identified by their respectable professions; the designated target 
audience was mothers and teachers. What the characters and target audience have in common 
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is a similar kind of authority: they are trusted people in their society. The doctor certainly 
mounts the eminence of the rest, but all-in-all, the characters appear as down-to-earth, not too-
flashy fellow humans. This choice of characters and target audience suggests that the 
credibility of the messenger was seen as vital to the campaign. It was assumed that if the US 
State Department was identified as the source of the commercials, it could be regarded as 
propaganda and lose credibility. Therefore, in the spring of 2002, Charlotte Beers and the SD 
asked Malik Hasan, a Muslim retired medical executive, for help in creating a non-profit, non-
partisan organization called The Council of American Muslims for Understanding 
(CAMU). Each ad was presented with the line “Presented by the Council of American 
Muslims for Understanding”. The intention of attributing the ads to CAMU was, according to 
Fullerton and Kendrick, “a strategic decision designed to enhance source credibility and make 
the message more believable” (2006, 31). Unfortunately for the SD, covering the source had 
the opposite effect of making the campaign more controversial, which I will discuss later.  
 What we can understand from the SVI’s representation of Americans and Muslims can 
be summarised as follows: Firstly, the Muslim is defined in distinction to the American and 
their relationship is one of alliance. Secondly, the rationale behind this relationship is to form 
an alliance against an external threat, which is not being an ally with the US. Thirdly, the 
relation is perceived as legitimate because it is beneficial for both parties, although the moral 
superiority belongs to the US. Fourthly, the legitimacy of the alliance depoliticises the 
relation and naturalises the use of Muslim opinion leaders to influence the public opinion in 
Muslim countries on the US’ behalf. 
 I will now turn to the controversy of the campaign, and analyse its role in the 
development of the PDWTE order of discourse. 
6.4 Controversy Reveals the Rules of the Discourse 
As discussed in chapter 5, there exists a discursive struggle about the practice of public 
diplomacy in the order of discourse described as the ‘public diplomacy in the war on terrorism 
era’ (PDWTE). Politicized, securitized and marketized discourses struggle for the definition 
of the geopolitical threat and which public diplomacy perpetrators, methods and messages are 
best designated to counter it.   
Because the SVI campaign has received so much attention, a study of the debate gives 
insight into what methods and messages are considered legitimate and illegitimate for and in 
the SD public diplomacy discourse. The introduction of the advertising genre in the public 
diplomacy discourse is well described by Fairclough’s notion of marketization, but the 
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controversy shows that SD public diplomacy discourse was not ready for this process. I will 
in the following discuss the response to the campaign and analyse the rules of the discourse.  
 During and after the campaign, the SVI caused a heated debate in domestic and 
international news media; and academics, communications scholars, advertising executives, 
diplomats and government officials concluded with various arguments that the campaign was 
a failure. In the book Advertising’s War on Terrorism (2006), Fullerton and Kendrick offer a 
systematic study of how the SVI campaign was received. Following quotes from foreign news 
media give a brief introduction to the response:26  
 “Another Zionist propaganda tool”  
  “The campaign comes in conjunction with beating the drums of the Iraq war”  
 “The campaign caused incitement against US policy in several Islamic countries, 
 including demonstrations denouncing US policy in Indonesia”  
 “A cynical campaign that insults the intelligence of the average Muslim”  
 “What we understand from this campaign is that Americans just need a small cloth to 
 polish their image, and that’s it!” 
 
Two complaints dominated the debate. The first was that the campaign was considered as 
propaganda, and the second was that the campaign did not explain US foreign policy 
(Fullerton & Kendrick 2006, 36). In other words: the debate mainly evolved around the genre 
and what the campaign was not about – the message has largely escaped without controversy. 
I will analyse what is controversial and accepted in the discourse, to assess the campaign’s 
function in the PDWTE order of discourse. 
6.4.1 The Propaganda Controversy 
To begin with the propaganda issue; this problem followed the campaign from its very 
initiation and remains to this day probably its closest connotation.  
Inside the State Department, the SVI was from the beginning known as “Charlotte’s 
project”, because Beers had full control of the project and final approval of the ads. Beers’ 
Madison Avenue- and Uncle Ben’s advertising background was frequently ridiculed in US 
mass media. Proclamations like “The notion that you can sell Uncle Sam like Uncle Ben’s 
(rice) is highly problematic”, “Uncle Sam is harder to sell these days than Uncle Ben’s ever 
was” and “to call our country a brand is to denigrate it in people’s minds” (Fullerton & 
Kendrick 2006, 104), emphasized the scepticism of many to the very idea that the US could 
be reduced to a commodity for sale. Many SD people were unhappy with the SVI because the 
advertising situated genre associated public diplomacy too much with propaganda. The genres 
                                                
26 See Fullerton and Kendrick (2006) for original sources. In my study, these quotes merely form a tale the 
Storyrealm relates to, and hence the source is not relevant. 
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of propaganda and advertising are both situated in a discourse of domination and information 
control that usually are particularly negatively perceived when they are government 
sponsored. To avoid the propaganda label, the SD insisted on calling the spots “mini-
documentaries” instead of ads, tried to have them aired outside of the normal commercial 
airtime and attributed the campaign to the Council of American Muslims for Understanding 
(CAMU). The technique of covering the source, called the ‘deflective source model’, is 
according to the leading propaganda scholars Jowett and O’Donnell (1999) associated with 
grey propaganda and disinformation. It was quickly revealed that the SD was the original 
source, and the mere use of this technique caused harsh criticism.  
Another problem caused by the propaganda issue was the difficulties of airing the 
campaign. The State Department initially hoped to get free airtime in the Islamic countries, 
but ended up having to purchase airtime on international TV-stations, and furthermore, the 
state-owned stations in most countries completely refused to run the spots. Al Jazeera was 
initially positive to the campaign, but ended up boycotting it as well (Fullerton and Kendrick 
2006, 34). The reason for this negative attitude towards the SVI, according to Beers, was 
probably that it was considered as propaganda (Ibid, 35). In other words, the propaganda issue 
followed the campaign and was seen by many as having an undermining effect. 
As much as three studies have analysed the propaganda aspect of the SVI, and 
although they agree that the campaign has clear propagandistic features, the studies disagree 
about whether it is a problem. Patrick Lee Plaisance (2005) distrusts Beers’ stated purpose of 
the SVI, to foster dialogue, and suggests that the campaign’s propagandistic nature reveals a 
different objective. The mere use of propaganda, in Plaisance’s opinion, shows that the 
campaign has “serious ethical shortcomings” (Plaisance 2005, 251). Sheldon Rampton at the 
Center for Media and Democracy posted a blog review about the SVI.27 A main criticism in 
the article is what Rampton calls “monologue about dialogue”, because the campaign did not 
enable dialogue, hardly even on the official SVI website OpenDialogue.org. Rampton 
concludes that propaganda, in addition to being dishonest, fails the effectiveness test because 
it is incapable of creating genuine understanding. The only advocates of the campaign and its 
methods I have come across are the advertising scholars Fullerton and Kendrick (2006), who 
argue that the campaign could have been efficient if it was aired longer. Although they agree 
that the campaign has propagandistic features, Fullerton and Kendrick argue that it is 
                                                
27 http://www.prwatch.org/node/6465. Calling a blog review a “study” may seem somewhat ambitious, but the 
review adds to similar writings from the same author, like the book Weapons of Mass Deception from 2003, 
written together with J. Stauber.  
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generally truthful and therefore defendable. Just as interesting as how negatively propaganda 
is perceived, is how critics seem to agree that dialogue is the better choice of method. 
Dialogue is considered ethical, genuine and effective for mutual understanding. This appears 
to me like a shortcut: there is no guarantee that dialogue is less manipulative than propaganda, 
even with the best of intentions. Although dialogue is a better facilitator for learning, it can 
also be a negotiation in which the strongest party is bound to lead and the weakest legitimises 
with its participation. Because the purpose of dialogue often is to come to an agreement, this 
communication situation necessitates willing parties in order to succeed, which requires a 
careful audience selection. The effect of such selected willingness can be to encourage 
compromise and facilitate a relaxed attitude towards the information in cases where a critical 
approach might be more beneficial for the weakest party.28 In contrast, propaganda – at least 
when it is recognised as such – can have the effect of empowering the listeners as responsible 
for their own opinions, encouraging them to take sides. The point here is not to advocate 
propaganda as ethical communication, but exemplify how any form of communication can 
have positive or negative moral associations, which again affects the perception of the 
content.  
The main problem for a public diplomacy campaign with being associated with 
propaganda is that the genre itself and the credibility associated with the situated genre, affect 
how the message is framed by the spectators. When a message is framed as propaganda in a 
Storyrealm (here referring to the spectators), the meaning attributed to the genre “leaks” to the 
Taleworld (the message). If the spectators dislike propaganda, and the message is framed as 
such, the effort can be counterproductive.  
 That being said, the campaign’s genre is not only inefficient as an instrument for 
power. Although the advertising genre in terms of credibility does not do the campaign any 
favours, its “popular” expression depoliticises its message. As a result, the content escapes 
attention and remains unchallenged. In the case of the SVI, this seems only partly to be the 
case. On the one hand, the campaign has been debated and highly controversial. But despite 
the controversy, the content of the campaign has largely circumvented analysis: the focus on 
the campaign has mainly been on its naïve propagandistic features.  
6.4.2 The Message Approval 
As mentioned, the second dominating controversy was what the campaign did not explain. 
There are two ways of analysing the status of a message in a discourse: through what is said 
                                                
28 For a thorough debate about the ethics of dialogue and propaganda, see Stoker and Tusinski (2006).  
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about it, and through what is not said about it. Considering the large amount of literature 
written about the SVI campaign, strikingly little has been mentioned about its content. One of 
the chief complaints was that the focus of the campaign was off-target: people blamed 
America’s tarnished image on US foreign policy, not on how Muslims are treated in America 
(Fullerton & Kendrick 2006, 105).  
 There seem to be a broad agreement that the message of the campaign is legitimate, 
and the relationship between Americans and Muslims is portrayed accurately. It has been 
mentioned that the campaign is a selective representation of reality, since post-9/11 
persecution and incarcerations of Muslims have been reported (Plaisance 2005). However, the 
portrayed relationship between Muslims and Americans in the SVI has hardly evoked any 
debate. Rather, even critics of the campaign have emphasized that religious tolerance is an 
accurate description of the situation for Muslims in the US. Another tale that is nowhere 
challenged is the tale about desired division: that Muslims as well as Americans wish to keep 
their identities separate. This apparent agreement can be seen as an indication that the 
portrayal of the relationship is representative of critical as well as practicing public diplomacy 
discourses.  
 The acceptance of the message demonstrates its soft power, even as a geopolitical tool. 
As a form of popular geopolitics, the campaign is situated in the power structure of the broad 
geopolitical culture. An important function of popular geopolitics is to establish a beneficial 
point of discourse and create a “smooth space” for practical geopolitics. This form of power is 
essentially soft: it attracts and co-opts people to change preferences rather than it coerces 
them. The campaign does not ask people to change; it merely advocates a perspective on the 
desirable form of Muslim-American relations. If it succeeds, the campaign will establish an 
American point of discourse in the popular culture that over time materialises in the target 
countries’ foreign policies or other spheres beneficial to the US, such as perspectives on 
terrorism et cetera. I do not mean to suggest that this is necessarily negative, but history has 
shown that this kind of naturalised geopolitics can be highly powerful. 
6.5 The Standing of the SVI in the Public Diplomacy Culture  
The controversy of the genre and the acceptance of the message highlight some of the 
boundaries of the ‘public diplomacy in the war on terrorism era’ (PDWTE) order of discourse. 
I will argue that the advertising situated genre marks a boundary between politicized and 
marketized public diplomacy discourses, and the message marks a boundary between 
politicized and securitized discourses.  
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Genre Message 
Politicized Marketized Politicized Securitized 
Karen Hughes Charlotte Beers SD DoD 
Figure 6.2: The Accept and Rejection of the Genre and Message  
 
Because the advertising genre traditionally has belonged to the discourse of the market, its 
introduction in the public diplomacy discourse marks a change in the traditionally 
governmental discourse. However, the advertising genre has not taken hold in the SD public 
diplomacy discourse. The genre is in a political context heavily associated with propaganda 
and has since Charlotte Beers’ era largely been dismissed as a public diplomacy method in the 
SD discourse. Other marketized processes, however, have since then occurred: outsourcing 
public diplomacy tasks from DoD has been officially accepted, and the SD is increasingly 
encouraging businesses to engage in public diplomacy activities. As discussed in chapter 5, 
private actors have fewer restrictions on available methods for public diplomacy and strategic 
communication. It is thus not the marketization of public diplomacy as such that has 
encountered such controversy, but rather the governmental fingerprints on propagandistic 
methods.  
 The SVI campaign is an effort to engage in dialogue with Muslims about the nature of 
the relationship between Americans and Muslims. It can be seen as an expression of the 
politicized discourse’s attempt to turn back the “clash of civilisations” discourse, as discussed 
in chapter 5, although it does not specifically refer to that notion. The fact that the notion is 
not used, however, does not mean that its geopolitical representation cannot be present. A 
typical feature of popular geopolitics is the tendency to depoliticise geopolitical discourses by 
simplifying the message and covering its motivation. However, the campaign’s rather 
apparent message that Americans and Muslims exist in peaceful co-existence witnesses the 
same motivation: to split up potential tensions between the groups and attract the audience 
with soft power. This motivation situates the campaign in the politicized discourse about 
public diplomacy and demonstrates its potential conflict with the securitized discourse. The 
securitized discourse rests on a geopolitical representation of a security threat that requires a 
corresponding representation of an enemy, while the soft power approach aims to deconstruct 
this idea.  
 Although the campaign was made in the earlier days of the war on terrorism era, much 
of the development of the State Department approach to public diplomacy is well exemplified 
with the SVI and its reputation. Concerning the method of the campaign, the advertising genre 
has not only been outmoded, it has been actively rejected. The message, however, has 
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simultaneously been carried on and blurred by a different practice. On the one hand, the soft 
power discourse of alliances remained central in Karen Hughes’ public diplomacy principles 
(engagement, exchanges, education and empowerment), dialogic ideal and projects such as 
outreach tours and the Rapid Response Unit. On the other hand, the process of coordinating 
information practices with the DoD witnesses a securitization process of public diplomacy.  
Because the coordination process of American public diplomacy is still occurring and 
the role of DoD still immature, the development is at this moment hard to predict. However, 
the outcome of coordinating such contradictory approaches is an interesting starting point for 
future studies of American public diplomacy. 
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7   CONCLUSIONS  
 
The subject of this thesis is the geopolitical rationale of American public diplomacy in the 
war on terrorism era. A ‘geopolitical rationale’ is a theoretical concept that refers to spatial-
political networks of power embedded in reasoning and practices. As the thesis shows, 
American public diplomacy is not a uniform concept, but has developed through competing 
geopolitical discourses, and this observation explains some of the confusion concerning its 
purpose and practice. The discourses represent diverging, and often contradictory, public 
diplomacy practices in the war on terrorism. I have labelled these discourses securitized, 
marketized and politicized in accordance with how they construe the geopolitical threat, which 
again determines what considerations should be taken into account for countering it.  
In this thesis, I have analysed the geopolitical rationale of public diplomacy in the war 
on terrorism era (PDWTE) through three aspects, which I will summarise in this chapter. The 
first aspect concerns what geopolitical representations form the premises of this order of 
discourse. The second aspect relates to how the geopolitical representations manifest in public 
diplomacy efforts, through designation of appropriate institutions and choice of means and 
messages. The third aspect explains the changes and contradictions of public diplomacy 
practices in the war on terrorism era, or the output of the discursive struggle. The objects of 
analysis have been a discursive struggle, comprising ideas and practices of public diplomacy 
in the war on terrorism era, and a case, the public diplomacy campaign Shared Values 
Initiative. Crudely, the analysis of the discursive struggle can be summarised as follows: 
 
 1. aspect: representation 
of anti-Americanism  
2. aspect: manifestation 3. aspect: output 
Politicized Soft power threat Counter clash, attractive 
means 
Securitized Security (Existential) threat Clash, any means 
Marketized Economic threat Private sector 
involvement, marketing 
means  
Contradictory 
means and 
messages, 
Discursive 
change, 
Shifting of tasks 
Figure 7.1: Summary of the discursive struggle  
 
To explain the geopolitical rationale of the different approaches, it is useful to start with the 
first aspect, their discursive premises. Each discourse advocates public diplomacy as a 
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response to the geopolitical threat of anti-Americanism. The idea of anti-Americanism is 
essentially geopolitical because it represents a power structure by which the US in one way or 
another is threatened by the outside world. Although the term as such remains unchallenged, 
the implication of the threat is construed differently by each discourse. In the politicized 
discourse, anti-Americanism is regarded as a threat to American soft power, in the securitized 
discourse it is regarded as a (potentially existential) threat to American security, and in the 
marketized discourse, it represents an undefined threat to American competitiveness and trade 
security. The perceived implication of anti-Americanism situates the threat in a game of 
power, which shapes the guidelines, or “rules”, for public diplomacy as a means to counter it. 
The rules of the securitized, politicized and marketized discourses are respectively structured 
around ‘security’, ‘soft power’ and ‘economic’ rationales. In a securitized discourse, the 
emergency element calls for short-term measures, with little consideration for other potential 
costs. In the politicized discourse, the threat of anti-Americanism involves a threat to 
American influence on all levels of the three-dimensional chess game of world politics – 
military, economic and transnational issues – to the extent that they depend on soft power. A 
particular concern in the war on terrorism is that the declining soft power contributes to an 
increasing popular support of Islamist terrorism. The consideration for soft power makes the 
issue highly complex and the rules for public diplomacy rather intricate: Any action must take 
the potential loss of soft power into account, in the long term as well as the short. These rules, 
based on the perception of the geopolitical threat of anti-Americanism, are closely linked to 
the second aspect of the geopolitical rationale: the designation of institutions to perform 
public diplomacy and choice of appropriate methods and messages.  
Chief institutions involved in public diplomacy activities in the war on terrorism era 
are the State Department (SD) and the Department of Defense (DoD). As I have shown in this 
thesis, the DoD mainly builds its public diplomacy practices on a securitized discourse, while 
the SD practices have elements from politicized, securitized and marketized discourses. The 
rules of these discourses have been analysed through the reaction on their practices from 
public diplomacy circles, which is often based on the reaction from external critics or the 
target audience, and whether the reaction has resulted in a change of practice.  
Concerning the choice of appropriate methods for public diplomacy, there is a conflict 
between the politicized discourse, which requires the use of uncontroversial means, and the 
other discourses, which have fewer restrictions. Two examples have been discussed: the 
practice of covering the source of public diplomacy/information operations, and the use of 
propaganda. Both practices have caused a heated debate about the practice of the respective 
 96 
institutions: in the SD following the Shared Values Initiative (SVI) and in DoD following the 
practice of paying for media coverage through Lincoln Group. However, the subsequent 
reactions witnessed a difference in the public diplomacy discourses between these institutions: 
While the SD marked a distance from the practice of covering sources, the DoD concluded 
that it was within its mandate. Both examples reflect the rules of the respective discourses and 
their institutional manifestation. The controversy in the SD witnesses the impact of the 
politicized discourse, whose purpose of public diplomacy is to counteract the geopolitical 
threat of losing soft power. The acceptance of the DoD practice, on the other hand, indicates 
the impact of the securitized discourse: the geopolitical threat is considered urgent enough to 
tolerate practices that are negatively perceived in public diplomacy circles and among the 
target audience.  
 Concerning which messages are considered appropriate, the clash of the practices is 
more obvious and its impact on public diplomacy is more substantial. How the geopolitical 
threat of anti-Americanism is defined in a public diplomacy discourse also affects which 
messages are being used to encounter it. The respective ‘security’ and ‘soft power’ 
imperatives in securitizing and politicizing discourses connote fundamentally different 
representations of the geopolitical ‘Other’, the anti-American. Exchanges of these 
representations inevitably clash: the geopolitical representation of a security threat requires a 
corresponding representation of an enemy, while the soft power approach aims to build 
bridges. The discussed SVI campaign and the idea of “clash of civilisations” that the 
politicised discourse aims to counter are good examples of this dilemma. This representation 
is particularly present in the war on terrorism, which is often associated with the idea of a 
civilizational conflict. In contrast, the politicized discourse particularly fears the equation of 
terrorists and Muslims because it enlarges the group that could potentially identify themselves 
as terrorists. Public diplomacy is, according to this approach, designated to target the demand-
side of terrorism, which is ordinary people’s inclination to sympathize with terrorist groups in 
an alliance against the US. Public diplomacy officials associated with the SD actively try to 
challenge the representation of a conflict or clash of civilisations.  
 The SVI campaign is an example of the difficulties of engaging in this debate. It is 
based on the politicized discourse’s representation of anti-Americanism as a threat to 
American soft power, and its message to audiences in Muslim countries is that Americans and 
Muslims live in peaceful co-existence in the US. The SVI campaign is an effort to engage in 
dialogue with Muslims about the nature of the relationship between Americans and Muslims. 
The analysis shows that the campaign actively engages in dialogue with an idea perceived as 
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dominating in Muslim countries: that Muslims in the US are either assimilated or excluded. In 
response to this idea, the campaign reconstructs the geopolitical identities as representing a 
relation of alliances. The problem with this “counter clash” thesis is that it has contradictory 
elements. On the one hand, it defines the ‘Muslim’ in exclusive distinction to the ‘American’, 
and constructs the relation as one of alliance. On the other hand, the SVI’s maintenance that 
Muslims have some kind of collective guilt for the terrorist attacks on 9/11 suggests the 
external threat as not being an ally with the US. All the attempts to construct the identity of 
Muslims in the US in a way presumably appealing to Muslims end up with giving the moral 
superiority to the US. That being said, such a reading of the film spots requires the approach 
of a devil’s advocate. But this warning is necessary in the discursive climate of the war on 
terrorism, where well-intended public diplomacy campaigns easily can be undermined by 
other actions, including conflicting public diplomacy practices.  
 Because securitized, politicized and marketized discourses all contribute to the total 
production of public diplomacy, their contradictory means and messages contribute to 
producing each other’s discursive context, or Storyrealm, wherein the message is consumed. 
In that sense, the manifestation of the geopolitical rationale is intimately related to the output 
of the discursive struggle. In addition to producing contradictory messages, the output relates 
to the shifting of tasks between institutions and discursive change.   
 In the PDWTE order of discourse, three different processes are occurring 
simultaneously, called securitization, politicization and marketization. Securitization is the 
most obvious process. The discursive struggle about the geopolitical situation has manifested 
in a shift of resource allocations and tasks for public diplomacy from the SD to the DoD. 
Since 9/11, the DoD involvement in public diplomacy has developed from merely supporting 
some of the SD initiatives to becoming an independent perpetrator with an institutionalised 
coordination unit. Simultaneously, there has been a steady shift of public diplomacy tasks 
from the SD to the DoD. The SD active contribution to this process witnesses a manifestation 
of the securitized geopolitical vision of anti-Americanism also in the SD. At the same time, 
the private sector is increasingly encouraged to engage in public diplomacy activities, 
producing a marketized discourse. Simultaneously, through the shifting of tasks, the SD 
discourse has defined its approach in negation to the securitized and marketized discourses 
and cultivated a soft power approach to public diplomacy. This double-edged process has 
caused much confusion among outsiders about the purpose of public diplomacy. However, 
this confusion should be recognised, as the geopolitical rationale of public diplomacy is 
inherently contradictory. 
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APPENDIX I: LIST OF INFORMANTS 
 
Public diplomacy perpetrators 
 
Alan Kotok, interview 16 February 2007  
Alan Kotok is a former USIA employee and managing editor of science magazine and the 
editor of USIA Alumni Association’s webpage publicdiplomacy.org. 
 
Alberto Fernandez, interview 28 February 2007 
Alberto M. Fernandez was Director for Public Diplomacy for the Bureau of Near Eastern 
Affairs in the US State Department between July 2005 and June 2007. As a career Foreign 
Service Officer, he served in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2003, and has previously served 
in Jordan, Guatemala, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and the United 
Arab Emirates. He speaks Arabic. 
 
Bruce Gregory, interview 2 March 2007 
Bruce Gregory is director of the Public Diplomacy Institute at The George Washington 
University. He was a member of the Defense Science Board’s 2004 Study Task Force on 
Strategic Communication, the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on Public Diplomacy, 
the Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs, and the Public Diplomacy Council. He has served 
as coordinator on the Department of State's Response to Terrorism Coalition Working Group 
on Public Diplomacy and as the State Department executive secretary on the Defense Science 
Board's 2001 Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination.  
 
Richard Schmierer, interview 1 March 2007  
Richard Schmierer is a State Department Foreign Service Officer. He served at the 
headquarters of the U.S. Information Agency between 1988 and1992, first as the head of the 
Middle East office of the International Visitor Program, and later in the Agency’s Office of 
European Affairs. Between 2004 and 2005 he served as Embassy Counsellor for Public 
Affairs in Baghdad, Iraq. He joined the staff of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy in 
Washington D.C. in August 2005. 
 
William A. Rugh, interview 26 February 2007 
William A. Rugh was a US Foreign Service Officer 1964-1995, serving in Washington and at 
seven Middle Eastern diplomatic posts including public affairs officer in Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt. He is currently an Associate of Georgetown's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, an 
Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute, a Trustee of the American University in Cairo, 
and a Board Member at AMIDEAST. Rugh is the author of Arab Mass Media (2004) and 
American Encounters with Arabs (2006).  
 
David Henry and Petter Næss, interview 14 January 2007 
David Henry and Petter Næss work for the American Embassy of Norway. David Henry is a 
Political Economic Officer and covers environment, agriculture, fishery and public outreach. 
Petter Næss has worked at the embassy and the US Information Service for a total of 20 years.   
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Sideline Critics  
 
Barry Zorthian, interview 27 February 2007 
Barry Zorthian is a retired Foreign Service Officer who has worked for Voice of America, for 
the US Information Services and for the private sector with broadcasting. He was also 
responsible for media relations during the Vietnam War.  
Today, he is a sideline critic of public diplomacy.  
 
John H. Brown, interview 23 February 2007 
John H Brown is a former Foreign Service Officer who resigned his post when the war in Iraq 
was launched, because he feared it would have negative consequences for public diplomacy. 
He currently teaches courses in public diplomacy at Georgetown University and University of 
Southern California, and is an active blogger on the subject. 
 
Principal Critics  
 
Chris Toensing, interview 26 February 2007 
Chris Toensing is the editor of Middle East report by the organisation Middle East Research 
and Information Project (MERIP). He has written critical articles about public diplomacy, 
such as ”Never too soon to say goodbye to HI”. 
 
John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, interview 12 February 2007 
John Stauber is the founder of the non-profit, non-partisan Center for Media & Democracy 
(CMD) and its newsmagazine PR Watch in Madison, Wisconsin. Sheldon Rampton is the 
research director of CMD. Together, they have written the books Weapons of Mass Deception 
(2003), The best war ever (2006), Toxic sludge is good for you (2004) and Banana 
Republicans (2004). Their approach to public diplomacy and propaganda is critical analysis 
and activism. 
 
Lauren Miller, interview 12 February 2007 
Lauren Miller worked for the Center for Media and Democracy from 2000-2006 as the editor 
for PR Watch, and wrote a chapter on public diplomacy in Toxic sludge is good for you 
(2004) by Rampton & Stauber. Now she is working for the listener sponsored community 
radio WORT in Madison, Wisconsin. 
 
Nancy Snow, telephone interview 8 March 2007  
Nancy Snow is a communications scholar at University of Southern California. She is a 
previous USIA employee and has written critical books and articles about public diplomacy, 
such as Propaganda, Inc. (2002) and Information War (2003).  
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APPENDIX II: PROJECT PROPOSAL FOR INTERVIEWEES 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO 
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Department for sociology and  
human geography 
 
 
Project proposal of Master’s thesis 
Anja Sletteland  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marketing democracy: 
American public diplomacy for the prevention of Arab and Muslim hostility  
 
The USA’s declining popularity in the Arab and Muslim world is often understood as a threat 
to American security. After September 11, 2001, a range of efforts have been made to 
persuade potentially hostile Muslims and Arabs that the USA is not waging war on Islam, but 
on terrorism. This “war of ideas”, as it is called, construes a positive image of the USA 
directed to the target audience of popular culture. In the war against terrorism, there is an 
increasing demand for extended use of ‘soft power’ like dialogue and persuasion instead of 
military attacks. Still, the strategy of using public diplomacy remains controversial. Many 
efforts to win hearts and minds have been ridiculed in the international press and claimed to 
have contributed to the growing anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim world. This 
controversy has put the public diplomacy strategy against terrorism in the contradictory 
position of necessity and impossibility. The purpose of the master’s thesis is to explore the 
discourses of American anti-terrorism public diplomacy. 
 
I will analyse the discourses of public diplomacy on two levels. Firstly, I will analyse how 
public diplomacy professionals construct, and try to convey to the Arab and Muslim world, an 
alternative relationship between the US and its opponents. The intention of this re-mapping of 
identities and interests is to counter anti-American sentiment and shift the focus to shared 
values and interests. Secondly, I will analyse the discourse about American anti-terrorism 
public diplomacy, in other words, the debates on the subject. This debate is nuanced and 
structured by a range of arguments. I want to examine the status of different arguments in the 
development of public diplomacy strategies. What I want to find out in the master’s thesis are 
three things: Firstly, how different public diplomacy efforts explain the USA’s role in the 
world; secondly, why American anti-terrorism public diplomacy is so controversial, and 
thirdly, how the controversy contributes to the development of the concept. 
 
The empirical work will be carried out by discourse analysis and interviews. To assess the 
discursive practice, I will analyse some of the efforts launched as public diplomacy since 
September 11, 2001. Amongst these are the advertisement campaign Shared Values Initiative 
from 2002. I also hope to get access to newer campaigns launched by Under Secretary of 
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State for public diplomacy and public affairs Karen Hughes, which claim to emphasize the 
dialogical aspect of public diplomacy. I will analyse how these campaigns represent USA and 
American values. To analyse the controversy of the concept, I will interview perpetrators and 
critics of public diplomacy. The interview material will reveal the variety of arguments 
structuring the discourse, how public diplomacy professionals perceive their own practice and 
how they relate to the controversy of the subject. Further, I will analyse how ideas about 
public diplomacy are caught up by political practice. 
 
I will interview persons who have been involved in the discourse about public diplomacy 
since September 11, 2001. This period has been characterised by intense debate and many 
shifts. Many critics relate to public diplomacy as if critical voices are completely neglected by 
the State Department and public diplomacy professionals. My impression is that this is far 
from the truth, and I would like to assess the effect of the criticism for the development of 
public diplomacy strategies. Therefore, I would like to interview critics as well as perpetrators 
of public diplomacy.  
 
What I would like to find out with the interviews, is indicated by the following questions: 
 
1. A recurring motto of American public diplomacy is “telling our story”. What is this 
story about? 
2. How can public diplomacy contribute to American security in the war on terror?  
3. Which role do the critics play in the development of public diplomacy strategies? 
 
The ambition of the master’s thesis is to provide knowledge about the diverging opinions on 
the subject of public diplomacy. This knowledge could contribute to more considerate 
strategies of public diplomacy in the future, for a more humane and enduring war against 
terrorism. 
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APPENDIX III 
Transcript of the Shared Values Initiative televisions spots 
 
This appendix contains a transcription of the SVI television campaign, copied from Fullerton 
and Kendricks’ book Advertising’s War on Terrorism: The Story of the US State Department 
Shared Values Initiative (2006). To view the actual spots, visit http://www.osu-
tulsa.okstate.edu/sharedvalues/.  
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Film Spot 1: Baker 
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Film spot 1: Baker (Continued) 
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Film Spot 1: Baker (Continued) 
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Film Spot 2: Doctor 
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Film Spot 2: Doctor  (Continued) 
 
 
 
 113 
Film Spot 3: Teacher 
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Film Spot 3: Teacher (Continued) 
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Film Spot 4: Journalist 
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Film Spot 4: Journalist (Continued) 
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Film Spot 5: Fire fighter 
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Film Spot 5: Fire fighter (continued) 
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